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South African educational policy after 1994, and in particular, the current Curriculum and 
Assessment Policy Statement (CAPS), express a very ambitious and wide range of aims and 
goals, with some relating to education for economic progress, and others relating to education 
pertaining to human rights, responsible and ‘good’ citizenship, and social justice – what might 
be termed ‘values education’. Of concern is the realisation that CAPS is unaware of and 
negligent about its strong neoliberal leanings – that is, it emphasises skills-oriented education, 
which stifles the implementation of values education. What follows is a report on a conceptual 
study of how neoliberalism, as espoused by CAPS, influences the ethical adeptness and 
enthusiasm of individuals and their ability to maintain a healthy relationality with the ‘other’. It 
was found that neoliberalism leads to exclusionary identity formation, hyper-individuality and 
the avoidance of ethical responsibilities. As a response, I argue for a consideration of 
contemplative education, underscored by an ethics of care (both of which contain values like 
empathy, compassion and responsibility). In this regard, the study challenges the neoliberal 
tone of CAPS and makes suggestions for new roadmaps unto values education. Bringing 
contemplative education to stand against neoliberalism in the South African context 
represents a new area of study, and I make recommendations for further research.   
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background  
The post-apartheid education policy milieu of South Africa is tumultuous, demonstrating 
considerable reform in order to move away from the oppressive educational systems of 
apartheid South Africa. Some of the post-apartheid policies include the White Paper on 
Education and Training (Department of Education [DoE], 1995), the National Education Policy 
Act, No. 27 of 1996 (Republic of South Africa [RSA], 1996a), the RNCS (DoE, 2002a; 2002b) 
and the current national Curriculum and Assessment Policy Statement (CAPS) (DoE, 2011d). 
Upon analysing the above policies, it becomes clear that there is a wide range of expected 
goals. Some sets of goals (as included in the aforementioned policies) relate to economic 
progress, and are aimed at ensuring that learners acquire all the necessary skills to be self-
actualised and contributing members of the South African economy (DoE, 1995; 1996; 1997; 
2002b; 2011d; 2011b). Other sets of goals within the same policy documents relate to ethical 
matters, such as becoming a ‘good’ citizen, enacting social justice, caring for one’s fellow 
human beings, and acting responsibly towards the environment, to name but a few (DoE, 
2000; 2001; 2002b; 2011c; RSA, 1996a; 1996b). Certain school subjects, such as Life 
Orientation, have a particular interest in such ethical ambitions as encapsulated in the second 
set of goals mentioned above.  
One of the questions, which arises from studying these policies, is whether the first set of 
policy goals (related to economic progress) might create tensions for the second set of policy 
goals (related to values education). Here enters the reason for the study and this thesis, which 
reflects an analysis of such tensions. The economic goals within these policy documents are 
suspected to operate under the ideology of neoliberalism. There is certainly nothing wrong 
with a country having economic aspirations and expressing them through their education 
policy, but when such aims are coated in and driven by a certain ideology, such as 
neoliberalism, there are many other consequences, beyond the realm of economic progress. 
Neoliberalism creates a certain mentality and atmosphere that moves beyond mere 
economics, and can come to influence areas, such as ethics and values education. Therefore, 
I turn to the not-too-well-known contemplative education, as a field that can be introduced to 
overcome some of the tension that might arise between neoliberalism and core ethical values. 
Contemplative education provides a way for permeating the entirety of an educational context 
with ethical values, such as compassion, empathy and responsibility (Barbezat & Bush, 2013; 
Pulkki, Saari & Dahlin, 2015). It operates by directly counteracting each of the ways in which 




research has yet been conducted regarding the effect of neoliberalism on values education in 
South Africa, nor regarding contemplative education in South Africa (most of the recent 
developments in the field of contemplative education have taken place in the United States of 
America). 
 
1.2 Research motivations 
Having spent nineteen years in different South African educational systems (among these, a 
public primary school, a public high school and a public university), as well as being actively 
involved with public university students and learning of their struggles by means of a particular 
university society over the last nine years, I am filled with an ever-growing worry about the 
absence of values education in such institutions. I am reminded of the plethora of times when 
teachers warned me of how tough the job market is, and so my instrumental approach to my 
education was formed. It is the same for millions of others in South Africa, and I shudder to 
think of the effects this has on the country and on the prospect of good citizenship.  
Some might argue that the responsibility of values education lies with parents and other 
personal caretakers. However, if children and young adults spend a considerable part of their 
formative years within the walls of educational institutions, is it not, in the very least, worth 
investigating why values education is almost entirely absent from curriculums or why there is 
a strong disconnect between its presence in policy versus its presence in reality? This 
preoccupation with economic skills and training within education has led me to consider to 
what extent there exists a naivety within the policy documents, such as the CAPS, and those 
crucial in the formation of CAPS. I am driven to consider the gaps that lie at the heart of such 
policy, making it difficult for ethical values and values education to truly flourish. It is here that 
I came upon the field of contemplative education (Barbezat & Bush, 2013; Forbes, 2016; 
Komjathy, 2017; Pulkki, Saari & Dahlin, 2015; Roeser & Peck, 2009; Zajonc, 2006), which is 
as old as education itself; yet, only resurging recently within modern education.  
Contemplative education seems to represent everything that is remedial to neoliberalism and 
its effects on education. Furthermore, contemplative education could act effortlessly as a 
complementary element in education, meaning that it does not have to, in any way, threaten 
or lessen the economic and skills-oriented education of the modern, globalised world. 
Deepening environmental degradation and social inequalities are the realities of the 
contemporary world, and I feel that our ability to overcome such challenges is directly related 
to the introduction of progressive modes of values education. This holds for the world at large, 
and for the specific South African context. It is certainly true that economic growth can help to 




compensating for the innumerable hidden costs of today’s way of life (Araghi, 2009; von 
Weizsacker, 2018). Consequently, I am interested in an exploration of the role which 
contemplative education could play in fostering a passion and desire for active participation in 
social justice. A contemplative dimension to education can permeate the curriculum and evoke 
qualities of contemplation, self-discipline, introspection, empathy, compassion, and 
responsibility, which are prerequisites for being a significant participant in social justice and 
ethical modes of being (Barbezat & Bush, 2013; Gilligan, 1977; Forbes, 2016; Komjathy, 2017; 
Noddings, 2002a; 2002b; 2005; 2013; Pulkki, Saari & Dahlin, 2015; Roeser & Peck, 2009; 
Slote, 2001; 2007; 2016; Zajonc, 2006).  
South African education policy reflects the aspirations of a fresh and enthusiastic democracy 
(see, for instance, DoE, 1995; RSA, 1996c), and it is my sincere desire that such aspirations 
might come to fruition. However, it is necessary for policymakers to reflect on whether or not 
there is enough attention and care being directed at those policy aims that relate to good 
citizenship and ethical and moral conduct, which lie beyond the dimensions of economic 
prosperity.  
 
1.3 Problem statement 
One of the goals of the South African educational system is to cultivate citizens who are 
concerned with issues of social justice and ethical and moral conduct (DoE, 2000; 2001; 
2002b; 2011d; RSA, 1996a; 1996b). Furthermore, Life Orientation as a school subject is a 
well-suited medium for this task (Rooth, 2005) and places more emphasis on such issues, 
compared to other subjects. However, schools are under pressure to fulfil economic goals, 
and neoliberal motivations leave very little room for education for social justice or values 
education (Hyslop-Margison & Ramirez, 2016). The neoliberal mood that permeates most of 
the world’s educational systems, including that of South Africa (Giroux & Giroux, 2004; Hill, 
2003; Hill & Kumar, 2009; Olssen & Peters, 2005; Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004), breeds an 
every-man-for-himself mentality within learners (Clarke, 2005; Newson, 2004). Even Life 
Orientation is not exempt from this neoliberal obsession with preparing learners for the 
economic world (Rooth, 2005). It seems there is a great need for a mode of education that 
can directly counter the neoliberal mood of self-interest, isolation and an instrumental 
approach to education, and which can revivify the presence of values education within the 







1.4 Research questions 
The main research question is: 
Can contemplative education respond to the tension between neoliberalism and values 
education in the Curriculum and Assessment Policy Statement (CAPS)? 
The sub-questions serve to elaborate upon the main research question. There are many 
philosophical and conceptual elements tied up in the main research question, and the sub-
questions represent the further investigation of these different elements. The sub-questions 
are as follows: 
• What are the inherent values contained in the Curriculum and Assessment Policy 
Statement?  
• How might neoliberalism undermine ethical values? 
• What are the inherent values of contemplative education? 
• How can the values cultivated by contemplative education counteract a neoliberal 
mentality? 
• What might contemplative education contribute to the values education goals of the 
Curriculum and Assessment Policy Statement and the policies that informed it? 
Furthermore, the research questions aimed to query the assumptions held within various fields 
and the accompanying literature. For example, when thinking of neoliberalism, I interpret it as 
an ideology, meaning that there are deep-seated assumptions and beliefs tied to it. My 
research questions represented the desire to explore the problem statement at a very 
foundational level and to formulate new assumptions and new theories or ways of wrestling 
with a problem. This is in line with the suggestions of Alvesson and Sandberg (2011), who 
argue that research questions that aim at an investigation of assumptions can provide a much 
more potent study than research questions that focus only on addressing gaps in existing 
literature and theories. My research questions also challenged the assumption that current 
attempts at values education are successful. 
As this study involved ethics and values, and investigated such topics by looking at the 
relational and the social interactions between the members within a society, I also drew 
inspiration from qualitative researchers, who are always interested in the motivations and 
beliefs held by people. Such researchers (see, for instance, Agee, 2009: 434) argue for 
research questions that “invite a process of exploration”, as opposed to questions that can 
simply be answered by a ‘yes’ or a ‘no’. The five sub-questions all start with ‘what’ or ‘how’ 




1.5 Purpose statement 
If we want to make certain that we educate good citizens, then it is becoming increasingly 
clear that there are limits to the near-exclusive focus on skill-oriented education meant to help 
the individual find their place in the workforce. I am of the opinion that, in our modern 
educational system, with its neoliberal undertones, there is too little room left for progressive 
values education. There is a popularized assumption that the overdriven focus on economic 
development will act as a panacea which will relieve many social issues, but the deepening of 
environmental degradation and social inequalities paints a different scenario. It is certainly 
true that economic growth can help to push technological advances and other progressions, 
but this does not come close to compensating for the innumerable hidden costs of today’s way 
of life. Consequently, the author is interested in an exploration of the role which contemplative 
education can play in fostering a passion and desire for active participation in values education 
and a development of an involved relationality and sympathy with the ‘other’. A contemplative 
dimension to education can permeate the curriculum and evoke qualities of contemplation, 
self-discipline, responsibility, and compassion, which would form a broadminded version of 
values education much needed in the current century. 
I aim to: 
• Investigate the neoliberal elements within CAPS 
• Find a moral framework to counteract neoliberalism within the empathetic and 
relational realm of care ethics 
• See if contemplative education can represent a lived and realized incarnation of such 
a relational moral framework  
 
1.6 Methodology 
The following section gives an overview of the research methodology utilised for this study. 
 
1.6.1 Research design 
Since there is no abundance of research on the effects of neoliberalism on values education, 
or of contemplative education on learners’ sense of ethics, I employed an exploratory design. 
This design makes it possible for one to clarify existing concepts and to gain a clear picture of 
a progressive area of investigation (Christoph, 2010). However, this approach can prove to be 
unstructured, and can place a limit on one’s findings. An exploratory design is unclear on 
which methods are to be used for investigation, since the best methods are yet to be 





Furthermore, the current study made use of a conceptual framework and conceptual design, 
and included a thorough analysis of policy and of various areas of academic literature in order 
to construct the conceptual framework.  
 
1.6.2 Research methods 
This thesis is a conceptual study, which made use of conceptual research, by looking, firstly, 
at various ideological narratives and how we uphold them through our daily lifestyles, habits 
and beliefs (neoliberalism), and, secondly, at philosophies, theories and schools of thought 
that can provide new lifestyles, habits and beliefs (contemplative education). This approach 
made sense, because large parts of the areas investigated were philosophically dense and 
highly theoretical. As Botes (2002: 23) explains, “concept analysis is associated with the 
research design of philosophical inquiry” and “the purpose of philosophical inquiry is to perform 
research using intellectual analysis to clarify meaning”. In other words, conceptual analysis 
and conceptual research are concerned with an intellectual exploration of different 
philosophical concepts and theoretical structures and the meanings they hold (Botes, 2002: 
23). Furthermore, because the study made use of various South African policy documents, 
and aimed to evaluate the values that are present within them, I made use of what is called 
“document analysis” (see Bowen, 2009) as a qualitative research method. Document analysis 
is efficient, inexpensive, stable, exact and readily available; however, it can, at times, provide 
insufficient detail and has to be combined with other research methods in order to answer a 
research question properly (Bowen, 2009).  
As this thesis progresses, each bit of conceptual research informs the chapters that follow. 
The study thus comprised an organic process of analysis and comparison of various 
theoretical frameworks to arrive at the most significant conceptual framework that might 
address the problem statement. I used different areas of literature to complement and build 
upon one another and, ultimately, the findings and conclusions are based on the overall 
narrative, which the literature created.  
Without a doubt, it is best to proceed with a conceptual study, as the nature of the thesis is 
such that many philosophical concepts need to be assessed. The golden thread that runs 
throughout the thesis is the concept of relationality – how one positions oneself towards and 
relates with others. The thesis can be explained as a way of looking at values education 
through the lens of relationality. I assess the relationality inherent in neoliberalism, in care 
ethics and in contemplative education. This involves breaking down the philosophical and 




of care ethics and the educational movement known as contemplative education. Each one of 
these has its own sense of relationality. Some approach it through economic obsession, hyper-
individuality, competitiveness etc. (neoliberalism). Some approach it through empathy, care, 
community, etc. (care ethics). Finally, contemplative education takes the approach of care 
ethics and runs even further with it by adding a more thorough lived and practiced dimension 
in the form of contemplative practices. These three schools of thought and the ways in which 
they form a type of relationality represent a massive collection of concepts and philosophical 
perspectives. Thus, a conceptual study is needed.    
 
1.7 Research context 
As the main research question indicates, this study explored issues related to South African 
education policy, and the research context was, therefore, the South African schools to which 
such policy documents relate. That being said, the previous section (1.5.2) indicated that this 
was a conceptual study, which employed conceptual research. This necessitated the 
exploration of contexts outside of South Africa, especially since such a large body of work 
relevant to the conceptual research has been generated in external contexts. However, since 
the research in question was of a conceptual nature, the external contexts became less 
problematic, as the findings took on a universal form, which is applicable to the South African 
context. Nevertheless, wherever possible, when discussing topics of a highly philosophical 
and conceptual nature, I have tried to include examples from literature that are directly related 
to the South African context.  
The chapters that deal with neoliberalism (Chapter 3) and with ethical values (Chapter 4) 
include sections that report on these topics in the South African context. Whenever this is 
done, it must be noted that it does not contribute as strongly to the conceptual research on a 
philosophical level as the sections that are based in external contexts. Ultimately, although 
there is much conceptual research that drew from literature from across the world, the current 
study aspired to contribute to the South African educational context and its policy. 
 
1.8 An outline of the chapters 
Chapter 1 provided a background to the thesis, and included my own motivations for 
undertaking this study. It also reflected a formal problem statement and discussed the main 
research question, the sub-questions, and the reasoning behind the form these sub-questions 
took on. Thereafter, I elucidated the methodology, focusing on the research design and the 




this a conceptual study with conceptual research. Finally, I explained the research context, 
making it clear that, despite strong conceptual themes, the study remained an investigation 
into South African education policy. 
Chapter 2 marks the beginning of the literature review, and includes a thorough exploration of 
the post-apartheid South African education policy (i.e. after 1994). It begins with a theoretical 
basis for understanding policy and a brief history of education in South Africa (before and after 
apartheid) before giving a detailed analysis of the different aims and goals of the post-
apartheid policy documents, culminating in the document that dictates the current curriculum, 
the CAPS. The chapter highlights the fact that there are both economic aims and values and 
aims and values relating to values education found within these documents. The chapter 
further starts to show a growing suspicion that policymakers might not be aware of how these 
different sets of aims might create tensions for one another – a suspicion bolstered by the fact 
that further policy documents were created specifically for values, a possible sign that there is 
a growing understanding that values education is not finding sufficient implementation. These 
value-oriented policy documents were also studied. The chapter ends with highlighting some 
of the disparities related to teaching values in the South African context. 
Chapter 3 is a literature review acting as an analysis and assessment of neoliberalism. It 
shows that neoliberalism is an ideology, and highlights some of its main supporters. 
Thereafter, I draw from the literature to show how neoliberalism has a significant influence on 
our ethical conduct through its influence on the identities we form and the way such identities 
change the ways in which we relate to one another. This involves an analysis of the hyper-
individualism and asocial relationality that neoliberalism proliferates. The chapter includes an 
analysis on the effects of neoliberalism on education and educational institutions, before 
ending with a look at what the literature reveals about neoliberalism and education in the South 
African context. 
Chapter 4 continues the literature review, and further reflects the starts of my analysis of the 
concept of ethical values. I chose to include a thorough study of care ethics, to act as a 
forerunner to my study of contemplative education. This decision was made because care 
ethics provides a philosophical understanding of ethics and values such as empathy, 
compassion and responsibility in relational terms (see Gilligan, 1977; Noddings, 2002a; 
2002b; 2005; 2013; Slote, 2001; 2007; 2016). Care ethics proposes that ethics is always 
relational. This is relevant because relationality is seen as an area strongly affected by 
neoliberalism. Care ethics becomes even more relevant when one considers that 
contemplative education also facilitates ethical values and values education by way of 
relationality. Care ethics and contemplative education are, thus, very similar, but care ethics 




modes of being (see Author, date). The chapter includes a study of responsibility (another 
important ethical value) from the viewpoint of relationality. Finally, it looks at the literature of 
South African authors concerning the difficulty experienced when the teaching of values 
struggles amidst the multicultural aspects of South Africa. 
Chapter 5 is the final part of the combined literature review, and entails a detailed analysis of 
contemplative education. It starts with a brief overview and history of the school, before 
entering into a deeper analysis of the contents thereof. The chapter points out to what extent 
contemplative education moves forward with the theme of relational ethics, transforming what 
was given by care ethics into newer and more concrete forms of ethical behaviour by way of 
practice and habit over and above mere theory. It is shown how the richly developed notion of 
compassion, as an ethical value, springs from a deep understanding of the 
interconnectedness of being. Thereafter, the chapter ends with a look at some areas of 
concern for the field of contemplative education. 
Chapter 6 is the concluding chapter. It gives a summary of the research findings, reflects upon 
the scholarly contributions of the study (in terms of South African education policy and the 
broader society), discusses the limitations of the study, and makes recommendations for 
further research.  
 
1.9 Summary 
This chapter served as an introduction to the study, and commenced with the sketching of the 
background. Various points added to the background for the study, such as a gap in policies, 
in the form of a naive unawareness of some of the tensions that exist between neoliberalism 
and values education, the ideology of neoliberalism itself, and, finally, contemplative education 
as a proposed solution for the difficulties faced by values education. Furthermore, the chapter 
highlighted my personal motivations for the study, presented the problem statement, the main 
research question and sub-questions, the methodology that was followed, and the research 
context, and, ended with an outline of what each coming chapter will contain and strive to 
achieve. The task that followed was to analyse the post-apartheid education policy documents 
in Chapter 2, to verify my assertions about the policy, before conducting a literature review, 
across Chapters 3, 4 and 5, in order to establish decent theoretical and conceptual frameworks 
for both an analysis and assessment of neoliberalism and an exposure of its effects on values 
education, and the construction of new, progressive approaches to values education, based 





CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW – POST-APARTHEID POLICY AND VALUES 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This study identified a significant problem within South African education policies. The main 
research question was: Can contemplative education respond to the tension between 
neoliberalism and values education in the Curriculum and Assessment Policy Statement 
(CAPS)? In other words, there is a tension or a shortcoming found within CAPS – namely that 
neoliberalism hampers the safeguarding of core values. The core values that I am referring to 
are those that relate to social justice, to empathy and responsibility, and to the general concern 
for one’s fellow human beings. Neoliberalism, this study argued, subverts such core values 
and preoccupies the citizen with a self-absorbed, overly economic outlook, which leaves no 
room for the pursuit of core ethical values.  
Therefore, I aimed to investigate the policy documents that arose from the post-apartheid 
South African landscape. This included not only the CAPS, but also the key policies, which 
led up to it. It behoved me to assess to what extent these documents attempt to strike an 
awkward balance between neoliberal goals and social justice-oriented ethical goals, which, 
respectively, pull the policies in opposite directions. However, it is of utmost importance that I 
make it clear that I am not against a country striving for economic progress. The extent to 
which this study was critical of neoliberalism was not criticism against economic aims, but 
criticism against the effect a neoliberal mentality has on ethical values, such as empathy, 
compassion and responsibility. This is a very important distinction. In other words, the 
contribution of this study is to remind one that education policy, which aims for a wide range 
of results, must be vigilant and form an understanding of how some of the moods and cultures 
created by the manner in which some of those ends are pursued might clash with the moods 
and cultures necessary for the pursuit of the other aims. Hence, neoliberalism might very well 
clash with the culture and values needed for the ethics of empathy, care, compassion and 
responsibility. This chapter reports on aims to identify the wide range of goals within the policy 
documents, and the extent to which the policymakers are aware of the potential tension 
between neoliberalism and core ethical values, as identified by the main research question. 
The first order of business was to give an overview of the research context. In other words, 
what were the conditions surrounding and leading up to the creation of CAPS? To understand 
this historical context, I begin by reporting briefly on the educational situation during apartheid. 
Thereafter, I provide an in-depth look at outcomes-based education (OBE) in order to 




After having given some attention to the South African historical context, section 2.3.1 reports 
on the values promoted by some key education policies of post-apartheid South Africa, such 
as the National Education Policy Act, No. 27 of 1996 (RSA, 1996a), the Revised National 
Curriculum Statement (RNCS) (DoE, 2002a; 2002b) and the CAPS (DoE, 2011d). This is 
where sub-question 1 of this thesis was investigated further: 
What are the inherent values contained in the Curriculum and Assessment Policy 
Statement?  
Thereafter, I report on three key documents specifically on values in education, namely – 
• Values, education and democracy: Report of the Working Group on Values in 
Education (DoE, 2000);  
• Manifesto on values, education, and democracy (DoE, 2001); and  
• Building a culture of responsibility and humanity in our schools: A guide for teachers 
(DoE, 2011a).  
It is also important to mention that, in my analysis of the different policy documents, the core 
values that they hold and advocate will come to the fore. Therefore, although my own deeper 
exposition on core values will follow in Chapter 3, it is inevitable that I will take a brief look at 
the values on which the said documents focus. 
 
2.2. An overview of the research context and policies 
Before looking at the different post-apartheid education policy documents, it is important to 
gain a good overview of both the research context as well as the concept of policy. 
 
2.2.1 A theoretical basis for understanding policy 
Before looking at the specific South African education policies, I wanted to get an idea of what 
policy is and what it ought to achieve. I turned to the work of Stephen Ball, who explains that 
education policy either “contributes to or interrupts processes of social reproduction” (Ball, 
2011:n.p.). Within this short phrase, there is a considerable amount to consider. It implies that, 
although policy is supposed to work towards the advancement of social justice, it can just as 
easily impede upon or hinder it. The words of Ball above serve as a further motivation (an 
endorsement, if you will) for the scepticism with which I already approached South African 
policy, as I noted that there were neoliberal tendencies, which stood against the social 
yearnings found in other parts of the policy documents.  
Above is a short discussion of what policy can and should bring about or which role it plays, 




definition in terms of “policy as text and policy as discourse” (Ball, 1993: 10). The key idea is 
that policies are not only objects, rigid and clearly defined as we would hope, but “also 
processes and outcomes” (Ball, 1993: 10).  
Ball (1993: 11) elaborates upon this idea when speaking of policy as text by asserting that 
policies are tied in with the real-world histories and trajectories of the policy writers, readers, 
and all who respond to it. What is more, the same inequalities that are felt between different 
classes of citizens, infiltrate the domain of policy, and lead to different levels of access to said 
policies (Ball, 1993: 12). From this inconsistency in terms of how policies are shaped and 
interacted with, one could glean that the true functioning of policy is not to provide exact and 
perfectly defined instructions, but rather to construct a perimeter or space within which one 
should try to limit or adjust one’s approach regarding the policy issues (Ball, 1993: 12). Policies 
can even exist in opposition to or cause tension for other policies (Ball, 1993: 13), and while 
Ball ascertains that it is one text that could contradict or counteract another text, this study 
found that such counter-productive tendencies could even exist within the same policy 
document (CAPS, in this case). As a final word on policy as text, Ball (1993: 13) wants one to 
realise that the ultimate outcomes or effects of policy are not something directly read off from 
a text, but they come about because of the interaction between different groups and their 
distinct desires and interests, as it all plays out within a real-world milieu. There is a strong 
limitation upon the power that a policy document wields, and it is almost as if it enters into pre-
established power dynamics (Ball, 1993: 13), joining an already existing game for which the 
rules have long since been drawn up.  
As for policy as discourse, Ball (1993: 14) wants one to take a step back and take up a vantage 
point from which one can see the broader narratives that shape not only the contents of a 
certain policy, but also the very voices and languages used to communicate the content. In 
other words, apart from looking at the details of a text, one must become aware of the 
discourses that control the limits of the possible contents and details thereof. He suggests that 
the very languages we speak work through us rather than us working through them (Ball, 
1993: 14). This reminds me of Jordan Peterson (2016:n.p.) who speaks about being 
“ideologically possessed”. Although Peterson speaks in most of his contexts about the idea of 
the dogmatic narratives that have entered universities, the main argument holds the same, 
whether it is in the academe or policymaking, our strings are often pulled by the ideologies 
and languages to which we ascribe – after all, the academe has a key role to play in much of 
the policy debates and formulations. Ball wants his readers to be aware that the dominant 
discourses, of which he specifically mentions neoliberalism (Ball, 1993: 15), limit our ability to 
create policies and to react and respond to policies in a truly objective and balanced manner 




Furthermore, Ball also proposes that education policy ideas, in our modern setting, flow quite 
easily between countries and groups and can be “identifiable as global educational policy” 
(Ball, 2011:n.p.).  
Vidovich (2007) expands upon the ideas of Ball and argues for a new understanding of policy 
where the classroom context is just as important and considered equally to the governmental 
aspects of policy. He aims to remove policy from the “pedestal”, the macro vantage point upon 
which it has long remained seated, and to redirect one’s attention to the micro elements 
(classroom contexts) (2007: 295). He argues that “hybridized [policy] models” offer the most 
accurate insights and can open up the door, through more active participation of all the 
different actors of all levels of educational policy, to a more democratic and empowering form 
of policy engagement (Vidovich, 2007: 295). Teachers, especially, can receive a renewed 
empowerment and step away from the “top down, state control” version of policy that is so 
common (Vidovich, 2007: 295). 
Now that I have given some attention to the work of Ball (1993; 2011) and Vidovich (2007), 
the reader is better equipped to understand the South African setting, the arena where policies 
are made and shaped. This analysis provides a theoretical structure through which the 
shortcomings of the policies under discussion are better appreciated and expected.  
 
2.2.2 A brief history of education in South Africa 
One must be aware of the specific historical context of education in South Africa. The country 
is not yet far into the post-apartheid era, with the legacy of apartheid still firmly felt. If we want 
to be able to make suggestions regarding issues of core values, assessing the past is 
valuable. As Badat and Sayed (2014: 128) say, “a critical analysis and understanding of the 
trajectory of post-apartheid South African education policy are important in the quest for a new 
educational order predicated on social justice” – and social justice, as shall be shown, is one 
of many core values, which are espoused by the different policy documents I studied. Of 
course, if one wants to understand the challenges faced by the current educational systems, 
history demands paying attention to apartheid-dictated policies and laws, which ensured the 
oppression and disenfranchisement of people who were not white.  
That legacy includes the questionable entities known as ‘Christian National Education’ (CNE) 
and ‘Bantu Education’. In short, CNE represented the white citizens’ desire, enacted through 
the state, for an educational system, which resonated not only with the religious sentiments of 
the white Afrikaner, but with many other facets of that white subculture (Van Eeden & 
Vermeulen, 2005: 179). Not only that, but as CNE moved towards a more secular version of 




This underlying narrative was incredibly disadvantageous, alienating and disrespectful 
towards the many other cultures that were existing and participating in this one-dimensional 
educational undercurrent (Van Eeden & Vermeulen, 2005: 180). However, CNE paved the 
way for Bantu Education (Hofmeyr, 2015: i), the next iteration of an oppressive educational 
system, which was even more openly discriminatory.  
As a brief but necessary piece of historical context, it is important to understand that for the 
entirety of the nineteenth century and almost half of the twentieth century, the education of 
black South Africans was undertaken and overseen by churches and missionaries initiatives 
(Hofmeyr, 2015: 7). However, when the National Party came to power in 1948, it was highly 
dissatisfied with the situation, where they had to help fund an education of blacks that was 
firmly in the hands of a set of liberal missionaries (Hofmeyr, 2015: 35). It set to work to instate 
the Bantu Education Act, No. 47 of 1953 (RSA, 1953), through which it forced Africans to study 
in a manner it saw as more closely aligned with their own culture (Van Eeden & Vermeulen, 
2005: 180). Little did the ruling white Afrikaners care how the black population felt. Black South 
Africans felt as if they were being cut off and excluded from a more modern educational format, 
which could help them with their struggle amidst an ever-growing and changing global 
economic system (Hofmeyr, 2015: 45). For the black population, education was supposed to 
help them cope with a system being imposed on them, an economic struggle within which their 
languages and uses would not mean much. It is not a conspiracy or unfounded speculation to 
claim that white Afrikaner power attempted to supress blacks through education. In the words 
of the then Minister of Native Affairs, Verwoerd (responsible for the education of black South 
Africans):  
I will reform [education] so that Natives will be taught from childhood that equality with 
Europeans is not for them … racial relations cannot improve if the wrong type of education is 
given to Natives. They cannot improve if the result of Native education is the creation of a 
frustrated people who … have expectations in life which circumstances in South Africa do not 
allow to be fulfilled (Verwoerd, 1953, cited in Reagan, 1987: 302).  
It is also important to note that the teachers who worked in the pre-Bantu Education Act 
schools were predominantly ascribing to an integrationist view of the world (see Christie & 
Collins, 1982: 60), meaning that they always encouraged their black learners to see 
themselves as having a fair place in the world, accompanied by fair and equal rights (see 
Christie & Collins, 1982: 60). Needless to say, this more uplifting scenario was completely 
undermined by the introduction of the Bantu Education Act (No. 47 of 1953) (Christie & Collins, 
1982: 60). With the coming of the Act, “the Nationalists are seen as emphasising an inferior 
and somewhat more ‘vocational’ education for the purpose of producing inferior non-




These developments were not only dehumanising and economically crippling for blacks in the 
long term by way of an inferior education, but logistical issues surfaced as well. Prior to the 
Bantu Education Act (No. 47 of 1953), the quality of education provided to black communities 
was much higher in terms of the financial and logistical resources made available compared 
to what was provided after the implementation of the act (Mokhaba, 2005: 76). This is because 
the government retracted large parts of its financial support for churches and other forms of 
missionary teachers who had previously taken charge of the education for black communities 
(Mokhaba, 2005: 27). Without the previous financial support that used to come streaming in 
from the government, the churches often shut down the schools they had been running 
(Mokhaba, 2005: 27). There was a decline in the money allocated to education for blacks, 
which led to dire and regressive circumstances, such as fewer available teachers and an 
increase in the number of black learners per classroom (Mokhaba, 2005: 28). 
With the end of apartheid, there was a great hope that these oppressive structures could be 
disassembled and transformed. The period immediately after 1994 was filled with high 
expectations for the social and economic progress of the country in general, which translated 
and still translates strongly into high expectations for educational reform. There has been a 
“wide array of ‘transformation’-oriented initiatives” (Badat & Sayed, 2014: 128). When the 
government of the new South Africa finally had an opportunity to rectify this imbalance, they 
wasted no time. 
 
2.2.3 The first changes 
One of the first major developments was the White Paper on Education and Training (No. 196 
of 1995) (DoE, 1995). It was one of the first foundational changes to the national curriculum, 
helping to start the move in a democratic direction. The document made an effort to study the 
new South African constitution and the way it relates to education, especially when it comes 
to fundamental human rights (DoE, 1995). The White Paper showed a considerable level of 
ambition, in expressing the desire for free and compulsory education to all (DoE, 1995: 73), 
and focused on integrating “education” and “training”, the latter referring to more technical 
skills and physical work (DoE, 1995: 15). The division that had previously existed between 
“education” and “training” within the apartheid system served to perpetuate economic and 
social inequalities set up along racial lines, and the above White Paper on Education and 
Training made it clear that it wished to address this issue and develop the field of “training” so 
as not to be a storehouse of underpaid and exploited labourers (DoE, 1995: 15:n.p.).  
In 1996, the Department of Education released a report of the ministerial committee, which 




abolition of the elements of the old curriculum, which were most discriminatory, out-dated and 
exclusionary (Jansen, 1998: 321). Thereafter, one saw the full-fledged employment of OBE.  
 
2.2.4 Outcomes-based education (OBE) 
OBE – which originated through what was termed ‘Curriculum 2005’ (C2005) (DoE, 1997) – 
was chosen in large part for its philosophical and not its curricular elements. Specifically, it 
was chosen for its easy integration with democratic philosophy, as it seemed to fit the desire 
for a democratic sentiment perfectly. It placed great emphasis on learner-centred classroom 
experiences, as opposed to teacher-centred ones (Chisholm, 2003; Mokhaba, 2005: 28), and 
the proponents of OBE remained vocal about its ability to grant freedom to the learner in the 
educational environment. The OBE movement is linked to William Spady (1994). In Spady’s 
works, one finds a clear indication of a call for a more free and flexible classroom environment. 
He analysed and assessed the traditional approach to education (Spady, 1994), indicating 
that it is rigid and not accommodating of the differences in learning abilities of individual 
learners. Furthermore, he argues that there is not much scope for communal or interactive 
education in such traditional forms of education (Spady, 1994). Spady (1994: 9) subsequently 
outlined the two main purposes of OBE: 
• ensuring that all learners are equipped with the knowledge, competence and qualities 
needed to be successful after they exit their educational system; and 
• structuring and operating schools so that those outcomes can be achieved and 
maximised for all learners.  
However, to what extent does the kind of post-education success mentioned in the first of the 
two purposes above gravitate towards an exclusively economic version of success? These 
are the types of ambiguous elements of South African education policy against which the 
current study cautions. As I attempted to show in the next chapter on neoliberalism (see 3.3.1), 
it seems to be the case that success is defined in very hyper-individualist terms, putting strain 
on ethical goals. Killen (1999: 4–5) takes the above purposes outlined by Spady (1994) and 
infers from them the following set of philosophical assumptions underlying OBE: 
• all learners are talented, and it is the duty of schools to develop their talents; 
• the role of schools is to find ways for learners to succeed, rather than finding ways for 
learners to fail; 
• mutual trust drives all good outcomes-based schools; 
• excellence is for every learner and not only for a limited number; 
• by preparing learners daily for success the following day, the need for corrective 




• learners collaborate in learning, rather than competing with each other; 
• as far as possible, no learner is excluded from an activity in a school; and 
• a positive attitude is essential. 
Beyond the democratic semblances in OBE, it is also popularly known for its focus on the 
outcomes of education, as opposed to merely the content (Spady, 1994). In Spady’s (1994: 
1) own words, it means “clearly focusing and organizing everything in an educational system 
around what is essential for all students to be able to do successfully at the end of their learning 
experiences”. Others, however, are quick to point out that there were numerous examples of 
innovative teachers in the older South Africa (Van der Horst & McDonald, 1997: 27) and that 
the concept of OBE is not a new one at all (Kudlas, 1994: 32).  
For the purpose of sketching the research context, it is highly relevant to study those questions 
raised in response to OBE, which offer a deeper analysis of its political appeal. Many writers 
noticed that this philosophical contact point OBE has with democracy came to be used as a 
political tool (Chisholm & Leyendecker, 2008; Jansen, 1998; Van der Horst & McDonald, 
1997). Van der Horst and McDonald (1997: 6) make it clear that OBE is often used by 
policymakers and politicians when there is a need for large-scale educational reformations 
during a period of political reform. Chisholm and Leyendecker (2008: 196) argue that the 
learner-centeredness of OBE found clear resonance with “local histories of resistance to 
colonialism”. Furthermore, OBE was “ambiguous enough” to be seen as a medium for, not 
educational, but social, political and economic reform (Chisholm & Leyendecker, 2008: 196). 
One of their main arguments is that “reforms have focused less on what is feasible in contexts 
of implementation than on the economic, social and political goals to be achieved” (Chisholm 
& Leyendecker, 2008: 196). The authors provide an analysis on the various actors converging 
to influence the country in such an economic, social and political way. Four main 
“developments” have been identified:  
[G]lobalisation, the changed focus of international aid agencies toward development 
assistance, the adaptation of sub-Saharan African countries to the new world order with its new 
political emphases, and the spilling over of new pedagogical ideas from the USA and Europe 
into sub-Saharan Africa (Chisholm & Leyendecker, 2008: 198).  
Furthermore, the child-centred approach to education had been pushed for many years, even 
in the apartheid years, by UNICEF, UNESCO, donor agencies and international non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) (Chisholm & Leyendecker, 2008: 198). Of course, these 
actors were not directly involved in the educational system of the apartheid government, which 
was most definitely not child-centred (see Naicker, 2000), but their peripheral influence was 
simmering along and gaining traction. The Jomtien World Declaration on Education for All 




social, political and economic upliftment. Additionally, South African liberation movements 
found inspiration for alternative education in neighbouring countries (Chisholm & 
Leyendecker, 2008: 199). These early educational ideas were thus formed in situations where 
“strands of Africanism, social-democratic and various forms of Marxist socialism, and non-
racialism” were all strewn together (Morrow, Maaba & Pulumani, 2002, cited in Chisholm & 
Leyendecker, 2008: 200). When it was finally becoming clear that apartheid might be 
overthrown, in the time close to the 1994 elections – 
Close links between the trade union movement, COSATU [Congress of South African Trade 
Unions], the National Training Board and individual curriculum developers in the run-up to 
elections in 1994 ensured that a mix of ideas linked to integration, competency and outcomes-
based education were adopted from Australia and translated into the schooling terrain 
(Chisholm & Leyendecker, 2008: 201).  
These various historical points made by Chisholm and Leyendecker make it clear that the 
decision to implement OBE was, to an extreme extent, politically driven.  
Jansen (1998: 321), when speaking of OBE, describes it as “primarily a political response to 
apartheid schooling, rather than one which is concerned with the modalities of change at the 
classroom level”. He argues that many of these early post-apartheid reformatory policies 
served as mere political symbolism, rather than having any serious implementation to show. 
Such early policies, such as C2005, were used by an insecure state as a mechanism for 
ensuring legitimacy (Jansen, 1998: 330). “[T]he national syllabus revision process (1995) was 
driven almost exclusively by official attempts to demonstrate to constituencies that at least 
some action was forthcoming from the Ministry of Education in the period immediately 
following the elections” (Jansen, 1998: 330). When any kind of implementation was to be 
noted, it “was not an advanced planning tool, but something improvised even as policy was 
being introduced to teachers” (Jansen, 1998: 203). 
Perhaps it was this preoccupation and fixation with political ends that led to various problems 
– hence, criticisms and revision were to follow. 
 
2.2.5 Criticisms and revisions 
Not long after the implementation of OBE did the criticisms and subsequent revisions pour in 
(Chisholm, 2005a). Not only the curriculum, but also the National Qualifications Framework 
(NQF) of South Africa was criticised and revised (Chisholm & Leyendecker, 2008, p. 201). In 
A South African curriculum for the twenty first century (Chisholm et al., 2005) provided some 
possible reasons for the failure of the first stages of attempted curriculum change and 




• skewed curriculum structure and design; 
• lack of alignment between curriculum and assessment policy; 
• inadequate orientation, training and development of teachers; 
• learning support materials that are variable in quality, often unavailable and not 
sufficiently used in classrooms; 
• policy overload and limited transfer of learning into classrooms; 
• shortages of personnel and resources to implement and support C2005; and 
• inadequate recognition of curriculum as the core business of education departments. 
It has also been argued that there was considerable confusion about the meanings of some 
of the key terms as well as what was meant by certain stated goals and ambitions (Chisholm 
& Leyendecker, 2008: 202). Eventually, it was the historically white and advantaged schools, 
which needed the changes the least, which adopted OBE the easiest, whereas black schools, 
in dire need of such changes, struggled with the implementation (Chisholm & Leyendecker, 
2008: 202).  
Jansen (1998: 323–329) provided a thorough set of criticisms – a list of ten causes of failure 
within OBE.  
• The language used to communicate the OBE system was overly complex and 
confusing (Jansen, 1998: 323).  
• There were premature presuppositions regarding a connection between OBE and the 
broader society, in terms of its ability to influence the economy positively (Jansen, 
1998: 323).  
• OBE and its advocates were rather naive about the classroom situations and 
competence of the available teachers (Jansen, 1998: 325).  
• OBE was instrumentalist in its philosophy, which was in stark opposition to how 
knowledge is garnered in some disciplines and subjects (Jansen, 1998: 326).  
• OBE is against the proclaimed political ideals of the ANC (African National Congress), 
because “there is something fundamentally questionable about a focus on ends as 
final outcomes when much of the educational and political struggle of the 1980s valued 
the processes of learning and teaching as ends in themselves” (Jansen, 1998: 327).  
• The instrumentalist approach of OBE left much to be desired in terms of the discussion 
surrounding values in education (Jansen, 1998: 327);  
• Studies have shown that OBE placed much administrative pressure on teachers 
(Jansen, 1998: 328).  
• OBE belittles curriculum content, and there is the threat of “serious losses with respect 




simultaneously engaging with the historicity of such concepts and ideals in the context 
of apartheid South Africa” (Jansen, 1998: 328). Furthermore, OBE can appear to be 
so narrow in its approach to curriculum content, that it underestimates the “cross-
curricular and inter-disciplinary demands encountered in learning a complex task” 
(Jansen, 1998: 328).  
• OBE requires drastic improvements in terms of teachers, assessment methods and 
strategies, management, learning resources and more – and all such improvements 
must converge for OBE to be successful (Jansen, 1998: 328). In Jansen’s own words, 
“an entire re-engineering of the education system is required to support the innovation” 
(Jansen, 1998: 328).  
• OBE was not able to inspire the overhaul in assessment that it needs in order to 
function properly, the proof being “the powerful interests insisting on the assessment 
status quo with respect to the matriculation examination” (Jansen, 1998: 329). 
When giving their opinions on the arguably failed educational reforms in post-apartheid South 
Africa, Cross, Mungadi and Rouhani (2002) write about the large gap between lofty ideas and 
ideals, on the one hand, and practicality and implementation, on the other, “[g]rand 
philosophies and high ideals are all very well. The devil of the detail requires great technical 
and political skills” (Malcolm, 2000, cited in Cross, et al., 2002: 171). 
Another criticism, as highlighted in section 2.2.4, argues that most educational reforms in post-
apartheid South Africa are seen by most analysts as politically concerned and motivated 
(Pretorius, 1998, cited in Du Plessis, 2005: 17). Malcolm (1999, cited in Du Plessis, 2005: 23) 
adds to this argument by reminding one that the decisions made by policymakers, in terms of 
which versions of OBE to focus on, clearly reflect that there is major historical, political and 
interest group pressure involved.  
The first wave of C2005 revision took shape under the RNCS (Chisholm, 2003). It aimed to 
improve upon its predecessor through “conceptual coherence […] a clear structure and […] 
clear language” (Chisholm, 2003: 4) and the RNCS became official policy in the beginning of 
2002 (Chisholm, 2003: 4). However, yet again, the revisionary movements were cumbersome, 
as there was, yet again, much political energy involved. The Minister of Education at the time, 
Kader Asmal, as well as a review committee relatively independent from the ANC 
spearheaded the review (Chisholm, 2003: 4). On the other side of the fence, there were 
teachers unions and various bureaucratic figures from the education department, to whom 
Chisholm (2003: 5) refers as “footsoldiers of C2005”. This second camp was heavily invested 
in C2005, as they had been closely involved with its formation and attempted implementation. 
Any proposed changes to C2005 were perceived by this group as a direct threat to OBE and, 




the proposed revisions as a regressive move back towards the direction of the old apartheid 
system and were not too welcoming thereof (Chisholm, 2003: 5). Those in this second, 
opposition camp saw the recommendations for a re-emphasising of more traditional and 
vocational subjects, such as science and mathematics, as mirroring the way of thinking of the 
past. However, a cabinet decision ultimately determined that occupational foundations in the 
revisionary recommendations were of unquestionable importance and would be kept 
(Chisholm, 2003: 5).  
Chisholm (2003: 12) provides a concise summary of the different actors and their decisions 
during the formation of the RNCS: 
The dominant players were the ANC, the teacher unions and university-based intellectuals. The 
ANC introduced a modernising, liberal humanist, pragmatic approach to reform. The teacher 
unions on the one hand reasserted the importance of outcomes-based education as 
foundational philosophy for the post-apartheid curriculum, and on the other established the 
necessity for a workable and implementable curriculum. They united around the need for a 
secular, liberal humanist, rights-based curriculum that recognises the diversity of South 
Africans. Radical intellectuals, by contrast, were critical in creating the context for democratic 
debate and discussion of the post-apartheid curriculum and for providing the theoretical and 
empirical climate for reform of the curriculum. These were the dominant influences on the 
curriculum. 
Finally, I consider and discuss the latest version of South Africa’s school curriculum – the 
Curriculum and Assessment Policy Statement (referred to as ‘CAPS’), which was 
implemented across South African schools between 2012 and 2014 (Du Plessis & Marais, 
2015: 117). Preceding CAPS was C2005 in 1998 (DoE, 1997), the RNCS in 2004 (DoE, 
2002a; 2002b), and the NCS in 2007 (DoE, 2011b). An interesting point to take into 
consideration is that CAPS was a new and improved curriculum, which reacted to the very 
descriptive nature of OBE with its own, more prescriptive approach (Van der Berg, Taylor, 
Gustafsson, Spaull & Armstrong, 2011). CAPS has been credited with administering a more 
desirable “macro pacing of the curriculum” along with more prescriptive textbooks, which 
provide “the scaffolding for accurate monitoring of curriculum coverage” (Van der Berg, Taylor, 
Gustafsson, Spaull & Armstrong, 2011: 10). ‘Macro pacing’ refers to the practice by which the 
teacher ensures that there is proper planning in terms of which parts of the curriculum are 
covered over a longer time frame, such as a year – and that the coverage of the curriculum is 
well paced, to ensure that all the desired worked will indeed be covered within the given time 
(Van der Berg, Taylor, Gustafsson, Spaull & Armstrong, 2011). Some are not enthusiastic 
about this prescriptive element, as stated by Engelbrecht, Nel, Nel and Tlale (2015: 3): 
Although recent curriculum transformation has integrated the principle of inclusive education, which by 




assessment, pace of teaching and the development of learning material (DoE, 2001), the current CAPS 
do not support the requirements of a flexible curriculum as stated in Education White Paper 6 [of 2001] 
(DoE, 2001; Geldenhuys & Wevers, 2013).  
In summary, the different reforms related mostly to the cumbersome technicalities and 
impracticalities of certain policies, and newer versions of policy served to simplify and 
streamline implementation, and to formulate a more realistic plan more in line with the 
capabilities of teachers (Cross, Mungadi & Rouhani, 2002; Jansen, 1998). Other criticisms 
served to refocus attention on the primary importance of key subjects, such as mathematics 
and science. As for the CAPS, it remains to be seen whether any serious criticism or reform 
lies ahead. 
  
2.3. On values  
Sections 2.2.1 to 2.2.5 aimed to give a brief overview and history of the policy documents that 
arose out of the post-apartheid reform period. Now I would like to turn my attention to values 
as they appear within the different policy documents. Of course, the current study took a keen 
interest in values, as I ultimately aimed to study the contradictory values that exist between 
the neoliberal and the ethical areas within CAPS. However, before continuing, I bring to the 
reader’s attention that the notion of values is alluded to in different ways and to various 
degrees within the different South African education policy documents. For the sake of 
structure and logic, I have decided to separate the discussion into two categories. First, I 
discuss those documents which mention values, but which were not specifically designed to 
address the topic, and, secondly, those documents specifically engineered to be a study of 
values within the South African educational system. It is not my intention to imply that the 
discussions around values found within the first set of more ‘general’ policy documents are in 
any way less relevant, meaningful or influential, but it is important for me to make the reader 
aware that the latter documents were specifically intended to address the notion of values. 
 
2.3.1 On values – general policy documents 
While the abovementioned criticisms and revisions of different curriculum policies were taking 
place, and seemed to focus especially on the technical aspects, and content and form of the 
curriculum, there remained the question of values. What follows is a summary of how the issue 
of values was discussed in various documents. The reader is reminded, however, that this is 
merely an overview account for the sake of sketching the research context. My own, deeper 




In the Preamble to the Bill of Rights of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (RSA, 
1996b), the Constitution is described as a supreme law with the purpose to “establish a society 
based on democratic values, social justice and fundamental human rights” (section 1(a)). 
Similarly, the National Education Policy Act, No. 27 of 1996 (RSA, 1996a, section A-4:n.p.), 
describes one of the purposes of education to be to “contribute to the full personal 
development of each student, and to the moral, social, cultural, political and economic 
development of the nation at large, including the advancement of democracy, human rights 
and the peaceful resolution of disputes” 
The National Education Policy Act, No. 27 of 1996 is one of the original flagships for the 
expression of the Constitution within education (RSA, 1996a). In the above quote, there is a 
call for the moral, social, cultural and political development of the nation (among other types 
of development). This is a vast task that is outlined. The list of social justice values and core 
values one can derive from the above quote can be near endless. Such a quote and the values 
it implies provide an ample foothold from which to argue for the advocating of core values 
amongst learners. The above quote references the need for education to contribute to the 
“personal development of each student” (RSA, 1996a:n.p.). Then it goes on to refer to the 
“moral, social, cultural [and] political […] development of the nation at large” (RSA, 
1996a:n.p.). Such development translates into encouraging learners to be responsible 
citizens, to take matters of social justice into their own hands and to adopt core values of 
empathy, compassion and responsibility. The current study, through exposing the drawbacks 
and moral limitations of neoliberalism (Chapter 3), found that such an ambitious “moral, social, 
cultural, political […] development of the nation at large” (RSA, 1996a:n.p.) can only take place 
if we are aware of the dangers inherent in an immature and hastily considered approach to 
the “economic developments” (RSA, 1996a:n.p.). This study argued that the policy is not 
aware of the extent of its own ambitions, the difficulty in balancing an economic focus with an 
ethical focus, and the ethical frameworks necessary to ensure that both aims can operate 
harmoniously along one another. The fostering of conscientious learners – the transformation 
of learners from an imbalanced neoliberal vantage point to responsible, mature and 
compassionate young adults – is what will be explored in future chapters as the necessary 
antidote for the tension between neoliberalism and moral core values. 
The National Education Policy Act, No. 27 of 1996 states its goal as “the democratic 
transformation of the national system of education into one which serves the needs and 
interests of all of the people of South Africa and upholds their fundamental rights” (RSA, 
1996a:n.p.).  
One can look at the above quotation and realise that there are different potential agents for 




attempt to affect the transformation through institutional and administrative measures, such 
as rules and restrictions brought into schools through policy, or changes in the curriculum, and 
do not focus in too much detail on the learners as agents of this transformation. This study, 
however implied that a bureaucratic and armchair-philosophy approach to teaching values 
might not be as valuable as more interactive and engaging methods that would help the 
learners to truly incorporate moral development into their lives. The policy track record of post-
apartheid South Africa is not too good (Jansen, 1998; 2002) and, therefore, I propose that it 
is valuable to understand to what extent democratic transformation based on democratic 
values, core values, social justice and fundamental human rights can be supported by learners 
themselves and through the moral growth they can achieve in a practical and ‘lived’ manner 
during their time at school. Of course, I expand upon these arguments in future chapters. 
It is also worthwhile to look at the values contained in the RNCS, a document which largely 
informed CAPS. Msila (2007:151) (referring to the DoE, 2002) writes:  
This system [informed by the RNCS] is based on the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa, Act 108 of 1996, which provides the basis for curriculum transformation in South Africa. 
Education and the curriculum have a crucial role to play in realising the aims of developing the 
full potential of learners as citizens of a democratic South Africa. 
There is an emphasis on values within the RNCS and the “promotion [thereof] is important not 
only for the sake of personal development but also to ensure that a national South African 
identity is built on values very different from those that underpinned apartheid education” (DoE, 
2002, as cited in Msila, 2007: 151). The type of learner that is envisaged as a product of this 
policy document is one who is: 
Inspired by these values, and who will act in the interests of the society based on respect for 
democracy, equality, human dignity, life and social justice. The curriculum seeks to create a 
lifelong learner who is confident and independent, literate, numerate, multi-skilled, 
compassionate, with respect for the environment and the ability to participate in society as a 
critical and active citizen (DoE, 2002, as cited in Msila, 2007: 151). 
Once again, the aims expressed are filled with the values of compassion, empathy, 
responsibility and general ethical conduct towards the ‘other’ and the environment we inhabit.  
The next document is the CAPS. Under the CAPS, all subjects have their own policy 
documents, while there are general policies that underlie all subjects (DoE, 2011b). CAPS is 
reinforced and informed by the RNCS, which means that it espouses values that are directly 
in line with the South African Constitution.  
From within the pages of CAPS, its aims and goals are clearly expressed, and it is stated that 




• “serves the purpose of equipping learners, irrespective of their socio-economic 
background, race, gender, physical ability or intellectual ability, with the knowledge, 
skills and values necessary for self-fulfilment, and meaningful participation in society 
as citizens of a free country”; as well as 
• “providing access to higher education; facilitating the transition of learners from 
education institutions to the workplace; and providing employers with a sufficient profile 
of a learner’s competences”.  
From the onset, it is clear that CAPS aims to fulfil both the economic needs of learners as well 
as the need for responsible citizens who care about social justice and core values. The above 
quotations represent, as a sort of summary, everything around which the current study 
revolved, as it highlighted the tension exposed by the research question – between 
neoliberalism and values of compassion and empathy. It is not that the two quotations, when 
read side by side, provide any clear evidence of a contradiction, but as future chapters reveal, 
the concerns in the second bullet point above (economic) far overshadow and undermine the 
“values necessary for self-fulfilment, and meaningful participation in society” (DoE, 2011b:n.p.) 
mentioned by the first bullet point. In other words, when looking at how education policies play 
out, it is the neoliberal positioning - represented by how a learner must prove him- or herself 
competent before his or her future employer - that weighs more heavily than any attention 
given to meaningful (social and ethical) participation in society. This point is argued further, 
with reference to the relevant literature, in Chapter 3. It speaks volumes of the naivety of the 
CAPS document in thinking that this tension would not arise and in not adequately preparing 
for it – or, in the very least, in not in any way speaking about the potential emergence of such 
a tension.  
The ethical aims of CAPS are further highlighted by another section, which indicates that 
CAPS is “based on the following principles” (DoE, 2011b:n.p.): 
• social transformation: ensuring that the educational imbalances of the past are 
redressed, and that equal educational opportunities are provided for all sections of the 
population; 
• active and critical learning: encouraging an active and critical approach to learning, 
rather than rote and uncritical learning of given truths; 
• high knowledge and high skills: the minimum standards of knowledge and skills to be 
achieved in each grade are specified and high, achievable standards are set in all 
subjects; 





• human rights, inclusivity, environmental and social justice: infusing the principles and 
practices of social and environmental justice and human rights as defined in the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. The NCS Grades R–12 is sensitive to 
issues of diversity, such as poverty, inequality, race, gender, language, age, disability 
and other factors; 
• valuing indigenous knowledge systems: acknowledging the rich history and heritage 
of this country as important contributors to nurturing the values contained in the 
Constitution; and 
• credibility, quality and efficiency: providing an education that is comparable in quality, 
breadth and depth to those of other countries. 
The above list reveals a broad range of principles, and includes both the economic goals of 
the country as well as the goals pertaining to core values. It is clear that core values of 
compassion and empathy are supported. The fifth and sixth points above speak of human 
rights, inclusivity, environmental and social justice, issues of diversity, indigenous knowledge 
systems and nurturing the values contained in the Constitution. Such concerns are the very 
definition of what it entails to be a responsible and compassionate citizen. 
The seven principles listed above are the general principles promoted through CAPS. In Life 
Orientation, however, there is a specific focus on the development of good citizens. The 
current study took special interest in the subject of Life Orientation as an area where change 
and transformation in the direction of values of compassion and empathy can be spearheaded. 
According to the CAPS policy document for Life Orientation (DoE, 2011c: 8), “it is a unique 
subject in that it applies a holistic approach to the personal, social, intellectual, emotional, 
spiritual, motor and physical growth and development of learners”, which “encourages the 
development of a balanced and confident learner who can contribute to a just and democratic 
society, a productive economy and an improved quality of life for all.” 
Furthermore, “the subject contains the following six topics in Grades 10 to 12” (DoE, 2011c: 8): 
• Development of the self in society; 
• Social and environmental responsibility; 
• Democracy and human rights; 
• Careers and career choices; 
• Study skills; and 
• Physical Education. 
Although the focus on economic incentives is still present, there is large scope within the 





In the academic literature there are some who notice the neoliberal elements within CAPS. It 
is quite difficult to find academic writing specifically on the neoliberalism inherent in CAPS, but 
I have tried my best to assemble some sources below:  
My own feelings are perhaps best captured by Maistry (2014: 66), who states (in reference to 
CAPS): 
While the document also makes reference to social justice issues, these are captured in a single 
point under the purpose of education. The strong market agenda for education in SA is 
alarmingly explicit but appears as an unassuming, innocent and noble will of the people. Its 
disturbing undertones are eloquently masked by the social justice rhetoric that permeates the 
policy document – another perplexing instance of the ‘talk left, walk right’ tendency already 
alluded to. 
 
Another study criticises that same neoliberalism through looking at textbooks and their 
subtexts (Maistry and David, 2018). Most textbooks, and economic textbooks in particular, 
normalise and promote the ideology of neoliberalism and there is almost no investigation into 
such problematic subtexts. Maistry and David (2018: 33) uncover: 
the tensions inherent in what masquerades as innocent, neutral economics content knowledge 
particularly with regard to the representations of the discourses of globalisation in school 
economics textbooks. As a consequence, in this article we offer a sober assessment of the 
extent to which Africanisation and decolonisation debates have infused school curriculum policy 
and the extent to which the official NCS(CAPS) in particular might present as a major obstacle 
to this agenda. 
 
Now that I have provided an overview into the motivation for OBE in relation to post-apartheid 
curriculum reform, and have paid particular attention to CAPS, I continue by taking a look at 
the documents that were drawn up specifically for the sake of focusing attention on and 
strategising the teaching of democratic citizenship and values. Needless to say, these were of 
even more relevance to the current study.  
 
2.3.2 On values – policy documents dedicated specifically to values 
In the discussion that follows, I explore three policy documents: Values, education and 
democracy: Report of the Working Group on Values in Education (DoE, 2000), the Manifesto 
on values, education, and democracy (DoE, 2001) and Building a culture of responsibility and 
humanity in our schools: A guide for teachers (DoE, 2011a). These documents took shape in 




policy documents, and that, as previously mentioned (see sections 2.2.5 and 2.3), any 
statements made about values had been rather general and vague. In other words, this is an 
opportune moment to reflect on how the very existence of these three policy documents attest 
to the admittance, on the part of policymakers, that core values – such as compassion and 
empathy – were struggling to find a home within the actual South African educational setting 
and needed a stronger strategy of implementation. Of course, one will not find the policy 
documents referencing their own neoliberal tendencies, but, as Chapter 3 will elucidate, 
whenever core values – such as empathy and compassion, and the attempt at a meaningful 
and ethical dimension at schooling – seem to be struggling to materialise, it is very often a 
sign of a very neoliberal symptom, a sign of an environment where economic drives are not 
easily leaving room for or – more accurately – allowing the right soil for other, more relational 
and ethical ambitions to flourish.  
 
2.3.2.1 Values, education and democracy: Report of the Working Group on Values in 
Education  
As Values, education and democracy: Report of the Working Group on Values in Education 
(DoE, 2000: 2) states, Professor Kader Asmal, the Minister of Education at the time, formed a 
working group on values in education. Their report serves as “a starting point in what ought to 
become a national debate on the appropriate values South Africa ought to embrace in its 
primary and secondary educational institutions” (DoE, 2000: 2).  
The report summarises the following recommendations at the outset of the document (DoE, 
2000: 6): 
• The Report is emphatic about the responsibility of schools to develop the intellectual 
abilities of all learners.  
• The Report is insistent that discrimination and prejudice on the grounds of race, gender 
and culture are profoundly harmful to learning and to the development of the self-worth 
of individuals. 
• The authors of the Report believe that schools should provide learners with the tools 
to solve the problems that come with being human, throughout the cycle of life.  
• [The Report] affirm[s] the policy of giving priority to schools located in the most 
disadvantaged areas of our country, where the majority of our population live, for 
investment in infrastructure and teaching quality. 
• The value of tolerance would be best promoted by deepening our understanding of the 




exploration and celebration of that which is common and diverse in our cultural 
heritage, on the other. 
• Regarding multilingualism, [the Report proposes] that, as a medium of instruction, 
learners use the mother tongue or the mother tongue and English. 
• The Report notes the lack of a strong reading and debating culture in our country and 
our schools. A key value that ought to be promoted is a thirst for knowledge and a 
receptiveness to new ideas, the value of openness.  
• The shift from apartheid education to education for democracy requires a move from 
the value of authoritarian discipline to the value of accountability. In this respect the 
Report underlines the importance of teaching as a vocation and not just a job.  
• The final value is social honour. This is about cultivating a sense of honour and identity 
as South Africans. It is about a process where individuals are comfortable with both a 
local or cultural identity and a national South African one (DoE, 2000: 6). 
The report sets out to identify practical solutions to the implementation and teaching of values. 
The nine points mentioned above reach deep into the curriculum and into classroom activities, 
and it seems the intention is to move beyond mere ideas about values towards further steps 
of enactment.  
The report highlights how the values identified relate to the broader South Africa and have a 
far-reaching and long-lasting impact: “They [values] are important for the personal, intellectual 
and emotional development of the individual. They are also influential in determining the 
quality of national character to which we as a people in a democracy aspire” (DoE, 2000: 6). 
This imperative nature of values is emphasised a second time: 
In a democracy, public education is one of the major vehicles by which the values of a people 
are acquired by the children and young adults who make up our schools’ population. It goes 
without saying that today’s children and young adults are tomorrow’s adults and leaders” (DoE, 
2000: 10). 
It is near impossible to over-emphasise the extensive positive and transformative effect that 
values could have on an entire country. It is of utmost importance, first of all, to realise the 
incalculable significance of values and, thereafter, to realise that the role that the educational 
system should play in teaching and imparting such values is significant. 
The Working Group report (DoE, 2000: 10) is quick to point out that a study of values in schools 
is historically situated and “does not occur in a vacuum”. The apartheid era guaranteed that a 
corrupted set of values were fostered, for the regime was based on principles which “denied 
the humanity of the majority of our population” (DoE, 2000: 10). In fact, the project of identifying 




democracy” (DoE, 2000: 11), since we are finding these values in the milieu immediately after 
erecting our Constitution and Bill of Rights (RSA, 1996a). It is all the more important, then, to 
create and facilitate documents such as this report, which help us move deeper into our study 
of values and their enactment.  
In order to construct the framework for the recommendations in general, the Working Group 
report states that there are “three key elements to an educational philosophy” (DoE, 2000: 
11). The first key element “is to develop the intellectual abilities and critical faculties among all 
of the children and young adults in our schools” (DoE, 2000: 11). This is already a challenge, 
since the type of thinking prevalent during apartheid fed on “conformity, obedience to rules 
and the suspension of intelligence” (DoE, 2000: 11). The second key element is inclusiveness. 
The third key element is to “provide learners with the tools to solve the many problems that 
come with being human, throughout the life cycle” (DoE, 2000: 11). To this end, the report 
notes that one needs an approach similar to the one used in science, where knowledge and 
rationality arm us to face challenges. However, beyond that, one needs “will and courage” 
which come not only from science, but from the “spirituality of humanity that defines our 
attitude to life” (DoE, 2000: 12).  
The section thereafter focuses on equity and the disproportionate access to education that 
followed apartheid (DoE, 2000: 16). A third section of the report, titled “tolerance”, urges one 
to consider the importance of having a diverse range of learners at school. For this, one would 
need to establish the value of tolerance (DoE, 2000: 22). This necessitates not only “a 
truthfulness about the failures and successes of the human past but [also] the active and 
deliberate incorporation of differences in the moral traditions, arts, culture, religions and 
sporting activity in the ethos and life of a school” (DoE, 2000: 22).  
Under the section on tolerance, the report mentions the subject of history – a reminder of the 
successes and failures of humankind (DoE, 2000: 23). From the study of history, we can 
reassess our moral stances and find a more tolerant foundation. Furthermore, we can open 
ourselves to the study of three highly important areas that support us in our sentiments of 
tolerance. Firstly, we can study the consolidating findings within the scientific and evolutionary 
fields for the lack of importance of outward appearance amongst human beings (DoE, 2000: 
24). Secondly, we can study the different histories of the different residents of South Africa, 
with their origins in Africa, Europe and Asia (DoE, 2000: 24). From this we can generate 
“knowledge of the other” and further our levels of tolerance (DoE, 2000: 24). Thirdly, we can 
study examples of past human rights violations and be as shielded as possible from repeating 




The report also mentions the worth of extra-curricular activities (for the sake of promoting 
tolerance and making learners comfortable with diversity). This includes performing arts at 
school and team-based sports (DoE, 2000: 25). It is recommended that “provincial 
departments of education interact with arts and culture bodies to develop diversity 
programmes in these areas” (DoE, 2000: 25.). 
The final point raised with regard to tolerance concerns “discriminatory practices” (DoE, 2000: 
26). It is recommended that there be much less lenience with such practices. The report warns 
that certain practices which “masquerade under the pretensions of culture” will be more 
engrained in the traditions of schools and pose a challenge (DoE, 2000: 26). An example given 
is that of initiation ceremonies at schools (where young learners are forced to participate in 
unpleasant activities and rituals before being welcomed into the broader group) (DoE, 2000: 
26).  
The next section in the report focuses on multilingualism. Apartheid had as its result the 
“furthering of Sepedi, Sesotho, Setswana, siSwati, Tshivenda, Xitsonga, isiNdebele, isiXhosa 
and isiZulu as so-called tribal oral languages and English and Afrikaans as official, state 
supported, languages of communication, record and business” (DoE, 2000: 30). The report 
suggests that each learner should be able to study in his or her own home language (DoE, 
2000: 31).  
The section thereafter is termed “openness”. This segment explains that, although problem 
solving is linked to literacy and numeracy, there is another realm of problem solving, which 
depends on the ability to open one’s self up to the world around one (DoE, 2000: 39). The 
report itself admits that it is “one of the most difficult qualities to define”, but explains it as – 
[T]he value of being open and receptive to new ideas; with developing the ability to ask good 
and penetrating questions; with insisting on good evidence for arguments; and with being willing 
to debate ideas in order to arrive at quality decisions (DoE, 2000: 39).  
To this end, a recommendation is made for the introduction of debating societies in schools 
(DoE, 2000: 39). 
The next section of the report deals with accountability. South African teachers have been 
burdened with unfair levels of blame; yet, their educational role is nothing less than a vocation 
with a “responsibility [that] requires a strong sense of commitment to some core norms of 
behaviour and conduct” (DoE, 2000: 42). Too often, we do not respect this compelling position 
within which teachers are. We fail to understand how dynamic and personal their role and 
contributions are. To see the educational experience as a market phenomenon is to miss the 
invaluable process of “individual growth”, which learners undergo (DoE, 2000: 42). 




reason, it is suggested that, although they have been at the receiving end of unwarranted 
criticism, teachers be punctual and scrutinise and monitor homework regularly (DoE, 2000: 
43). There must, at least, remain such a standard of accountability for teachers. Finally, 
governing bodies run by parents should be reassessed so as to reinforce the synergy and 
cooperation between teachers and parents (DoE, 2000: 43). 
The final section of the report is titled “honour”. Apartheid saw a country without any symbols 
which all could support. There were nothing more than the symbols of the white minority (DoE, 
2000: 48). This left the country cautious when it came to the politically charged act of building 
a national identity (DoE, 2000: 49). Rather, South Africans have been urged to “reconcile” and 
find the “common ground” rather than “to aggressively assert our South African-ness against 
outsiders and the ‘other’” (DoE, 2000: 49). Notwithstanding, the report suggests that the 
national anthem, the national flag and a pledge of allegiance to remind of “the fundamental 
values to which South Africans in a democracy aspire” can be some of the items, which could 
surcharge schools with a growing atmosphere of national identity (DoE, 2000: 50). 
A report such as this one is an invaluable contribution to South African education policy. The 
fact that the report envisions all the values as they are situated in a classroom and curricular 
context, speaks volumes of the understanding on the part of the policymakers of the necessity 
to move from purely theoretical discussions into the realm of implementation. However, I 
remain sceptical about whether or not the suggestions made in the report can penetrate deep 
enough into the internal world of learners. However, I digress, the section on contemplative 
education shall, hopefully, give us a renewed perspective on how to share and teach values 
in a more penetrating manner than what the abovementioned policy documents can facilitate. 
 
2.3.2.2 Manifesto on values, education, and democracy 
Values, education and democracy: Report of the Working Group on Values in Education (DoE, 
2000) was directly followed by the Manifesto on values, education, and democracy (DoE, 
2001). The document was born from the idea to “[mould] a people from diverse origins, cultural 
practices, languages, into one, within a framework democratic in character, that can absorb, 
accommodate and mediate conflicts and adversarial interests without oppression and 
injustice” (DoE, 2001: 1). The present day holds its own set of challenges, such as “HIV/AIDS, 
unemployment, globalisation and the maintenance of national unity” and it is strongly 
suggested that “education is an essential part of meeting these challenges” (DoE, 2001: 1). 
Beyond the six qualities identified as essential by Values, education and democracy: Report 
of the Working Group on Values in Education (equity, tolerance, multilingualism, openness, 




step further – 
[A]nd explores the ideals and concepts of democracy, social justice, equality, non-racism and 
non-sexism, Ubuntu (human dignity), an open society, accountability (responsibility), the rule 
of law, respect, and reconciliation in a way that suggests how the Constitution can be taught, 
as part of the curriculum, and brought to life in the classroom, as well as applied practically in 
programmes and policy making by educators, administrators, governing bodies and officials 
(DoE, 2001: 2).  
In other words, these are the ten main values which the manifesto identifies as essential 
values found in the Constitution.  
The manifesto highlights a set of educational strategies used to instil the values it wants to 
promote (DoE, 2001: 4). Specific strategies are used, because “values cannot be legislated” 
(DoE, 2001: 4). In other words, the manifesto is implying that we must be wary of disseminating 
values in a formulaic and abstracted manner. Values are complex sets of ideas and lifestyle 
characteristics, which need to be understood deeply by any child and which should be taught 
through example.  
Allow me to now share the strategies suggested by the manifesto:  
• “Nurturing a culture of communication and participation in schools”  
This entails the creation of dialogue between parents, learners and staff (DoE, 2001: 4) 
and would have the “effect of enabling young South Africans to become open, curious 
and empowered citizens” (DoE, 2001: 18).  
• “Role-modelling: promoting commitment as well as competence among educators” 
Staff members have to be committed to their craft because everything they do will be 
absorbed by learners who are prone to follow whatever example is in front of them 
(DoE, 2001: 20). This implies that teachers have to move beyond competence and 
have a sense of commitment as well – through an understanding of the values 
contained in the Constitution (DoE, 2001: 21).  
• “Ensuring that every South African is able to read, write, count and think” 
We must first acknowledge and, thereafter, tackle the immense shortcomings in terms 
of these essential skills (DoE, 2001: 22).  
• “Infusing the classroom with a culture of human rights” 
We must ensure that all children, regardless of race, gender or class, are treated 
equally and fairly (DoE, 2001: 26). 
• “Making arts and culture part of the curriculum” 




importance as “mastery of numbers and natural laws in the school setting” (DoE, 2001: 
27). Furthermore, arts and culture can act as a vessel through which learners absorb 
the “values of equality, non-racism, non-sexism, ubuntu, openness, reconciliation and 
respect” (DoE, 2001: 28). 
• “Putting history back into the curriculum” 
History can act as an exercise in interrogation, through which we interrogate “the 
values and morality that, in the past, were the product of political expedience, habit, 
and convention” (DoE, 2001: 29). It gives a context to values when they are set against 
a narrative backdrop (DoE, 2001: 30). 
• “Introducing religion education into schools” 
The different religious traditions and systems act as some of the most potent conveyers 
of values known to us. Religion is a powerful path unto compassion, care and general 
mature awareness of others (DoE, 2001: 32). Therefore, to study various religions, 
without promoting one at the expense of others, is a great asset to learners.  
• “Making multilingualism happen” 
Learners have shown to be much more receptive and effective at school if they can be 
taught in their mother tongue (DoE, 2001: 34). Furthermore, it is vital that South 
Africans become adept at using the English language, as it is the foremost international 
language, used for tourism, business, cultural exchanges and more (DoE, 2001: 34).  
• “Using sport to shape social bonds and nurture nation building at schools” 
Through sport, children can learn to channel their various energies in ways that help 
to curtail prejudice and promote unity in diversity (DoE, 2001: 37). 
• “Ensuring equal access to education” 
The various values we are trying to instil will not travel far if there is not a fair and open 
level of access to them (DoE, 2001: 39). 
• “Promoting anti-racism in schools” 
This entails making sure that not only grosser forms of racism, but also subtle forms, 
such as devaluing another’s culture, are stopped (DoE, 2001: 42). 
• “Freeing the potential of girls as well as boys” 
Much of what a girl takes herself to be is dictated by the social construct that is gender. 
And, often, it ends in a narrow and limiting definition for such girls (DoE, 2001: 44). 
Girls are discouraged from pursuing areas of science, business and mathematics that 
are seen as more masculine (DoE, 2001: 45). Girls are also kept away from school 




(DoE, 2001: 45). Then there is a range of physical and sexual abuse to contend with 
(DoE, 2001: 45). All of these obstacles need to be addressed if we are to free the 
potential of girls.  
• “Dealing with HIV/AIDS and nurturing a culture of sexual and social responsibility” 
In order to combat HIV and AIDS successfully, we need to arm ourselves with values 
such as “respect, responsibility, the ability to think, say and act the same thing – 
integrity” (DoE, 2001: 47). Each year, young people are having their first sexual 
encounters at younger and younger ages (DoE, 2001: 47). We need to draw upon the 
constitutional values of respect, responsibility, openness and communication if we 
wish to help young people to protect themselves (DoE, 2001: 49). Furthermore, values 
such as “social justice, equality and Ubuntu” will help us to avoid stigmatising and 
discriminating against victims of HIV and AIDS (DoE, 2001: 49).  
• “Making schools safe to learn and teach in and ensuring the rule of law” 
It is impossible to teach values in an environment that is neither safe nor stable. One 
cannot teach values if those very values are being undermined by those who are 
supposed to absorb and express them (DoE, 2001: 51).  
• “Ethics and the environment” 
We should advocate a sustainable and responsible way of life, where one considers 
the impact of each of one’s actions on one’s surroundings. After all, there is no 
possibility of a healthy life without a healthy environment (DoE, 2001: 54). The 
manifesto states, “when the Constitution was adopted it linked environmental issues 
to values underpinned by human rights and social responsibilities” (DoE, 2001: 54). 
The proper management of the natural environment requires deeply realised values, 
because such management calls for limiting measures in the areas of “the production 
processes, employment practices, legislation on conservation, local government law 
and, ultimately, the habits of living of individual citizens” (DoE, 2001: 55).  
• “Nurturing the new patriotism, or affirming our common citizenship” 
The manifesto recommends that we, as a country, embrace “a shared sense of pride 
in commonly held values – and in the symbols of those commonly held values”, 
because, through this process, “a common identity is forged, and a loyalty to this 
common identity is established” (DoE, 2001: 57). And this sense of pride should be 
very far from the “narrow patriotism of the past, predicated upon, and perpetrating, the 
subjugation or denial of others” (DoE, 2001: 57). The point is, schools can play a 
considerable role in the creation of a sense of national pride, which can drive the 




2.3.2.3 Building a culture of responsibility and humanity in our schools: A guide for 
teachers (‘the guide’)  
The third document on values, Building a culture of responsibility and humanity in our schools: 
A guide for teachers (‘the guide’) (DoE, 2011a, is, to my mind, the most relevant of the three 
(from here on out I will refer to it as ‘the guide’). This is because the document recognises that 
values and democratic rights are near meaningless concepts without being joined to the idea 
of responsibility. From the outset, the document cites the necessity of respect (DoE, 2011a: 
2). It is indeed interesting that the document looks critically at how rights can be approached 
from a self-motivated position (DoE, 2011a: 4). In doing so, the guide expects a new level of 
self-reflection from learners, not seen in the previously discussed policy documents. The guide 
recalls the concept of ubuntu and reflects on the individual’s inescapable integration with his 
or her community. Indeed, “individual freedoms cannot really be separated from the freedoms 
of the whole community” (DoE, 2011a: 4). It goes on to show that the idea of responsibility is, 
in fact, grounded in legislation under the “Bill of Responsibilities” (DoE, 2011a: 4). This Bill of 
Responsibilities (see RSA, 2008) is a reminder to the learners of South Africa that our “rights 
like equality, respect, dignity and life” cannot be carried very far unless we “take responsibility 
to act in ways that protect, ensure and uphold these rights” (DoE, 2011a: 4). The Bill can help 
South Africans to break away from the illusion that “freedom means doing what I like”, and it 
encourages citizens to give back to their communities (DoE, 2011a: 4). 
The DoE (2011a: 6) had research conducted, which indicated that there are two values whose 
absence is felt most – respect and dialogue. The guide reminds us that “respect is an essential 
precondition for communication, for teamwork, for productivity” (DoE, 2011a: 6). 
Within the guide one finds a set of rights along with the accompanying responsibilities to 
ensure that those rights can be upheld for all (DoE, 2011a: 6). This includes the rights to 
equality, human dignity, life, family or parental care, education, work, freedom and security of 
the person, own property, freedom of religion, belief and opinion, living in a safe environment, 
citizenship and freedom of expression (DoE, 2011a: 9). I will not go into the details, but for 
each of these, the guide makes it clear that one cannot fairly make a claim to such rights if 
one is not taking the necessary steps in ensuring that these rights are maintained for others 
(DoE, 2011a). In other words, one should take up some responsibility and be focused on other 
persons ad their needs, instead of being exclusively focused on one’s self. Beyond helping 
others to live out such rights, one should also be grateful for anything that is provided by one’s 
country or fellow citizens, and engage with such resources and initiatives with utmost respect 
and appreciation. Together, such attitudes mark a learner who has begun to understand that 




The guide gives ideas on “including responsibilities in school norms”, through the use of a 
code of conduct (DoE, 2011a: 15). Such a code of conduct should ensure that the right to 
education is upheld for all (through school culture), that human rights are integrated into school 
life through classroom activities and the choosing of class leaders, and should “ensure that 
human relationships within the school community are based on the values of equality, dignity, 
respect and responsibility” (DoE, 2011a: 15). 
Thereafter, the guide turns to the issue of discipline, a necessary ingredient for a code of 
conduct and responsible behaviour. It denounces the use of “sarcasm, hitting or other forms 
of punitive punishment”, pointing out that it is “unlikely to produce meaningful results for 
anybody” (DoE, 2011a: 21). Corporal punishment will not go far in helping the child to develop 
a sense of responsibility in a balanced way; rather, one must find a system of discipline which 
is “educationally sound” and which can “provide opportunities for children to make right what 
they have done (based on the principle of restorative justice)” (DoE, 2011a: 21). 
The guide mentions four acts, which are against corporal punishment: 
• the National Education Policy Act (No. 27 of 1996); 
• the South African Schools Act (No. 84 of 1996); 
• the Abolition of Corporal Punishment Act (No. 33 of 1997); and 
• the Regulations Promulgated Under the Child Care Act (No. 74 of 1983 amended 
1998) (DoE, 2011a: 24). 
In other words, discipline is best constructed through a harmonious process between both 
teachers and learners, where the learners can arrive at an internally originating sense of 
discipline that is built from core values, which are centred on respect and responsibility. 
The guide also emphasises the importance of weaving the education about rights and 
responsibilities into the curriculum, through: 
• the management of the classroom; 
• the way the learning environment is set up; 
• the relationships in the classroom – learner to learner and teacher to learner; and 
• the activities and strategies developed for learning and teaching (DoE, 2011a: 27). 
Thereafter, the guide moves to pre-existing policy documents, and notes that “[t]he framework 
established by the Constitution, Bill of Rights, Law and Policies for education in South Africa 
supports teaching and learning for democracy, human rights and peace quite directly” (DoE, 
2011a: 30). It mentions “the critical and developmental outcomes”, which “are a list of 
outcomes informed by the Constitution” and which “describe the kind of citizen it is hoped will 
emerge from the education and training system and underpin all teaching and learning 




– a group of young adults armed with “core life skills for learners, such as communication, 
critical thinking, activity and information management, group and community work.” (DoE, 
2011a: 30). Eventually, these outcomes aim to enable learners to “learn effectively and 
become responsible, sensitive and productive citizens” (DoE, 2011a: 30). 
In the post-apartheid era, the curriculum was revised, with a specific emphasis being placed 
on human rights and responsibilities, for “the power of education to create social cohesion and 
to transform values and social cultures” was recognised (DoE, 2011a: 31). The NCS strives 
to “infuse and integrate [outcomes for human rights and responsibilities] across the whole 
curriculum” instead of forcing it into or relegating it to a specific Learning Area (DoE, 2011a: 
31). The implication is quite profound, for now it falls upon each teacher to teach “for and about 
human rights and human responsibility” (DoE, 2011a: 31). This section of the guide, showing 
how the need for responsibility (as a counterpart to rights) is firmly grounded in the previous 
policy documents and their outcomes, is a further legitimisation of the entire guide.  
At this juncture, I must profess that I am incredibly excited by this guide. The three policy 
documents that have been explored in this section focus exclusively on values, and, therefore, 
are different to those explored before them. This final ‘guide’ (Building a culture of 
responsibility and humanity in our schools: A guide for teachers) was the most important 
document for my purposes, as it honed in on the most essential concept of responsibility.  
This focused discussion and investigation of responsibility as a sustainer of important values 
is an important contribution to the literature on values. It shows, once more, that the policy 
documents are in support of the core values of compassion and empathy, because the focus 
on responsibility runs parallel with an awareness of and concern for other human beings. The 
main thrust of the guide argues that rights are not something we merely grab for ourselves, 
without any consideration of being responsible for the well-being of others. 
A further consideration of the value of responsibility and possible philosophical underpinnings 
for the concept will be reported on in the next chapter. For now, I simply say that ‘the guide’ is 
a special document. The topic of responsibility is a well-timed one and I feel it will become 
increasingly important as the various challenges we face converge worldwide.  
In light of the above policy documents, it is clear that there is full support from the various post-
apartheid policy documents for the cultivation of learners who are deeply concerned with core 
values of compassion, empathy and responsibility. The documents emphasise the cultivation 
of different values and practices, which can see a democratic and fair South Africa emerge – 
one that takes human rights seriously. The documents also make it clear that core values of 
compassion, empathy and responsibility (not to mention others) are a necessary foundation 




However, I have one piece of criticism that might constitute the most important finding of this 
chapter. One should carefully note that Values, education and democracy: Report of the 
Working Group on Values in Education (DoE, 2000) and the Manifesto on values, education, 
and democracy (DoE, 2001) (the policymakers’ first real response to the lack of 
implementation of values education) merely identify different values, without having any 
specific strategy or step-by-step action plan on how to implement the teaching and 
representation of values. The third document on values to appear, ‘the guide’ (DoE, 2011a: 
37), does include what it terms “[p]hase by phase ideas for learning and teaching about 
responsibilities at school”, but the recommendations within this section of the document 
remain rather unstructured. ‘The guide’ has the feeling of serving as a friendly reminder to 
teachers of how they might include some values education in their teaching. It serves as a 
collection of (hopefully) stimulating ideas, and certainly does not represent any solid, clearly 
outlined and centralised action plan for implementation.  
Thus, it is clear that there is a significant gap in this piece of policy, as with most others I have 
looked at. Ethical values and values education consistently give the impression of an 
afterthought, and I simply cannot imagine Mathematics, Accounting, Natural Science or any 
other skills-oriented and economically important subjects receiving such vague outlines for 
implementation within the curriculum. This speaks volumes of how the approach towards 
implementation is not realistic – in fact, there is hardly any structured approach – although the 
notion of values is strongly present throughout all the policy documents I studied. I propose 
that it is part of the effect of the strong presence of neoliberalism in education that leads to 
such oversights, but more on that in the next chapter. 
 
2.4 Disparities in the teaching of values 
It is important to draw the reader’s attention briefly to the way in which different disparities in 
the South African context influence the teaching of values. 
There are disparities in terms of language, whereby the learning process is made exceedingly 
difficult for (especially) indigenous African children, who have to switch from their indigenous 
tongues to English as a language of instruction (Macdonald, 1990). There are further 
disparities brought about by economic inequalities. Even though government attempted to 
balance the learner–teacher ratio across different socio-economic areas, better-resourced 
schools can draw from a larger pool of school fees to hire additional staff, and poorer schools 
sometimes strain to find enough teachers to fulfil the most basic needs of the school (Van der 
Berg, 2008: 10). There are disparities (in terms of infrastructure and resources) brought about 




constraining influences, such as “child abuse and violence, HIV and AIDS and a lack of access 
to services, as well as the fragmentation of the family unit, the loss of caregivers and unsafe 
environments” (Children’s Institute, 2003, cited in Rooth, 2005: 3). These disparities give rise 
to another disparity – the digital divide. The digital divide refers to the major gap in terms of 
opportunities between those with access to information and communication technology (ICT) 
services and those without access to it. This disparity is most definitely relevant in the South 
African context (Mutula, 2005; Oyedemi & Mogano, 2018). 
The point is that the South African curriculum is influenced by many variables. There are many 
groups of people, with different needs and interests. The same holds true for any discussion 
about values. One must remain cautious when expectations are constructed for teaching a set 
of universal values to diverse groups of people. Therefore, the various disparities have been 
mentioned in order to remind the reader of the complex setting against which the current 
research question (see section 2.1) was posed. However, the issue of varied and deep 
disparities lay beyond the scope of the current research project. My aim was not to attempt to 
grapple with such disparities but to offer, amidst the disparities, an argument for the ability of 
contemplative education to teach values of compassion and empathy in a manner that is 
flexible and mindful of the different disparities. In future chapters, I will argue that 
contemplative education can be presented in an adaptive way, calling not so much for physical 
resources or practical advantages as for a paradigm shift on behalf of those who try to teach 
contemplative education and those to whom it is taught. 
Furthermore, in thinking of policies, it is essential to meditate upon the overall inadequacy of 
pages and pages and chapters and chapters of policy ideas if such ideas are met with a learner 
base that is entirely apathetic, detached, uninspired and not at all equipped with the right 
hypotheses and methods for feeling themselves involved in the world they inhibit. This is what 
I aimed to gain from care ethics and, to a larger extent, from contemplative education – the 
pedagogical approach, the techniques, the mind-set, the worldview that urges students to feel 
responsible and empathetic.  
 
2.5 Summary 
This chapter focused on the education policies of post-apartheid South Africa. When asking 
whether contemplative education can respond to the contradiction between neoliberalism and 
core values in CAPS, it becomes necessary to assess the policy documents that led up to 
CAPS. After looking at a theoretical understanding of the concept of education policy itself, 
and a brief history of education in South Africa under apartheid and the negative effects it had 




A chronological account of each main policy document revealed the different goals and values 
found within such documents. Furthermore, I looked at the criticisms levelled against the policy 
documents. Thereafter, considerable time was allocated to specific policy documents, which 
do not express values in an indirect manner while focusing on other concerns, but which were 
specifically drawn up to focus on values. It was important for this study, which had a primarily 
philosophical drive, to be grounded in a specific South African context, and this was achieved 
through a proper investigation of the policies, as reported on in this chapter. Finally, I feel it 
necessary to mention once again the key overall finding – the policy documents are clearly 
highly ambitious (as a newly formed democracy should be), while, at the same time, they do 
not take into account the precautions and awareness necessary in order to make these various 
aims realise.  
Other authors, as touched upon in this chapter, have noted that this naivety has shown itself 
through the poor implementation of the policies. This study found such naivety by exposing 
the tension between neoliberalism and ethical core values that are both present in the policy 
documents. There is no clear indication that the policies are aware of the potential threat of 
this tension. I showed that there was a definite awareness of the need to improve policy on 
values (Values, education and democracy: Report of the Working Group on Values in 
Education (DoE, 2000), the Manifesto on values, education, and democracy (DoE, 2001) and 
Building a culture of responsibility and humanity in our schools: A guide for teachers (‘the 
guide’) (DoE, 2011a)], but one is yet to see a similar awareness towards the role neoliberalism 
plays in undermining ethical values. The next chapter will continue the discussion of the 















CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW – NEOLIBERALISM 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The problem statement asked whether the tensions found in CAPS between the desired core 
values and the desired neoliberalist goals could be bridged by contemplative education (see 
section 1.4). However, in order to understand such a question fully, it is clear that the concepts 
of neoliberalism, values and contemplative education need some clarification and 
understanding.  
Sub-question 2 reads: 
How might neoliberalism undermine ethical values? 
The first parts of this chapter (3.2) sketch a brief overview of neoliberalism, and mention some 
of its ardent supporters. Thereafter, I report on the writings of the critics of neoliberalism (3.3), 
in order to answer sub-question 4. The findings quickly lead to the premise that the ways in 
which neoliberalism shapes our identity, and the ways in which such identities shape how we 
relate to others, offer the best answer to the question regarding how neoliberalism undermines 
ethical values (see 3.3). This topic will show how our identities are formed around a 
consumerist and neoliberalist model, which stifles our relationship with the ‘other’ and 
obfuscates a chance of developing many of the ethical values praised by the ethics of care 
and by contemplative education.  
Relationality is a topic that surfaces within the works of the care ethicists and the works of 
those writing about contemplative education (after all, ethics is largely about how we relate to 
others), but it is equally important to find authors writing about the influence neoliberalism has 
on relationality, because such literature would necessarily show a greater understanding of 
the ethical implications of neoliberalism. After this analysis follows a section that looks at the 
specific effects neoliberalism has on educational institutions (see 3.3.4).  
Finally, it should also be mentioned that, although this latter section on educational institutions 
is included in the chapter, it is not immediately clear how much of the work preceding it is 
related to education or, for that matter, to the South African educational context. However, this 
does not mean that the current study did not ultimately focus on the South African context. I 
urge the reader to consider how this chapter serves as a conceptual framework for 
understanding neoliberalism. All the findings have a bearing on the South African educational 
context, for they cast a light on the lives of learners beyond just the classroom. It can be argued 
that the life learners live outside the walls of a classroom is what they bring with them to the 




being able to make accurate claims about how one should proceed with a learner’s education, 
one must first know something about the learner in question. That is the rationale behind a 
conceptual approach, and in order to follow such a way of investigation, one needs to assess 
the international literature. I have also attempted to include, near the end of the chapter, a 
discussion of important writings by South African authors regarding neoliberalism in the South 
African context.  
 
3.2. Neoliberalism – a quick summary and a look at its supporters  
Neoliberalism has become the main authority on how society is organised, both in the United 
States and the rest of the world (Harvey, 2005). What we now have is a society that has taken 
its economic rationality into other spheres of politics and social culture, which has transformed 
the citizen into an “autonomous economic actor” (Saunders, 2010: 42) and taken away large 
parts of state support systems (Baez, 2007; Lemke, 2001; Turner, 2008). Even social and 
political institutions have come to define their approaches based on economic measures 
(Apple, 2001; Aronowitz, 2000; Giroux, 2005; Harvey, 2005; Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004), 
such as “commodification, commercialization, and marketization, as well as the extension of 
market logic and the prioritization of economic outcomes” (Saunders, 2010: 42). In addition, 
even though, unemployment, inequality and personal debt have skyrocketed since the 
inception of neoliberalism, and power has moved from the hands of government to 
multinational organisations and financial institutions, the loyalty to this theory remains firm 
(Dumenil & Levy, 2005; Harvey, 2005; Palley, 2005; Przeworski, 1992; Springer, Birch & 
MacLeavy, 2016). 
The way in which neoliberalism differs from classical liberalism is the way in which it adapted 
to meet the economic threats of the 1970s (Lemke, 2001). This adaptation is significant, 
because the economic rationale subsequently extended past mere economics and into other 
areas of life (Lemke, 2001). Everything done by an individual in the modern era is done as an 
economic decision-making process, with concern for the maximisation of “human capital” 
(Baez, 2007: 7). Today’s citizen has a rooted belief in the strength of the economy to bring 
prosperity to all (Shaikh, 2005; Springer, Birch & MacLeavy, 2016). Whenever the system 
seems to malfunction, it is claimed that such failure is due to interference with the working of 
the market (Harman, 2008). Inequalities are not possible when the market is completely free, 
argues the neoliberalist, because when self-regulated, the market will ensure that wealth is 
distributed adequately (Turner, 2008). For some of the pioneering writers of neoliberalism 
(Hayek, 1962), it is always possible for an individual to work hard and pull him- or herself out 




exists a trickle-down effect, whereby the further prosperity of rich portions of society translates 
into the prosperity of all (Friedman, 1962). 
Many writers (Apple, 2004; Davies & Bansel, 2007; Eagleton, 1991, in Saunders, 2010; 
Harvey, 2005; Munck, 2005) also elaborate on how neoliberalism has managed to become so 
deeply engrained in the modern world. It should be understood for what it is – an ideology. As 
Eagleton (1991, in Saunders, 2010: 49) states, this ideology is maintained and promoted by 
“excluding alternatives and rival forms of thought, legitimizing the neoliberal structure and 
outcomes, [and] obfuscating the impacts of neoliberalism”. The staunch proponents of 
neoliberalism (politicians and the general public) claim it as the only viable option  in terms of 
an overarching economic plan (Harvey, 2005). One only needs to look at a figure like Margaret 
Thatcher, who frequently used the expression “[t]here is no alternative” (Apple, 2004: xi; 
Saunders, 2010: 49).  
The fall of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) served as another nail in the coffin 
for the narrative of alternatives (Munck, 2005). Davies and Bansel (2007: 253) remind one 
that, despite the many calamities brought about by neoliberal governments (George, 1999; 
Saul, 2005), “neoliberalism is still accepted as the only possible economic and social order 
that is available to us” (Davies & Bansel, 2007: 253), and “it is taken without question as true 
that future security and prosperity are linked to market solutions which solidify cooperation 
between economically interdependent nations” (Davies & Bansel, 2007: 253). According to 
Eagleton (1991, in Saunders, 2010: 49), an important method for imbedding the ideology of 
neoliberalism is to obfuscate its negative social and economic footprint. Such a “fragmented 
truth” (Saunders, 2010: 50) allows for the ease of sustained support from the citizens. Some 
theorists hold that the media and schools are used to obscure the real drawbacks of 
neoliberalism (Aronowitz, 2000; Herman & Chomsky, 1988; McChesney, 2004). 
As an ideology, neoliberalism has no shortage of support in today’s world. However, it is 
important to note that this support comes almost exclusively from economists, corporations 
and politicians. Of course, there is, firstly, the support coming from the originators, in the 
writings of figures such as Milton Friedman (1962) and Frederick Hayek (1962). Furthermore, 
one could argue that neoliberalism comes from a momentum of thought that is older – from 
the liberalism that predates it (see Smith, 2019) – but Friedman and Hayek gave it its unique 
form. Then there are the modern economists, who either furiously defend the merits of 
neoliberalism (such as Smith, 2017; Sumner, 2016) or who eagerly restate their allegiance to 
the doctrine (see Bowman, 2016; Williams, 2017). Many of these articles come from think-
tanks – a popular modern political force. Many of the aforementioned articles are available on 
think-tank websites. The massive influence that such groups have on policy decisions is 




reminds one that these groups, which are “never subject to democratic accountability”, have 
an enormous effect on the workings of the state. Wacquant (2010, cited in Slater, 2016: 379) 
puts it even more strongly by saying that think tanks have “irrevocably altered the institutional 
matrix through which policy knowledge percolates”. The bottom line is that these think tanks 
act as a very powerful way through which the supporters of neoliberalism channel their 
influence.  
 
3.3. Neoliberal values antithetical to ethical values 
After taking a brief look at an overview of neoliberalism and its supporters, I now turn to the 
writings of the critics, to consider some of the contestation and controversy surrounding 
neoliberal ideology, to see whether there are any areas where I disagree with the critics. This 
section is where sub-question 4 – “How does neoliberalism undermine ethical values?” – 
receives its due attention. Therefore, this section will show the different values, formed through 
the ideology of neoliberalism, which are in many ways antithetical to ethical values such as 
empathy, compassion and responsibility for one’s fellow human being. 
 
3.3.1 The neoliberal identity – individualism and economic decision-making 
Writing about neoliberalism, Baez (2007) shows extensively how our economic predisposition 
has filtered into the different areas of life, such as relationships and social institutions, of which 
schools form an invaluable part. Saunders (2010: 53) argues that the “pervasiveness of 
economic rationality into all aspects of life” is what contributes most to establishing the 
dominance of neoliberalism. Perhaps the most powerful effect of neoliberalism is the extent to 
which the individual is now defined by and identifies with economic incentives. All the non-
economic parts of the individual’s life are approached using a similar cost–benefit analysis 
(Lemke, 2001). 
In fact, within neoliberalism, there is such a great focus on the individual and his or her 
pursuance of an economically defined maximisation of ‘returns’, that social measures for the 
eradication of injustice are seen as something impeding upon individual autonomy (Saunders, 
2010). Therefore, these analyses of how citizens become economically minded in all areas of 
life were of great importance to this study, as one began to see why neoliberalism blocks one’s 
ability to be engaged with core values of empathy and responsibility. Critics of neoliberalism 
would rightly claim that neoliberalism benefits the rich at the expense of the poor and makes 
use of structural inequalities to benefit business (Chomsky, 1998; Giroux, 2005). It is, 




mode of life can be considered ethical. Neoliberalism does not bode well for our capacity to 
assimilate and live through values of empathy, compassion and responsibility. Davies and 
Bansel (2007: 252) note that this increased individualism brings about the “shrugging off of 
collective responsibility for the vulnerable and marginalized”.  
Apple (2004) also explains how neoliberalism has become so enmeshed with our beliefs and 
ways of thinking that we would be unable to consider it objectively as something for which 
there might be alternatives. When we use economic thinking to inform each aspect of our life, 
such thinking is seen as a natural part of being a human being. Hayek (1962) accepts 
economic thinking as a necessary ingredient of the free world (Saunders, 2010). Hofstadter 
(1992) writes how social Darwinism (see Hofstadter, 1941) has filtered into our way of thinking 
and mode of living. Competition is the norm (Hofstadter, 1992). Neoliberalism is also 
reinforced by the tendency to accept cost–benefit analysis and rational choice as mind-sets of 
which all human beings make use at all times (Bowles & Gintis, 1975; Munro, 2004). 
An article entitled “Neoliberalism and education” by Davies and Bansel (2007) also provides 
significant insights. The authors argue that neoliberalism as an ideology is a planned system, 
pushed by those with interests to pursue and gains to make. Work on this point has been done 
by George (1999) and Saul (2005). It is Foucault who notes that those in power “structure the 
possible field of action of others” (Foucault, 1994: 341). Davies and Bansel (2007: 248) state, 
“[it is] primarily this reconfiguration of subjects as economic entrepreneurs, and of institutions 
capable of producing them, which is central to understanding the structuring of possible fields 
of action that has been taking place with the installation of neoliberal modes of governance”.  
Davies and Bansel (2007: 248) then note that schools play a central role in helping this 
structuring of society along through the production of “highly individualized, responsibilized 
subjects”. The work of Rose (1999) shows how individuals become passive and submissive, 
and give up their freedom while thinking that they are gaining more and more of it. Davies and 
Bansel (2007: 249) further suggest that individuals are “seduced by their own perceived 
powers of freedom” while also having “let go of significant collective powers” like the “erosion 
of union power”. Individualism is, then, something seen as a sign of newfound freedom, while 
it is actually nothing but an opportunity for corporations to permeate increased competition. 
The result of this is nothing but more risk for the individual rather than the government, which 
harms not only the individual, but the state as well (Saul, 2005). Ironically, the very freedom 
that we seek, being so economically defined and dependent, is a freedom now even more at 
the mercy of the state, which shapes the economy through what it “desires, demands and 




The ways in which individuals are brought to take on more personal risk and to invest 
themselves wholeheartedly in a neoliberal mode are subtle, yet effective. Economic efficiency, 
or, better yet, survival, is presented as a “moral absolute” (Davies & Bansel, 2007: 251) and 
the usual avenues of democratic discussion are pushed to the side (Mouffe, 2005). Yet 
another way in which neoliberalism gains popularity in a covert way is through the use of 
“piecemeal functionalism” (Davies & Bansel, 2007: 251), which refers to the country-wide 
influences of large corporations and technocrats on policy, whereby there is a greatly 
“lessen[ed] chance people will grasp the overall [neoliberal] scheme and organize resistance” 
(Sklar, 1980: 21). Yet again, it is through discussions of globalisation and inevitability that 
people are eager to compete in a global market, and thus adopt such functionalist ideas 
(Davies & Bansel, 2007). And, as shown previously in this section this functionalism further 
increases (ironically) the control that government has over people’s lives – “[p]olitics must 
actively intervene in order to create the organisational and subjective conditions for 
entrepreneurship” (Rose, 1999: 144). 
Davies and Bansel (2007: 253) further show how the individual is identified as an 
entrepreneurial actor: 
Central to the imagined possibility of entrepreneurial success is the millionaire, or now 
multimillion dollar hero: even the most ordinary person can envisage for him/herself a life of 
extravagant consumption and a spectacular lifestyle. This fantasy is both produced and made 
tangible through the public circulation of celebrity lifestyles, cosmetic surgery and fashion tips. 
These, along with reality television home renovation, cooking and gardening programmes, 
locate media viewers within practices of consumption through which they come to understand 
that whatever they have is not enough, and that more is always better. Further, ambitions to 
wealth are modelled by corporate heroes and savvy entrepreneurs, and brought within reach 
through the promise of lotteries and ‘get rich quick schemes’. Practices of consumption, 
attached to a discourse of lifestyle, install desire within subjects in such a way as to consolidate 
their embeddedness in discourses of success as material, as involving economic ambitions and 
desires above all else. In this way, the market, as a model of entrepreneurship, is firmly installed 
in the desire of each subject to ‘be’ and to ‘become’. 
The current section has also mentioned the focus on “rational choice” inherent in 
neoliberalism. This type of ‘rationality-obsession’ begins with economics at the theoretical 
level, and then travels further to our broader cultural narratives. Economists are usually under 
the sway of a syndrome one can term ‘pure theory delusion’. In other words, economists do 
not seem to distinguish very often between straightforward mathematical theories and 
complex realities (Bordieu, 2002). Economists, according to Bordieu (2002:n.p.), have their 
minds formed in a “purely abstract, bookish, and theoretical” manner. Yet, although they are 




of belief” (Bordieu, 2002:n.p.). Some use the term “economism” to refer to this tendency of 
modern economists to believe (naively) that economics can be separated and divorced from 
the political sphere (Brohman, 1995: 297; De Goede, 2003: 80). It is with the same 
oversimplified reductionist stroke that we conceive of individuals as rational choice-makers, 
forgetting the multitude of variables related to culture, history and emotional motivation. As 
Brohman (1995: 315) states, “if development concerns processes of human action and 
interaction rather than just goods and resources, it is important to deepen our understanding 
of what it is to be human”.  
I agree strongly with these writers that the predominance of economic thought – without it 
being interwoven and balanced with the social and political realities of the modern world – is 
a dangerous position, which sustains an uncritical pursuance of our contemporary model of 
progression (regression). It would seem that economists are, generally, not interested in 
anything other than what makes an economy prosper in a very narrowly defined and gross 
domestic product- (GDP)-oriented manner. Then it becomes very easy to “cloak with 
mathematical reason” (Bordieu, 2002:n.p.) the obvious destructive elements of our global 
neoliberal system. Whatever the cause of the economists’ limited vision, are those the types 
of people that should be carrying the greatest weight in policymaking? I find myself firmly 
placed within the other camp – those who consider the ideology of neoliberalism to be an 
obstacle on the path of ethical human progress (see Barber, 2008; Bauman, 1999; 2007; 
Edwards, 2000; Rhodes, 2013). As will be show in the next two chapters, the tendency to try 
to reinterpret complex, daily ethical situations, and pervert them into abstract versions of their 
former selves, does not create a good platform for progressive ethical thinking (see Barber, 
2008; Bauman, 1999; 2007; Edwards, 2000; Rhodes, 2013). 
 
3.3.2 A potential gap in the critical literature 
Thus far, within this section (3.3.1), I have shown that there are many authors who highlight 
the hyper-individuality and economically-driven, hyper-rationalised decision-making that 
results from neoliberal ideology. However, I feel the analysis has not answered sub-question 
2 – “How might neoliberalism undermine ethical values?” sufficiently. We saw, for example, 
how one piece of literature (Davies & Bansel 2007: 252) noticed the “shrugging off of collective 
responsibility for the vulnerable and marginalized”. However, there is no further investigation 
or explanation and no deeper analysis of exactly how this came to be. The theorists referred 
to in the previous section (Apple, 2004; Baez, 2007; Bowles & Gintis, 1975; Davies & Bansel, 
2007; Hofstadter, 1992; Lemke, 2001; Munro, 2004; Saunders, 2010) made mention of how 




broad and there is no discussion of the underlying processes that lead to such a situation. It 
is in the midst of such broad analyses that some (such as O’Neill & Weller, 2016; Venugopal, 
2015, cited in Macrine, 2016) feel obliged to point out the unsystematic nature of the literature 
critical of neoliberalism. O’Neill and Weller (2016: 84) aim to investigate whether 
“neoliberalism’s power to shape contemporary societies is overstated”, feeling that 
neoliberalism has been defined so broadly that its threat is exaggerated. While there are those 
who insist that neoliberalism should not be too tightly defined (such as Springer, 2015, cited 
in O’Neill & Weller, 2016: 85), others feel it is not wise to bestow such a “mercurial position” 
on something that is said to be of such critical significance (O’Neill & Weller, 2016: 85). 
Venugopal (2015, cited in Macrine, 2016: 310) sees ‘neoliberalism’ as a “deeply problematic 
and incoherent term that has multiple and contradictory meanings, and thus has diminished 
analytical value”. Then again, others would argue that neoliberalism is so malleable because 
it always exists as a leechlike entity that needs to infiltrate and merge with other systems (see 
Peck, 2013, cited in Macrine, 2016: 311). While I cannot agree with those who claim the 
dangers of neoliberalism might be overstated (such as O’Neill & Weller, 2016: 84), I do think 
their concerns stem from them sensing a real problem, even if misidentified. For example, 
O’Neill and Weller (2016: 91) state:  
[E]ffective political activism must target actual events and occurrences that affect ordinary 
people’s lives, and engage in ways that mobilize their interests, preferably in opposition to solid 
things that you can metaphorically throw a rock at, not imaginary things that defy definition. 
In other words, what lies at the heart of the frustrations of writers such as O’Neill and Weller 
is the difficulty in mobilising citizens against neoliberalism. They express that neoliberalism, 
that which one attempts to oppose, is like an undefined, unidentified mist that cannot be 
grabbed or struck at. It is at this juncture that I want to voice my biggest concern regarding the 
literature critical of neoliberalism and offer some insights unique to this study. My concern is 
that there is not enough detail when analysing the behavioural patterns and ethical beliefs of 
the individual. By ‘beliefs’ I specifically mean the ways in which we view, think about and 
interact with other people. The fourth sub-question of this study was: “How does neoliberalism 
undermine ethical values?” I feel one needs a completely different type of analysis to answer 
this question – different from the macro-level analysis just mentioned. I want to bring to the 
reader’s attention a more micro-level analysis.  
Whereas the literature reviewed thus far might have spoken in political, economic or 
sociological terms, this study emphasised a more psychological or contemplative direction. 
After all, the main research question was, “Can contemplative education respond to the 
tension between neoliberalism and values education in the Curriculum and Assessment Policy 




counteractive effect of contemplative education against neoliberalism (when speaking of 
values). This has, in large part, to do with the ability of contemplative education to make one 
aware of the modes and patterns of thinking that have control over us (see 5.3.1). 
Contemplative education is, thus, quite psychological and introspective and it is this nuanced 
exploration of the internal world of the individual that offers a detailed roadmap for countering 
potentially unethical neoliberal tendencies (see 5.3.1 and 5.3.2). Contemplative education 
(Chapter 5) as well as the care ethics discussed in the next chapter (as a precursor to 
contemplative education) both share an emphasis on social structures at micro level – the 
decisions and judgements we make about others and how we relate to them.  
Of course, I will delve into these aspects of care ethics and contemplative education in more 
detail in the relevant chapters, but it is necessary to mention briefly this preoccupation with 
the microanalysis of the individual and his or her beliefs, identities, perceptions and patterns 
of behaviour, that shape both schools of thought. This is because this attention to the micro-
level details makes these two schools of thought unique in their power to deconstruct and 
counteract neoliberalism. If that which counteracts neoliberalism were best understood in 
terms of a micro-level analysis of the individual, then it would have done this study well to find 
criticisms of neoliberalism, which understand the relevance of such a micro-level analysis. 
That is the role the next section and the upcoming chapters, in my humble opinion, succeeded 
with. This was, in my estimation, the best way to answer the question of which values 
contained in neoliberalism stand opposed to ethical values. 
When asking about which values drive us toward a continued absorption in neoliberal 
ideology, the general idea is that people function as a “reserve army of employees rendered 
docile by these social processes that make their situations precarious” (Bordieu, 2002:n.p.). 
In other words, it is growing job insecurities and economic austerity that serve as our excuse 
for doubling down on economics as our saviour. I am not convinced that such an analysis cuts 
deep enough. What is this culture of desires, the shallow values that have become the norm, 
which have led us so easily down that road? This is the more intimate level at which I wanted 
to investigate the values contained within neoliberalism. Macrine (2016: 313) blames the 
streams of knowledge to which we are exposed for our obsession with neoliberalism and 
claims, “naming the various pedagogies of neoliberalism can help to expose the insipid logic 
of the neoliberal regimes and expose how these predatory practices teach us to accept our 
oppression”. However, even a pedagogical explanation, is not, I fear, self-reflective enough. It 
is for this reason that I wanted to find answers that dig deeper. 
Therefore, the choice of care ethics and contemplative education was a very specific one, for 
these are the schools of thought where values are intertwined with one’s relationship with the 




in which they affect one’s environment and one’s fellow human beings. However, as I 
mentioned, before moving to care ethics or to contemplative education, I had to identify 
criticisms of neoliberalism that move from a macro-oriented to a micro-oriented analysis. Such 
areas of criticism against neoliberalism could prove essential for the momentum of this study. 
One such area included writings on identity and relationality. These critics (Barber, 2008; 
Bauman, 1999; 2007; Edwards, 2000; Rhodes, 2013) place the responsibility for the 
continuing flourishing of neoliberalism more firmly within the lap of the individual. They make 
clear that there are identities we accept and relational behaviours we imbibe, which make our 
neglect of the other and infatuation with neoliberalism seamless (Barber, 2008; Bauman, 1999; 
2007; Edwards, 2000; Rhodes, 2013). This is the type of introspective and self-critical direction 
in which the literature on neoliberalism might as well move. I remind the reader that when I 
say I have identified a gap in the literature, I am not claiming that this area of (micro-level) 
criticism does not exist (I provide the necessary examples and cite the authors). I am merely 
expressing that it is an underrepresented area within the literature. Perhaps that only shows 
that our entire academic world lacks a contemplative and self-reflective element. Furthermore, 
my unique contribution will be to show how writings such as what follows align perfectly with 
what has been said within care ethics and contemplative education, making myself part of the 
growing but small group of persons who feel that contemplative education is an apt counter to 
the negative effects of neoliberalism on education. 
 
3.3.3 The neoliberal identity and relationality 
As I have attempted to explain, as an expansion of the criticism of neoliberalism, some writers 
study the way in which we form identities, for ourselves and others, and how such identities 
influence the way in which we relate to the ‘other’. As will be clear in future chapters, values 
of empathy, compassion and responsibility require a mature sense of relating with and caring 
for the ‘other’. Various writers (such as Barber, 2008; Bauman, 1999; 2007; Edwards, 2000; 
Rhodes, 2013) have shown that neoliberalism fails miserably in this regard. This section is, 
thus, the most important part of my response to sub-question 2 of this thesis: “How might 
neoliberalism undermine ethical values?” 
Rhodes (2013: 37) is troubled by the “neoliberal subject position [with its] assumed allegiance 
to capital rather than to other human beings or the quality of life”. He refers to the work of 
Peterson (2006) to remind us of how neoliberalism results in the “literal destruction of the 
public space” (Rhodes, 2013: 37) and “its marketization and commodification of relationships” 
(Rhodes, 2013: 37). In a neoliberal framework, responsibility is a very individual concern. We 




The effect is that any thoughts on values of empathy and responsibility become what Rhodes 
calls “asocial” (Rhodes, 2013: 39). My question is how effective our core ethical values will be 
if we are so impersonal in the ways in which we relate. Lister (2010: 243, cited in Rhodes, 
2013: 40) wonders what the effect of our attempts at social justice would be if we forget that it 
is grounded in “social and political relations … and involves dimensions of recognition, respect, 
discrimination, representation, voice, domination and oppression”.  
We must view social justice as a “relational issue” (Rhodes, 2013: 41). Then we will be able 
to see that there is a “constitutive relationship between the individual and [his or her] social 
surroundings” and that “the individual and the broader collective are […] dependent upon each 
other” (Rhodes, 2013: 41). Rhodes goes on to warn that our obsession with a personal version 
of responsibility leads to the minimisation of “systemic concerns” (Rhodes, 2013: 42). He 
mentions the idea of “ethical consumerism” (Rhodes, 2013: 43) as an example of our 
impersonal approach to social justice.  
Marginson (2006: 207) shows how our neoliberalist attitude, even when concerning matters 
of ethics and social justice (empathy and responsibility), has a “superficial discursive fit with 
the desires for commodified consumption now central to daily life”. As Žižek (2009, cited in 
Rhodes, 2013: 45) explains, it is as if one purchases ethical satisfaction and success, the 
pacification of one’s conscience, as if it were another product on the market. Žižek (2009, cited 
in Rhodes, 2013: 45) is quite adamant in his stance on social justice, arguing that an attempt 
at social justice that does not look at systemic issues only “perpetuates an unjust system by 
minimizing the misery level of the byproducts of that very system (poverty, homelessness, 
entrenched social hierarchies) such that the system itself continues to be tolerated”. Rhodes’ 
general message (2013: 46) is that we should be careful to accept a social justice that caters 
to our “individualized, privatized, personalized, and commodified consumer-choice oriented 
framework”. 
Biesta (2007) reminds us that all the uncertainty that surrounds us (of which strangers form a 
part) is an inescapable part of life. Therefore, avoiding this uncertainty is a key ingredient of 
our submission to the ideologies that weaken our sense of empathy, compassion and 
responsibility. Once we can admit that uncertainty is a “permanent condition of life” (Bauman, 
1994: 36), and face it, we can realise that we cannot have an ethical system without this “world 
of otherness” (Biesta, 2007: 54). Thinking in terms of education, we must know that teachers 
cannot force learners to find solutions to these uncertainties, but they can create “opportunities 
within education to meet and encounter what is different, strange, and other” (Bauman, 2007: 
69). Consequently, we shall find that “difference, plurality and uncertainty is not a challenge to 
endure, overcome or tolerate; it is the condition from which individuals can collectively realize 




the fully integrated and rational self for which we yearn so much in our contemporary academic 
milieu – and that teachers have a chance to facilitate a more pragmatic identity discovery for 
learners. The work of Gunzenhauser (2008) also covers the notion of self-reflection and the 
formation of an identity based upon one’s relation to the other, as opposed to the more 
ambitious and self-satisfied, yet, arguably, false sense of identity for which we are usually 
striving. Gunzenhauser calls it the “subjectivity formed in day-to-day life” (2008: 2235). Trend 
(2007: 7) gives the same message: “underexamined aspects of daily existence can provide 
insights into larger issues that affect who we are”. 
Rhodes (2013) adds how we, in the modern, neoliberal world, form our identity primarily 
through the act of consumption, “[s]cholars suggest that consumption is now more significant 
than production as a cultural force that shapes individuals and society and deserves, for all its 
conceptual messiness, to be studied” (Rhodes, 2013: 75). He quotes Sassatelli (2007: 6): 
[T]o consume is to act as consumers, that is to put on a particular, contested kind of identity 
and to deal with its contradictions. In this light, consumer culture is more than commoditization 
and affluence, more than conspicuous consumption and the democratization of luxuries. 
Consumer culture also produces consumers. 
Consumer identity is so deeply engrained within our culture that the act of consumption can 
be seen as patriotic (Soper, 2008). Sassatelli (2007: 11) says our society “requires a process 
of learning whereby social actors are practically trained to perform (and enjoy) their roles as 
consumers”.  
For theorists such as Sassatelli (2007) and Campbell (1987), it is highly important to 
acknowledge the role individualism plays in forming the consumer identity. This individualism 
leads to the possibility to “create and express an identity through […] acts of consumption” 
(Rhodes, 2013: 76). 
Rhodes (2013) draws from postmodern writers (Baudrillard, 1998; Campbell, 2004; 
Featherstone, 1991; Gottdiener, 2000) to show how our identity is formed through the 
signifying power a product and its ability to bestow meaning. The inherent or practical value 
of the product becomes secondary. Baudrillard (1998) shows how our consumption becomes 
our proud projection of our most cherished identity. Similarly, Sassatelli (2007: 155) echoes, 
“[o]ur world calls us to positively demonstrate our capacity to choose” and this is how we try 
and convince others and ourselves that we are “sovereigns of [our]selves” (Sassatelli, 
2007: 155).  
Getting back to the ideas of relationality, Edwards (2000) reminds us that consumption 
specifically also fulfils the role of creating divisions – inclusion and exclusion – in service of 




integrity of our ethics and our sense of empathy and responsibility. As Rhodes (2013: 85) 
says, “[b]oth Bauman (2007) and Barber (2008) fear a world filled with apolitical individuals 
who have little sense of connection or responsibility to one another.” 
Turning to the article entitled “The self in a consumer society” (Bauman, 1999), one gains 
more insight into the construction of this consumerist identity and the implication for values of 
empathy and responsibility. Bauman (1999: 37) shows how the neoliberalist consumer identity 
is built on the premise that “nothing should be embraced by a consumer firmly, nothing should 
command a commitment forever”, envisaging our overall struggle with commitment (as, for 
example, with a commitment towards ‘the other’). Furthermore, “consumers must never be left 
to rest, [but should] be constantly exposed to new temptations” (Bauman, 1999: 38). Is this 
model realistic? Not quite, for, although “everybody may wish to be a consumer and indulge 
in the opportunities which that mode of life holds […] not everybody can be a consumer” 
(Bauman, 1999: 40). In other words, there are clear economic limitations to this neoliberal 
lifestyle that almost all seem to pursue fervently. 
Another important article by Bauman (2007) is “Collateral casualties of consumerism”. 
Bauman investigates the concept of collateral damage and to what extent it really is only a 
“denial of responsibility – moral responsibility as well as legal” (2007: 25), explaining that “what 
the invoking of the ‘unintentionality’ argument intends to deny or exonerate is ethical blindness 
– conditioned or deliberate” (Bauman, 2007: 26). Bauman goes on to focus on how the spirit 
of denial and the argument of collateral damage are found in the form of our economic pursuits 
(Bauman, 2007: 27), finding the highest expression in “commoditization of human life” 
(Bauman, 2007: 28). The high pressures of our modern work environment create problems at 
home, where a cycle of reduction in social proficiency and lessened enthusiasm for 
maintaining homely relations unfolds. In Bauman’s (2007: 29) words: 
The search for individual pleasures articulated by the currently offered commodities, a search 
guided and constantly redirected and refocused by the successive advertising campaigns, 
provides the sole acceptable – indeed badly needed and welcome – substitute for both the 
uplifting solidarity of work-mates and the glowing warmth of caring-for-and-being-cared-by the 
near and dear inside the family home and its immediate neighbourhood. 
Bauman is eager to challenge politicians who claim to be worried about the family unit to admit 
the consumerist cause behind the “wilting of social solidarity inside workplaces and the fading 
of the caring–sharing impulse inside family homes” (2007: 29).  
Bauman looks at the concept of the ‘underclass’1 and how it denotes persons who are outside 
“all classes and the class hierarchy itself, with little chance and no need of readmission” (2007: 
 




30). This is because the “defining mark of sovereignty is the prerogative to exempt and 
exclude” (Bauman, 2007: 30). He goes as far as to remind us of the classifications Jews 
received in Nazi Germany. In consumer society, people are judged by their “commodity value” 
(Bauman, 2007: 31). Those without market value are isolated, not only physically, but also 
through “mental separation, resulting in the poor being banished from the universe of moral 
empathy” (Bauman, 2007: 34). From here, there is more scope for avoiding our ethical roles. 
To make us think critically about the identities we place upon those who form part of the 
‘underclass’, Bauman reminds us that “threats are projections of a society’s own inner 
ambivalence and ambivalence-born anxieties about its own ways and means” (Bauman, 2007: 
35). In other words, we often classify as a threat whatever is nothing but a product of our own 
shortcomings, as we do with our contributions to systemic inequality. And whereas there was 
once a sense of collective responsibility for what was seen as “a collectively caused blight” 
(Bauman, 2007: 39), we now view it as individual problems caused by individuals – “[t]he 
dangerous (because potentially rebellious) classes are thereby redefined as collections of 
dangerous (because potentially criminal) individuals” (Bauman, 2007: 39). One finds one’s 
self in the underclass because of one’s own actions (Bauman, 2007: 41).  
We have come as far as to remove the problem of our underclass from issues of poverty, and 
thereby we have managed to “deny the people assigned to the underclass the right to press 
charges and ‘claim damages’ by presenting themselves as victims (or even ‘collateral’ only 
victims) of societal malfunction or wrongdoing” (Bauman, 2007: 43). If the downtrodden want 
any compensation, “it is they who would have to shoulder the burden of proof” (Bauman, 2007: 
43). Even more importantly, as a result of all the emphasis on the underclass and its depravity, 
the blame is shifted away from the issue of poverty. Actually, “the abnormality of the 
underclass normalized the presence of poverty” (Bauman, 2007: 43). Bauman (2007: 45) 
refers to Mead (1992) as an example of a writer who helps to convince us that we have done 
all we can to help the poor, and we have provided all the chances, yet “they are [still] 
irresponsible, they indecently refuse to take them” (Bauman, 2007: 45).  
As neoliberalism pushes for fewer and fewer public services, the family unit has become the 
expected safety net (Hochschild, 2003, cited in Bauman, 2007: 45). Yet, our consumerist 
mentalities “strip the families of their social-ethical skills and resources” (Bauman, 2007: 45). 
Bauman refers to the “modernizing” goals of neoliberalism as the cause of “the continuing 
decomposition and crumbling of social bonds and communal cohesion” (Bauman, 2007: 50). 
All the while, we wonder where the benefits are that were promised by the invisible hand 
mechanism, a concept that is now even further “beyond the reach of the available instruments 




expressed by Manne (2005: 5), according to whom “the New Right’s market fundamentalism 
eroded the foundations of the basic human associations – community, family, marriage.” 
The work of these writers proves exceedingly useful, as it sheds light on some of the values 
found in neoliberalism – values such as hyper-individualism and hyper-rationalism (Baez, 
2007; Bordieu, 2002; Bowles & Gintis, 1975; Davies and Bansel, 2007; Lemke, 2001; Munro, 
2004; Saunders, 2010), strong desires for commodities (Baudrillard, 1998; Marginson, 2006; 
Rhodes, 2013; Sassatelli, 2007; Soper, 2008), the avoidance of strong commitments (Barber, 
2008; Bauman, 1999; 2007; Edwards, 2000; Rhodes, 2013) and exclusionary identity 
formation (Bauman, 2007; Edwards, 2000). These values lead to a weakened sense of the 
family network and care, asocial functioning and a disregard for the plight of the ‘other’. The 
analysis above gives an account of the negative values inherent in neoliberalism, because 
this analysis does not simply relate of which broader social systems and structures a learner 
forms part, but looks at the inner workings of the learner, the behaviour and patterns that exist 
within him or her, that make it easier for such learner to slot into the said systems (schooling 
and social). In other words, the above analysis gives a thorough account of the culture and 
ideas to which the child or young adult is subjected, even beyond the boundaries of schools 
or universities. Thus, when thinking of learners in a classroom, this section is important 
because when teaching a child, one teaches a child who has formed an identity and a specific 
mode of relationality. This is why it is not as effective, I argue, to teach them about the values 
inherent within neoliberalism as an ideology (something external to themselves), as it would 
be to challenge the patterns of thought and behaviour that that are present within them as 
neoliberal values.  
The topics of neoliberalism, consumer identity and relationality magnifiy very specific 
psychological, ethical and private pitfalls of neoliberalism, which will help one to have a fuller 
grasp of the significance of care ethics and contemplative education when one realises exactly 
how well these schools of thought counter the said pitfalls (because they also address very 
specific, personal and psychological drives within the individual).  
 
3.3.4 Neoliberalism and education  
As was clear in section 3.3.1, educational systems are used to spread neoliberalism. The role 
that schools play in solidifying this ideology of neoliberalism was mentioned by a few writers 
(Baez, 2007; Davies & Bansel, 2007), who strengthen the premise and motivation of this thesis 
– that the South African curriculum, its neoliberalist leanings, and the effect those leanings 
have on the ethical functioning of a child, deserve investigation, criticism and transformation. 




There is no doubt that these neoliberal tendencies have spilled over into the realm of 
education.  
Tertiary institutions have had to focus on maximising earnings and acquiring private funding 
in the wake of decreased government funding (Alexander & Arceneaux, 2018; Giroux, 2005b; 
Giroux & Giroux, 2004; Hill, 2003; Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004). The economic focus has led 
to the focus on hiring part-time staff (Alexander & Arceneaux, 2018; Aronowitz, 2000; Giroux, 
2005; McLaren, 2005; Rhoades, 2006). The organisational side of the institutions have also 
undergone change, taking on a hierarchical form, rather than the older model of shared 
governance (Currie, 1998; Eckel, 2000; Gumport, 1993; Hadley, 2014). Even the research 
generated by a faculty has become geared towards commercialisation and application 
(Alexander, 2001; Clark, 1998; Sibanda, 2019; Slaughter, 1998; Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004), 
while tenures are criticised as economically inefficient (Horowitz, 2004; Tierney, 1998). 
Learners are also more focused on the instrumental value of their education rather than the 
inner satisfaction and deeper lessons they can gain from it (Astin, 1998; Bowl, 2017; Kopnina, 
2014). The learner is now re-identified as a customer for whom the education is a product 
(Chaffee, 1998; Swagler, 1978; Wellen, 2005).  
There are numerous studies on how a learner sees him- or herself as a customer (Apple, 
2004; Aronowitz, 2000; Giroux & Giroux, 2004; Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004). Previously, there 
was a much richer sense of identity in terms of learning and development (Winston, 1999). 
Saunders (2010) remarks how society continues to identify with learners as customers (also 
see Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004), even when many writers have shown that learners can never 
be equated with customers (e.g. Swagler, 1978; Winston, 1999) and that there are negative 
results owing to this misidentification (e.g. Newson, 2004; Wellen, 2005). 
The neoliberal influence on educational institutions has not only taken root in America, where 
it has been researched in North and South America (Torres & Schugurensky, 2002), but also 
in Western Europe (Hill, 2003), Australia and New Zealand (Marginson, 2004), and other parts 
of the world (Hill & Kumar, 2009; Olssen & Peters, 2005). The next section (3.4) will show the 
study of neoliberalism in South Africa. 
Saunders (2010: 55) relates how Bowles and Gintis (1976) “chronicle the vocalization of the 
curriculum, corporatization of governing boards, and the focus on marketable technologies 
and meeting the needs of capital beginning over a hundred years before the rise of 
neoliberalism”. Saunders (2010: 55) elaborates by specifying what the unique contributions of 
neoliberalism are to the educational system. Although schools had already begun to be 
economically oriented, with the advent of neoliberalism one sees an increase in the “scope 




administrators, and policy makers explicitly support and embrace these capitalistic goals and 
priorities” (Saunders, 2010: 55). 
Neoliberalism has created an atmosphere of competition (Clarke, 2005), which has come to 
influence learners in schools and at university. Gone is the sense of community, as it was 
replaced by ‘customers’ who are focused on their own human capital (Newson, 2004). 
According to Davies and Bansel (2007: 254), “public institutions, such as schools and 
hospitals, previously supported as essential to collective well-being, were reconstituted under 
neoliberalism as part of the market”, creating the idea that “there is nothing distinctive or 
special about education or health; they are services and products like any other, to be traded 
in the marketplace” (Peters, 1999: 2). For Davies and Bansel (2007: 254), schools are “early 
targets” of such neoliberal ideology, which use “management technologies [that include] 
increased exposure to competition, increased accountability measures and the 
implementation of performance goals in the contracts of management”. 
To summarise this brief analysis of neoliberalism and education, all of these findings make it 
clear that the effect of the neoliberal ideology on school learners and university students (and 
those who manage schools) is to instil in them a preoccupation with economic hankerings 
(Chaffee, 1998; Swagler, 1978; Wellen, 2005). The learner’s way of moving through life is 
seen as an economic actor using economic rationality to make choices (Apple, 2004; 
Aronowitz, 2000; Giroux & Giroux, 2004; Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004). Their school 
experience has instrumental value and learners see themselves as consumers of a product – 
which undermines their potential to be community-oriented (Astin, 1998; Bowl, 2017; Kopnina, 
2014).  
All of the above makes me wonder to what extent the neoliberal ideology affects the ability of 
a growing learner to care about and cultivate values of empathy and responsibility. To engage 
in ethical education, as future chapters will show, one requires a contemplative approach, and 
an environment that stimulates reflective and introspective attitudes. The fast-paced, 
competitive and profit-driven nature of neoliberal education does not bode well for the above 
requirements. Finally, seeing education in such extreme instrumental terms is quite antithetical 
to how one should view one’s education if one were to gain ethical training from it. 
 
3.4 Neoliberalism and South Africa 
Finally, as the last section on neoliberalism, I consider some of the literature indicative of the 




In the previous chapter, I have introduced many post-apartheid education policies (see 2.2.3, 
2.2.4, 2.2.5, 2.3.1 and 2.3.2). It is important to study some of them and to assess to what 
extent they are wrapped in neoliberal ideology. I draw upon the authors mentioned in the 
previous chapter, who analysed and assessed the policy documents and implementation. 
Jonathan Jansen has written extensively on the political mood of, especially, the first few 
phases of post-apartheid policies. Outcomes-based education (OBE) was the first serious 
move on the part of the post-apartheid government to enact educational reform. However, as 
I referenced in the previous chapter (see 2.2.4), Jansen (1998) points out that it was to be a 
series of policies, which served as mere political symbolism, rather than having any serious 
implementation to show. This is a response from government, which seems to be not much 
more than “a political response to apartheid schooling, rather than one which is concerned 
with the modalities of change at the classroom” (Jansen, 1998: 321). These early policies also 
strived to assure legitimacy for the new state (Jansen, 1998: 330). Jansen (1998: 330) argues, 
“the national syllabus revision process (1995) was driven almost exclusively by official 
attempts to demonstrate to constituencies that at least some action was forthcoming from the 
Ministry of Education in the period immediately following the elections”.  
Jansen makes similar arguments elsewhere, and says that when any kind of implementation 
was to be noted, it “was not an advanced planning tool, but something improvised even as 
policy was being introduced to teachers” (Jansen, 2002: 203). Chisholm (2003; 2005) and 
Chisholm and Leyendecker (2008) argued likewise about the education policies being steeped 
in political agendas. The framework of OBE has informed all post-apartheid education policies 
and has been an attempt to place the learner at the centre of the educational process 
(Chisholm, 2003). However, this learner-centredness can be argued to be nothing but a front 
for economic incentives. Jansen (1998: 324) points to the economic incentives, which drove 
these early reforms, noting that, “among advocates, OBE policy claims in South Africa are 
either associated with, stated as prerequisite for or sometimes offered as a solution to 
economic growth”.  
Yet, Jansen (1998: 324) also points out, “[there] is not a shred of evidence in almost 80 years 
of curriculum change literature to suggest that altering the curriculum of schools leads to or is 
associated with changes in national economies”. Even studies done by the World Bank in 
Colombia and Tanzania (Psacharopoulos & Woodhall, 1985) show “there is simply no 
evidence from experimental research that curriculum diversification, i.e. an attempt to make 
curriculum responsive to economic conditions, has ‘significant’ social or private benefits” 
(Jansen, 1998: 324). Chisholm (2003; 2005) and Chisholm and Leyendecker (2008) argue 
likewise about the economic agendas that have always laid behind the post-apartheid 




Africa to focus on “integration into a global world on the basis of markets and advanced 
technology”. 
Jansen (1998: 327) also accuses OBE-based policies of avoiding the issue of values by 
focusing on instrumentalism and specified outcomes, and never on the deeper purposes of 
education. The only value statement he feels is identifiable is the phrase ‘participate actively 
in promoting a sustainable, just and equitable society’ from the report of the Learning Area 
Committee for Human and Social Sciences (1996, cited in Jansen, 1998: 327). He calls this 
phrase one of many “bland and decontextualised global statements” (Jansen, 1998: 327). I 
have already discussed how an instrumental approach to education places significant barriers 
between a learner and his or her capacity to cultivate values of empathy and responsibility 
(see 3.3.4). There seems to be little awareness amongst members of government of how a 
focus on economic goals is often to the exclusion of empathetic and responsibility-driven 
values, for the contradictory sets of goals are always found, side by side, in the different 
education policy documents. 
Baatjies (2005) provides a detailed analysis of how the corporatisation of education under 
neoliberal ideology, as discussed in section 3.3.4, is present in South African education. Peet 
(2002: 71) points out that neoliberalism has been deeply rooted in the ANC (the ruling party 
in South Africa since 1994). Other authors, such as Brock-Utne (2003), provide a detailed 
analysis of the strong neoliberal influences on education across sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
3.5 Summary 
This chapter aimed to answer the sub-question related to neoliberalism: “How might 
neoliberalism undermine ethical values?”. The first part of the chapter provided an overview 
of neoliberalism, and looked at some of its supporters. Thereafter, I attempted to answer the 
question of the values contained within neoliberalism and which counteract or undermine other 
ethical values. To answer this question, I showed how neoliberalism leads to identities based 
on a type of hyper-individualism and economic decision-making. However, I did not feel that 
the authors referred to in this sub-section could answer the sub-question adequately. 
Therefore, I aimed to find literature that offered a deeper analysis. This was found in the form 
of work done on neoliberal identities and relationality (see 3.3.3).  
The choice of these writers relates to how they make a deeper and more detailed study of the 
beliefs we hold (especially regarding other people and how we relate to them) when we are 
saturated with neoliberalism. This is a very introspective and detailed account of some of the 
values fostered by neoliberalism. The choice of focusing on the work of these writers also 




that centre on care ethics and contemplative education. I use the term ‘micro-level analysis’ 
to explain the kind of vision I believe is best suited for unveiling the values contained within 
neoliberalism at core level – in psychology, in the hearts and minds of the people that make 
up the modern, neoliberal system. The final section of the chapter brought the reader’s 
attention back to the South African context and showed what has been written regarding 



























CHAPTER 4: LITERATURE REVIEW – CARE ETHICS 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I report on my attempt to understand the values of compassion and empathy 
through a care ethics lens. A short section at the end also considers responsibility as a value 
(see 4.5). Compassion, empathy (these two are sometimes understood in synonymous terms) 
and responsibility are all identified as values espoused by the South African education policy 
documents. The main premise of this study was that contemplative education could act as the 
defender of these values whereas neoliberalism would lead to their minimisation. Sub-
question 3 asked, “What are the inherent values of contemplative education?” and this led to 
question 4, “How can the values cultivated by contemplative education counteract a neoliberal 
mentality?” This chapter, then, reports on the project of understanding the values within 
contemplative education.  
Care ethics serves as a useful conceptual framework through which to understand some of 
the ideas found in contemplative education better, especially those related to contemplative 
education and compassionate, ethical living. Ultimately, I was more interested in 
contemplative education than I was in care ethics, for reasons that will be explained in the 
next chapter, but care ethics offers a foundation for understanding, in a conceptual and 
philosophical manner, what is most lacking, in terms of empathy, compassion and 
responsibility, in a neoliberalist world. This is because care ethics is, arguably, a solid 
philosophical school, that focuses exclusively on ethics and ethical conduct between human 
beings (see Gilligan, 1977; Noddings, 2002a; 2002b; 2005; 2013; Slote, 2001; 2007; 2016), 
and, as I will attempt to show, allows for a thorough conceptual challenge levelled at 
neoliberalism. If I had focused on contemplative education alone, the arguments constructed 
against neoliberalism would not have been nearly as well formulated and philosophically 
grounded. Beyond that, care ethics also contains many arguments and concepts found within 
contemplative education and, thus, helps one to understand the thrust of contemplative 
education ideas. 
Therefore, this chapter reports on some of the concepts and arguments introduced by care 
ethicists, and provides accounts of these base arguments as iterated by different authors, as 
well as more arguments brought forth by single authors, and, of course, the criticisms against 
these authors and against care ethics in general. The concept of values is central to the realm 
of ethics in general (Pojman, 1995), and, therefore, forms part of a considerable network of 
philosophical debates and conversations. It was necessary for me to be clear on the specific 




relevance of their writings with regard to the tension between neoliberalism and the values of 
CAPS. It was also important to consider what has been written about the challenges regarding 
the implementation of values in the South African context, and such literature was considered, 
in order to broaden the understanding of the concept of values in a way that is applicable to 
the setting where this study was situated.  
 
4.2 An overview of the ethics of care 
Care ethics, as a school of thought, evolved from the idea that we need an alternative to the 
justice-based theories of modern human rights theory. For the care ethicists (Gilligan, 1977; 
Noddings, 2002a; 2002b; 2005; 2013; Slote, 2001; 2007; 2016), such justice- and rights-based 
morality, through its emphasis on principles, involves an abstraction of reality and, 
consequently, allows human beings to become more asocial and less directly involved and 
responsible in the lives of their fellow human beings. This was argued in the second half of 
the previous chapter, and will become more obvious during this chapter. Instead, care ethics 
(Gilligan, 1977; Noddings, 2002a; 2002b; 2005; 2013; Slote, 2001; 2007; 2016) places primary 
emphasis on a very interpersonal type of involvement in the ethical struggles of those around 
us, and urges us to build empathetic relationships with them.  
Although some (such as Sander-Staudt, n.d.) would say that care ethics as it exists today was 
influenced by much earlier feminist figures and writers such as Mary Wollstonecraft, Catherine 
and Harriet Beecher, and Charlotte Perkins, it took form as its own theory with writers Carol 
Gilligan (1977) and Nel Noddings (2013) during the 1980s. A major subsequent contributor, 
in my mind, is Michael Slote (2001; 2007; 2016), although there are many other important 
contributors, such as Joan Tronto (1993) and Virginia Held (1993; 2006). In 4.3, I explain some 
of the main tenets of care ethics, as well as how they contrast with the justice- and principle-
based morality of the modern, neoliberalist world.  
 
4.3 The contents of the theory 
In this subsection, I turn to the contents of the theory of care ethics, looking at where Gilligan 
(1977), Noddings (2002a; 2002b; 2005; 2013) and Slote (2001; 2007; 2016) are in agreement, 
and in which areas Noddings and Slote developed their own, further theories, with nuanced 






4.3.1 Dichotomies between principle-based morality and care ethics  
I begin with the work of Carol Gilligan (1977), who is, arguably, the founder of care ethics. In 
“In a different voice: Women’s conceptions of self and of morality”, Gilligan (1977) reports on 
some of the long-held assumptions in Psychology. She focuses on how our ideas of the 
perfection of personal and moral development have been constructed around male traits and 
behaviour. This study came from a personal point of view, as she had been working alongside 
the prominent developmental psychologists, Erik Erikson (1994a; 1994b) and Lawrence 
Kohlberg (Kohlberg & Gilligan, 1971; Kohlberg & Kramer, 1969). Gilligan (1977) observed that 
Kohlberg’s studies were exclusively revolving around boys. From the psychological 
inclinations of the boys, the psychological standards within Kohlberg’s work were constructed. 
The effect is that the pinnacle of moral development is seen as “increasing differentiation of 
self from other and a progressive freeing of thought from contextual constraints”, as well as, 
“the rejection of a self defined by others [in favour of] the assertive boldness of ‘Here I stand’” 
(Gilligan, 1977: 481). Immediately one can see the emergence of what was to become a main 
trait of care ethics – the rejection of the false notion that one can stand completely independent 
from one’s environment and from other people.  
The “developmental challenges of adolescence” have come to be framed by “Piaget, Erikson, 
and Kohlberg”, who claim that, ideally, an individual “thinks formally, proceeding from theory 
to fact, and defines both the self and the moral autonomously, that is, apart from the 
identification and conventions that had comprised the particulars of his childhood world” 
(Gilligan, 1977: 481). In other words, moral development is apparently perfected through the 
male traits of cold logic and uninvolved, objective engagement with the world. However, those 
who have understood moral development in such traditional ways know not what to make of 
the anomaly of women, “whose perception of self is so much more tenaciously embedded in 
relationships with others and whose moral dilemmas hold them in a mode of judgment that is 
insistently contextual” (Gilligan, 1977: 481). The reaction or explanation has been to “consider 
women as either deviant or deficient in their development” (Gilligan, 1977: 481). Immediately 
Gilligan’s work creates many themes that would run throughout all of care ethics. There is the 
highlighting of different dichotomies – the generalised abstraction versus the particular, 
contextualised reality, and the independent versus the interdependent – the former of each 
pair of categories being linked to men and the latter to women.  
Furthermore, this dichotomy between independence and interdependence is reinforced 
through a “splitting of love and work” (Gilligan, 1977: 482), with the former allocated to women 
and the latter to men. Yet, this splitting itself portrays a false version of adulthood and moral 
development, which is not well balanced (Gilligan, 1977: 482). This version favours “the 




autonomous life of work than toward the interdependence of love and care” (Gilligan, 1977: 
482). Gilligan (1977: 482) sets out to establish a position for women, whereby the traits of care 
and empathy represent a different approach to morality, rather than a shortcoming in terms of 
psychological and moral development. Indeed, what has been pointed out thus far reflects a 
very narrow-minded, rigid and impersonal type of morality and its accompanying lifestyle. The 
analysis of neoliberalism, especially the section on identity and relationality, made it clear that 
it is through this false and disconnected disposition – this arguably imbalanced type of ethical 
position (which dominates the modern world) – that we come to a state of being so lacking in 
empathy and responsibility. I urge the reader to take careful note of how the ‘every man for 
himself’ theme within neoliberalism, which implies that any person’s suffering is due to his or 
her own doing, and which makes it so easy to feel indifferent towards the plights of others, 
lines up neatly with the abstracted, independent and uninvolved man and his abstracted 
morals, as identified by Gilligan (1977). 
Nel Noddings (2002a; 2002b; 2005; 2013) built upon the work of Gilligan, and was part of the 
school of care ethics. The very same dichotomies can be found in her work. In Caring: A 
relational approach to ethics and moral education, Noddings (2013: 30) notes that empathy, 
as defined by the Oxford dictionary, is “the power of projecting one's personality into, and so 
fully understanding, the object of contemplation”. This definition has an overly rational and 
masculine mood to it (Noddings, 2013: 30). In other words, what one can notice is that, from 
the very onset of her work, Noddings (2013) uses the same framework as Gilligan (1977) in 
that she highlights the stark contrast between the abstracted and general masculine ethics 
and the fluid, practical, particular and lived feminine ethics that she wishes to construct.  
Noddings calls for an understanding of empathy where “I set aside my temptation to analyse 
and to plan” and, instead, “I receive the other into myself, and I see and feel with the other” 
(Noddings, 2013: 30). This is a “receptive state” (Noddings, 2013: 30), without which no deep 
state of empathy can be achieved. She expounds upon this receptive feeling by referring to a 
mother responding to the cries of an infant. Such a mother does not analyse and objectively 
interpret the negative experiences and needs of the infant, but feels with the infant in order to 
respond best (Noddings, 2013: 30). This analogy of a mother and her infant expands upon the 
thoughts of Gilligan regarding the interdependent nature of the interactions between moral 
actors, and offers a further study thereof. What better image of interdependent love, affection 
and care can one conjure than a mother and her infant?  
Furthermore, this relationship is also found within the classroom, and in care ethics, there is 
an acknowledgement of the interdependent nature of the interaction between child and carer 
(Noddings, 2002b: 208). Teachers should let the learners know that they are bringing fulfilment 




Moreover, learners should become accustomed to the notion of interdependence in the “wider 
world” by “[seeing] that salespeople, service workers, and all other legitimate workers should 
be treated with courtesy and, when appropriate, with gratitude for their contributions” 
(Noddings, 2002b: 208). Again, this is exactly the emphasis on interdependence one sees 
emphasised in contemplative education, and it acts as the perfect counter-measure to the 
asocial, falsely independent neoliberal.  
This interdependence is also represented by family values and family settings. Noddings 
emphasises the fact that women’s roles, usually associated with the home, have been largely 
ignored and undervalued both in academic contexts and in society at large (Noddings, 2002b: 
27). Moreover, political and moral discussions are framed in terms of the public sphere, laws, 
formalities, principles of justice and many other male-associated undertakings (Noddings, 
2002b: 27). In care theory, the “emphasis is reversed”, because “our most treasured human 
capacities are nurtured in families or homelike groups” (Noddings, 2002b: 27). Again, if we 
can remember, the contents of the previous chapter made it clear that neoliberalism, through 
its focus on commodities and the pursuit thereof, strongly disrupts family cohesion and the 
ability of individuals to meet their emotional needs within the realm of their family life. In other 
words, care ethics shows itself, yet again, to provide a perfect counter-measure to the negative 
effects brought about by neoliberalism. 
Noddings adds to the discussion of the dichotomy between the abstract and the particular. In 
Starting at home: Caring and social policy (Noddings, 2002b: 20), she enters into a discussion 
of the goals of care ethics. She concludes that care is ultimately about developing and 
encouraging growth in a child or learner (Noddings, 2002b: 20). Very important to note, is that 
‘growth’ is a dynamic and context-specific concept. Fittingly, then, Noddings (2002b: 20) 
reminds us that the “objective of care shifts with the situation and also with the recipient, 
[because] two students in the same class are, roughly, in the same situation, but they may 
need very different forms of care from their teacher”.  
Noddings continues, “Science and philosophy have concentrated on generalization and 
universalization, and this concentration has been accompanied by an almost exclusive 
emphasis on method in science and the agent-as-method in ethics” (Noddings, 2002b: 20). 
She claims that even virtue ethics, from which she wants to separate herself and her care 
ethics, places too much emphasis on the agent, the one making the moral decision, and not 
enough on the ‘other’, the recipient of whatever empathy or care is required (Noddings, 2002b: 
20). In other words, she argues for the necessity of a greater understanding of the 
relationships that we all share and the relationships and interconnectedness that are at play 
as we try to navigate the world in an ethical manner. Noddings (2002b: 23) feels that 




elaborate moral theories. She also expresses concern for how this obsession with a theoretical 
paradigm might affect how we feel about on-the-ground moral behaviour, leading us to belittle 
or become alienated from the very real and unpredictable practical realm of actual ethical 
behaviour, “[w]hen the tendency to theorize is celebrated, caring-about may brush aside 
caring-for as too immediate, personal, parochial, or emotional to be widely effective” 
(Noddings, 2002b: 23). 
The different dichotomies I have identified are also highlighted by Slote (2001; 2007; 2016). 
The writings of Michael Slote are not often mentioned when the main contributors within care 
ethics are discussed. However, I find his contributions to be highly relevant. For my purposes, 
Slote provides considerable material for understanding the different values in which this study 
was interested. When it comes to the dichotomy of the abstract and autonomous moral actor 
of the principle-based system of ethics versus the practically engaged and interdependent 
moral actor who moves with care, Slote makes unique contributions (2016). He expands upon 
both sides of the dichotomy by adding a deeper analysis. In From enlightenment to receptivity: 
Rethinking our values, Slote (2016: x) speaks about receptivity. He explains that Western 
philosophy has given precedence to “activity, rationality, autonomy, [and] control” when it 
comes to the conversation about values (Slote, 2016: x). Nonetheless, he does not wish to do 
away with these “traditionally favoured ideals”, but sees receptivity, the foundation of empathy 
and care, as a “touchstone for other values” (Slote, 2016: x).  
Slote (2016: 225) makes it clear that he is not against the virtue of autonomy, “habitually 
thinking and acting for oneself”, which is such a driving force behind Western civilisation – as 
long as we are not so overcome by an autonomous mode of living that we are completely out 
of touch with the reality of a life that is undeniably interconnected with the ‘other’ around us. 
We need to have a receptivity and empathy towards the lives of others. Slote is concerned 
about the way in which “traditional rationalist thinking about autonomy either denies this in one 
way or another or ignores it” (Slote, 2016: 225). It is a matter of being able to view the world 
in a balanced way. In fact, Slote (2016: 226) uses the word “counterbalance” when referring 
to the role receptivity plays in relation to autonomy and rationality.  
I have already mentioned that this study did not aim to topple the entire epistemological 
hierarchy of philosophy and ethics, branding reason as useless and counterproductive. I 
merely align myself with writers and movements that notice how reason paired with empathy 
and care, with contemplation, or, as Slote (2016) terms it, ‘receptivity’, created an overall 
stronger moral framework. Reason remains intact, just as the right amount of salt added to a 
meal brings the entire experience to new heights without disturbing any of the existing flavours. 
That being said, Slote (2016: 226) sets out to show that reason and rationality do not 




accepting. He uses the term “Faustian” to refer to the manner in which we, through our 
masculine leanings, are willing to forego “higher values” in exchange for “power, curiosity, and 
material gain” (2016: xi). This is, of course, based on the character in Von Goethe’s work 
(Faust, 1998). Through receptivity, we can learn to allow higher values, such as empathy, care 
and responsibility, to exist and function, and not be pushed aside by our desires to control and 
dominate (Slote, 2016: xi). This renewed conception of values is attributed to “feminism”, “the 
green movement”, “the horrors of war and genocide that dominated the international 
landscape of the twentieth century”, and analytical philosophy and its resistance to the moral 
relativism and scepticism of postmodern thinking (Slote, 2016: 1). 
For Slote (2016: 4), the Enlightenment period (1685-1815) is one of many examples of the 
obsession of Western civilisations with activeness and activity. This obsession is something 
deep ecologists have noted as expressed through our domination of nature, and which 
feminists have noted as expressed through some men’s desire to dominate women. In his 
book, Slote (2016: 4) argues that receptivity (a foundational character trait for empathy) is a 
value that is underexplored and absent in our post-enlightenment Western world. Slote (2016: 
8) also pays homage to his care ethics affiliation, mentioning the important contributions of 
Gilligan (1977) and Noddings (2002a; 2002b; 2005; 2013), and then enters into a discussion 
on empathy. He is emphatic in pointing out that “empathy is a crucial factor in making caring 
possible”, but says that it has been largely neglected by Western academia (Slote, 2016: 8). 
Slote (2016: 9) refers to the work of Martin Hoffman (2000), who, in Empathy and moral 
development: Implications for caring and justice, reports on his investigation, from a 
psychological point of view, of the role empathy plays in moral development. 
 
4.3.2 Questionable sacrifices 
The latter part of the previous section referred to Slote’s (2016) remarks on the environmental 
destruction and the abuse of women, which resulted from the masculine obsession with 
activity over receptivity. Perhaps this would be an opportune moment to relay the thoughts of 
Gilligan (1977) and Noddings (2013) regarding the sacrifices that are made for the sake of 
abstract principles. At the end of her work, Gilligan (1977) looks more deeply at abstracted 
morality and points out the dangers inherent in a conception of moral development dominated 
by male traits. She refers to it as an “ethics abstracted from life” (1977: 515) and associates 
with it a “blind willingness to sacrifice people to truth” (1977: 515). She points to the writings 
of Erikson (1993), who was critical of Gandhi, to show the shortcomings of an “ethics of an 
adulthood that has become principled at the expense of care” (1977: 514). In Gandhi’s 




justified by abstract principles (Gilligan, 1977: 515). Once again, I remind the reader of how 
neoliberalism becomes such an abstract principle, through which unjust and impersonal 
behaviour is allowed, simply because we are told that on paper everything checks out and is 
fair under the invisible guiding hand of the market. Gilligan, reflecting on Gandhi’s life, calls 
some of his questionable actions the “self-deception of rationalized violence” (1977: 514). This 
is the same rationalised violence explained away by society in general as a necessary 
collateral damage of the neoliberalist system, in a moment of ethical blindness, as relayed in 
the previous chapter in the section on identity and relationality (see 3.3.3).  
Gilligan speaks of the same tendency as identified by these critics of neoliberalism, although 
she does not offer a detailed account (as those critics do) of how this abstracted morality finds 
its destructive expression within a system such as our modern global economy and the culture 
so fervently and loyally married to that economy. However, the significance of the work of 
Gilligan (1977) and of other care ethicists is that they give us a moral theory by which we can 
assess, more deeply, what is missing, in terms of values, from our modern world. In other 
words, the critics of neoliberalism, writing about relationality and identity, have clearly exposed 
the problem, whereas the care ethicists begin to indicate possible solutions. 
Similarly, Noddings (2013) states the drawbacks of the male-dominated approach to morality 
– an elaboration upon some of the dangers to which Gilligan had alluded. Noddings (2013: 
31) speaks of a “process of concretization that is the inverse of abstraction” – a process 
preferred by women. This means women will seek ways to safeguard those about whom they 
care from principles of justice that might seem unfair in a certain context. Noddings (2013: 43) 
illustrates the point by speaking of our relationship with children, in whom we are invested and 
whom we love, not because of an abstract principle, but because of natural feelings. Just as 
Abraham was willing to sacrifice his child for a higher, divine reason, in “traditional, masculine 
ethics”, the deity to which we are loyal is “principle” (Noddings, 2013: 44). Based on these 
observations, Noddings (2013: 37) states: 
The father might sacrifice his own child in fulfilling a principle; the mother might sacrifice any 
principle to preserve her child. This is far too simplistic to be considered a summary or definitive 
description of positions, but it is indicative and instructive. 
As Noddings (2013) mentions, one should not take the above statement as a rule set in stone, 
but there is certainly much to be learnt from a careful observation of the differences in 
masculine and feminine approaches to ethics. Neoliberalism is our modern principle to which 
many are sacrificed. As the previous section on neoliberalism pointed out so emphatically (see 
3.3.1 and 3.3.3), it has become the norm to wave away the sufferings of another as their own 
fault, brought about by their laziness and lack of enthusiasm about the economic pursuits of 




dominate our world, and which lead to an emotionally stinted version of ourselves so quick 
and willing to sacrifice ‘the other’ to the ‘principles’ of our carefully curated and abstracted 
moral frameworks, provide an invaluable insight into the psychological sub-consciousness that 
drives neoliberalism like coal would drive a gear. 
 
4.3.3 Emotions and intuitive feelings  
An interesting way in which Noddings (2013) and Slote (2016) expand upon the ideas of 
Gilligan is the inclusion of another dichotomy – rationality versus intuitive feelings and 
emotions. Of course, this is built upon the dichotomies mentioned previously (see 4.3.1). The 
rationality mentioned here is part of the abstracted, principle-based morality that has been 
discussed all the while.  
Noddings (2013: 33) ventures into speaking about emotions when she analyses empathy. She 
finds it important to clarify that a feeling of empathy (which she terms “engrossment”) is not a 
purely emotional feeling, devoid of all sense of a higher intellectual faculty – as might be 
alleged (Noddings, 2013: 33). It is simply that we are “in the world of relation, having stepped 
out of the instrumental world” (Noddings, 2013: 34). In other words, feeling in a relational 
manner is not something ‘lower’ than objective, rational problem solving. Noddings (2013: 36) 
states, “instrumental thinking may, of course, enhance caring”, but “rationality (in its objective 
form) does not of necessity mark either the initial impulse or the action that is undertaken [to 
empathise and care]”. Noddings is showing that our moral urges come from an emotive realm 
and wish to establish the importance of such emotive drives. Here we see a difference 
between the early works of Gilligan (1977) and Noddings (2013). Gilligan did not set out to 
establish care ethics as its own ethical theory. However, Noddings thinks about care ethics as 
a potential ethical theory that is to be placed within the already established playing field of 
abstract, universalised masculine ethics and, thereafter, defended and argued for. 
Slote (2016) also sets out to argue for the importance of emotions and feeling in ethics, and 
reminds one that emotions and feelings have seen some popularity in the past. The entirety 
of the Romantic movement (which peaked from 1800 to 1850) argued in favour of it (2016: 2); 
however, the same cannot be said of the modern academic world. Slote is clear about 
positioning himself alongside his analytic philosopher colleagues, and wants to contribute 
within this realm. Therefore, he wants to add to and expand upon this field by reinvestigating 
the validity of the supposed dominating centrality of reason and rationality in ethics (Slote, 
2016: 2). He writes: 
I am going to argue that reason/rationality and activity/control are a lot less important than we 




need to be strongly counterbalanced by a value and virtue of receptivity that has been almost 
totally neglected within our philosophical traditions. 
Like others who have undertaken somewhat of a reassessment of our relationship with reason 
and rationality, Slote casts his gaze upon the Enlightenment period (1685-1815). He writes, 
“the general picture of human life and human values that one gets from Enlightenment thinking 
is distorted and unhelpful in many different ways”, and he aims to rethink our values, as 
opposed to what is usually done under postmodernism: “be[ing] skeptical and/or nihilistic 
about values and the making of value judgments” (Slote, 2016: 3). 
Slote (2016: 14) also argues that a true understanding of empathy means that we not only 
connect with the emotions and feelings of another, but also with their “attitudes, belief system, 
or point of view”. Furthermore, if one claims to be truly objective and natural in the formation 
of one’s own beliefs and opinions, one must first have empathised with the ideas and opinions, 
which stand against one’s own (Slote, 2016: 14). This process is only thoroughly followed if 
one – at least hypothetically and as an exercise – regard the other’s point of view favourably, 
something which is facilitated through feeling and emotion (Slote, 2016: 14).  
The Enlightenment tendency to belittle feelings and emotion (see Slote, 2016) has a price, 
indeed, for “emotion/feeling is essential to rational/cognitive thinking and cannot be banished 
from such thinking without paying a great epistemic/cognitive/rational price” (Slote, 2016: 14). 
In other words, to think of the realm of cognition without considering feelings and emotions is 
an incomplete conception of cognition, something which most from the Enlightenment period 
never properly considered. As with other care ethics writers, Slote (2016: 17) emphasises the 
fact that he is not trying to do away with the cognitive and rational processes of life. However, 
when it comes to the discussion of values and ethics, he suspects it has “much or more to do 
with feeling than with reason, and that claim certainly represents a basic and large-scale 
rejection of the Enlightenment picture of things” (Slote, 2016: 17). 
When again entering into the discussion of Faustian motives of power and domination by 
looking at the treatment of women and the environment, Slote (2016: 18) argues that passivity 
is not to be replacing activity but rather that activity should always be accompanied by “being 
receptive or open in one’s dealings or relations with people and things (in the environment)”. 
For Slote (2016: 18), this idea has not been explored properly at the time of his writing. I am 
uncertain whether he is referring to contemporary moral philosophy, to the entirety of the 
Western philosophical canon, or to what exactly, but, as I will show in the next chapter on 
contemplative education (see 5.3.2), the idea is certainly an old one. However, one can hardly 
argue against the fact that receptivity as a virtue has long been absent from Western ethical 
thinking. Slote refers to it as a virtue for which one “dared not speak its name” (Slote, 2016: 




avoided the very emotionally and intimately involving idea of receptivity and care (Slote, 2016: 
21). In today’s analytical philosophy circles, there is certainly not much room for the 
acceptance of the Romantic idea that feeling and emotions are more important guiding factors 
than logical and rational thought (Slote, 2016: 27). There is a sentimentalist tradition within 
moral philosophy but, as Slote (2016: 29) states, an epistemological framework has never 
been formulated for it. Slote (2016: 29) aims to undertake that project of erecting an 
epistemology and to show that “[e]mpathy, sympathy, anger, and love turn out […] to be 
absolutely essential to the process of learning things and arguing about them with others” 
(Slote, 2016: 29). In other words, these apparently non-traditional traits are essential for 
discussions and deliberations on ethical issues. Whereas the principled justice of the 
neoliberalist state requires no truly receptive empathy in order to continue, and can flourish 
amidst groups of hyper-individualised, asocial and isolated persons (Baez, 2007; Barber, 
2008; Bauman, 1999; 2007; Bordieu, 2002; Bowles & Gintis, 1975; Davies and Bansel, 2007; 
Edwards, 2000; Lemke, 2001; Munro, 2004; Rhodes, 2013; Saunders, 2010), for someone 
like Slote, there is the realisation that “moral respect for others requires us to see things from 
their standpoint” (Slote, 2016: 198) – and without that deeper level of empathy where one can 
truly understand the position of ‘the other’, and the range of emotions that allow for this, there 
is a threat to one’s capacity for moral respect. 
If one might remember what was discussed in Chapter 3, regarding the overuse of an 
abstracted rationality as a consequence of neoliberalism (see 3.3.1), then the current 
discussion of an ill-placed rationality that leads to asocial behaviour and sacrificial tendencies 
seems highly relevant. This is yet another example of how care ethics and the values it 
advocates serve as a near-perfect countermeasure against the ethically disruptive effects of 
neoliberalism.  
 
4.3.4 Care ethics as an extended moral system 
Slote (2001) expands upon the philosophy of care ethics by constructing a broader, universally 
applicable version of it. In Morals from motives (Slote, 2001: 64), there is reference to 
Noddings (2013), who argued that caring cannot extend to those with whom we are too 
unfamiliar. However, Slote holds that this is actually possible (2001). Slote joins this 
conversation, saying that two types of caring are possible: intimate caring and humanitarian 
caring (Slote, 2001: 64). The latter type, of course, implies that we can, most certainly, extend 
our caring to those beyond our circle of intimate acquaintances. Slote sees it as an important 
task to study both types of caring and to see to what extent both can be integrated in the life 




be raised and scenarios imagined where a person must choose between the two types of 
caring, Slote reminds us that under most circumstances, the moral actor can make decisions 
that are beneficial to both those near and dear and to humanity at large (Slote, 2001: 76).  
Such concerns, as expressed by Noddings (2013), about the potentially limited scope of care 
ethics, are perhaps symptomatic of the general lack of confidence, from many different camps, 
in the ability of care ethics to formulate for itself a rounded framework (Slote, 2001: 92). Since 
Gilligan (1977) pointed out the differences in the approaches by men and women to morality, 
this debate about the feasibility of an ethics of care has flared up (Slote, 2001: 92). For most, 
it seems impossible to extend a moral viewpoint to a universal level without employing the 
“masculine” principles, such as rights, justice and laws (Slote, 2001: 92). Slote (2001) is 
confident that care ethics can develop a universally applicable system of morality without 
having to revert to such masculine principles. He does this by pointing out that: 
[Institutions and systems within a country or within our world] are to be judged in terms of their 
motivational underpinnings, their human element, and it follows from such a picture that if the 
people of a just society with just institutions became increasingly selfish or indifferent to fellow-
citizens, the society itself would have become less ethically admirable, less just, even if those 
institutions – the husk or shell of justice – were somehow to remain in place for a while (Slote, 
2001: 109).  
This version of society, where institutions and laws seem to be just, but where so much 
unnecessary suffering exists, is exactly what comes about in a neoliberalist model where no 
one is encouraged to move beyond explicit laws and take up responsibilities beyond what the 
human rights principles indicate. Laws that force one to take care of strangers would not make 
much sense, but laws that merely state one cannot explicitly harm others leave a lot to be 
desired. Somewhere in the middle is where citizens need to place themselves, willing to take 
responsibility for fellow citizens even when not forced to do so by laws and specific principles. 
There is a need to pursue a culture of caring, a culture of compassionate contemplative living, 
that creates within one the genuine desire to help others. 
This agent-based virtue ethics of Slote (2001: 109) implies that “the justice of a given society 
cannot simply be ‘read off’ from the way institutions (or laws) are at a given time”, but – 
[It] depends on the ‘(ethical) soul’ of the society, and it is an attractive feature of agent-based 
views that they in this fashion treat social justice as a more deeply human matter than it is on 
theories of justice that place primary importance on (mere conformity to) rules, principles, 
and/or institutional norms (Slote, 2001: 109).  
Slote admits that our society is already historically arranged in such a way that it seems foreign 




“impartial rules or principles” (Slote, 2001: 109), but what is unknown does not necessarily 
equate with what is unfeasible.  
In The ethics of care and empathy, Slote (2007: 11) argues that care can extend beyond only 
those we know, again differing from Noddings (2013). Slote (2007: 11) admits that there is a 
“difference in strength between (the moral requirements of) humanitarian caring and (of what 
we can call) personal caring”, but he also maintains that both types should be understood as 
caring, and he notes that Noddings herself, in later works (see 2002b), changed her views and 
agreed with this expansion upon the concept of caring (Slote, 2007: 11). 
As in some of his other work (see 2016), Slote (2007) draws heavily from the work of Hoffman 
(2000). Specifically, he cites Hoffman’s use of the concept of “inductive discipline” (Slote, 
2007: 15), according to which parents and other instructive figures play a large part in the 
“development of full moral motivation and behaviour” – 
[By facilitating a] child’s capacity for empathy with others [through] noticing when a child hurts 
others and then making the child vividly aware of the harm that he or she has done – most 
notably by making the child imagine how it would feel to experience similar harm (Slote, 
2007: 15).  
This is in contrast to the “power-asserting” methods of moral instruction that makes use of 
physical force or rigid moral rules and principles (Slote, 2007: 15). It is this concept or method 
introduced by Hoffman (2000) that Slote (2007) uses to try to add legitimacy to a system of 
ethics resting on empathy. 
Furthermore, Slote (2007: 28) notes how much has been said on how empathy is more easily 
evoked for those who are near and dear and, if this is considered, how we can develop an 
empathy that is truly extended to all of humanity in situations that call upon a more far-reaching 
morality. As noted by Slote (2007: 29), even Hume (1978) was sceptical of any type of affection 
that could extend beyond the borders of one’s country. However, Slote feels that this 
scepticism of Hume is a reflection on the era in which Hume lived (1711–1776), more than 
any true indication of any limits inherent in the modern person’s capacity for empathy (Slote, 
2007: 29). Today’s global landscape is an infinitely more interconnected setting than the world 
of Hume’s age. Additionally, Hoffman’s ‘inductive discipline’ (1970) is a glowing example of 
how empathy can extend to those who are not part of our immediate circles (Slote, 2007: 29). 
Slote notes how Hoffman (1990) also refers to the processes that can deepen “an older child’s 
concern for (groups of) people in other countries” (Slote, 2007: 29). This can be achieved as 
follows: 
Both parents and schools can expose children to literature, films, or television programs that 




them; and they can encourage their sensitivity to such people by asking children to imagine – 
and getting them into the habit of imagining – how they or some family member(s) would feel if 
such things were happening to them. In addition, families, schools, and countries could provide 
for more international student exchanges than now exist, with visiting students living with local 
families and attending local schools – thus bringing home to both visitors and those visited the 
reality and real humanity of those who might otherwise just be names or descriptions. (I have 
read somewhere that such a program of exchanges between Palestinian and Israeli students 
is now under way in the Middle East.) Finally, parents and schools could inculcate in children 
the habit of thinking about, and being concerned about, the effects of their own actions and 
inactions (and those of their family, neighbors, and government) on the lives of people in other 
countries (Slote, 2007: 29). 
Slote (2007) realises that these are just theoretical suggestions and that they might be difficult 
to implement, but overall he is satisfied that he has illustrated that an empathy for those who 
are distant can be developed as well – and this goes a long way in establishing an ethics of 
care based on empathy (Slote, 2007: 30). Slote goes through much effort to argue for the 
universal applicability of care ethics, as opposed to other writers, such as Noddings (2013), 
who felt it is better applied to those closer to us. Slote also mentions that Noddings later 
changed her perspective and argued for and formulated a broader form of care ethics. What I 
also appreciate about Slote (2007) is his references to psychological literature, showing that 
empathy as a value is not some randomly chosen construct of some haphazard care ethicists, 
but a value solidly grounded in psychological studies. 
 
4.3.5 Community  
Noddings (2002a) and Slote write about both the effect a community has on a young learner, 
and the sense of community that is generated through care ethics. One can view this as a 
unique elaboration upon both the sense of interconnectedness that is an integral part of care 
ethics and upon the notion of the particular, contextualised moral reality, versus the so-called 
autonomous and abstracted moral actor.  
Noddings (2002a) traces the modern history of moral education. She notices that, although 
character education was long since popular in America and beyond, the twentieth century saw 
it dwindling, as there was an increasing concern for the diversity of society not being 
accommodated by such character education programmes, which often seemed to lean 
towards a specific culture or tradition (Noddings, 2002a: 63). Therefore, “cognitive approaches 
to moral education” started taking root (Noddings, 2002a: 63). In this approach, there is an 
emphasis on the “development of moral reasoning” (Noddings, 2002a: 63) but no real 




[T]he stories are philosophical fictions designed to trigger critical thinking. If they illustrate a 
tradition, it is the Enlightenment tradition of Descartes and Kant – one that extols the power of 
mind and reason. Besides their compatibility with liberal ideology, cognitive methods seem 
more congruent with the growing emphasis on science and mathematics. (Noddings, 2002a: 
63) 
Noddings (2002a) points out, however, that cognitive methods to moral education brought with 
it a few challenges. Firstly, these methods seemed more applicable to research than to 
teaching and a classroom context, requiring unnecessary attention and preparation to make it 
suitable for the classroom (Noddings, 2002a: 64). Furthermore, the cognitive approach, with 
its abstraction of morality and reliance on principles and theories, seems to reinforce the idea 
of “purposive rational action” (Noddings, 2002a: 64). In this formulation, we become 
preoccupied with action driven by the means-to-an-end rationality. The end in and of itself is 
not deliberated upon, thus leading, ultimately, to individuals who are narrowly focused on their 
rationalised means to an end – to an extent where they become isolated and alienated from 
any sense of community.  
It is for this reason that Noddings (2002a: 64) notes an upsurge in the response of 
“conservative philosophers, sociologists and theologians”. She contends that community is an 
essential bedrock to the “production of worthy and acceptable citizens” and that character 
education and care theory are essential for preserving a sense of community (Noddings, 
2002a: 64). If we think back to the previous chapter, we might remember that neoliberalism 
creates a highly individualised and asocial citizen (see 3.3.1 and 3.3.3). Needless to say, if 
Noddings (2002a) is speaking about educational methods and goals that lead to a more 
community-oriented learner, then that is the exact counter needed for the effects of 
neoliberalism. 
Furthermore, she takes a position against liberalism (which she sees in relation to the Kantian 
line of moral philosophy [see Kant, 2013]), and questions its conceptions of human beings as 
ultra-individual and “rational decision-makers” (Noddings, 2002b: 71). Along with this line of 
moral philosophy stand the theories of Rawls (2009), who conceives of a “veil of ignorance” 
(Noddings, 2002b: 71), under which we can strip human beings of their different predisposed 
ideas and idiosyncrasies in order for them to make objective decisions about how to organise 
themselves justly and run a society. Noddings finds this idea to be faulty, and asks her readers 
to consider that an individual is deeply shaped by his or her upbringing, his or her home 
environment and the care he or she had received. Another one of the strongest arguments 
against liberalism and Kantian ethics points out that such ethics disregards community. Dewey 
(1927, cited in Noddings, 2002b: 74) notes how liberalist theories “held that ideas and 




means of isolated contact with objects”, when, in reality “knowledge is a function of association 
and communication; it depends upon tradition, upon tools and methods socially transmitted, 
developed, and sanctioned” (Noddings, 2002b: 74). Therefore, one could argue that it is not 
only in theory that liberalism loses touch with the concrete needs of a well-functioning 
community, but also practically speaking – for, with its overemphasis on rights, there is a 
genuine lack in terms of discourse about responsibilities (Noddings, 2002b: 74). Noddings 
refers to the “no duty to rescue” (Noddings, 2002b: 74) concept in American law, according to 
which one has no obligation to attempt to aid another in danger (in certain circumstances), 
such as a drowning child for which one is not explicitly responsible (Noddings, 2002b: 74). 
Although I personally feel that this is not a good example, Noddings also mentions the general 
example of negative duties and how a preoccupation with them has “eroded not only a sense 
of responsibility for one another but even our understanding of human sociality” (Noddings, 
2002b: 74). As Glendon (1991, cited in Noddings, 2002b: 74) puts it: 
Neglect of the social dimension of personhood has made it extremely difficult for us to develop 
an adequate conceptual apparatus for taking into account the sorts of groups within which 
human character, competence, and capacity for citizenship are formed. In a society where the 
seedbeds of civic virtue – families, neighborhood, religious associations, and other 
communities – can no longer be taken for granted, this is no trifling matter. 
For Noddings (2002b), the communitarian view on moral education (see Taylor, 1989) is more 
realistic, as it delves into an understanding of the human being as more than just a rational 
actor (Noddings, 2002b: 94). Rather, the “times, culture, and situations in which they live” form 
human beings (Noddings, 2002b: 94). However, the communitarians focus on how such 
socialisation occurs through communications, whereas Noddings (2002b: 94) insists that the 
self is also formed “in encounter with objects and events that induce affects; moreover, the 
developing self can be reflexive – it can encounter itself and pose questions for itself”. It is in 
instances like this that the mood of the care ethicists perfectly encapsulates the underpinnings 
of contemplative education, which I will explore in the next chapter (see 5.2 and 5.3). It is that 
notion, that one can become highly introspective (or contemplative) and consider one’s own 
development and one’s own relationship and interaction with the world, which is shared by 
both schools of thought (care ethics and contemplative education).  
Slote (2016: 30) makes brief comments about the effects of community as well. In speaking 
of his project to establish an epistemology for receptivity and care ethics, he mentions the 
traditional Cartesian epistemology, where the point of view of the individual is of great 
importance. Another category of philosophers, the social epistemologists, is more aware of 
“constitutive or causal influence from the individual’s larger community” that will affect how 




social epistemologists do not “put enough emphasis on the epistemological importance of an 
individual’s prior education”. Furthermore, not only does a child’s education show the 
“nonindividualistic influences” (Slote, 2016: 31) that form a part of learning, but the emotional 
dimensions involved in what a child learns through his or her education has been ignored even 
by the social epistemologists. For the purpose of this study, I considered whether we are 
adequately aware of the influences that affect a child, such as his or her community, or the 
media to which the child is exposed. If so, how can we ever help them to enter into 
introspective modes of being where they can truly assess their ethical conduct and progress 
forward with and develop such conduct? That is why I would claim that the work of Slote and 
that other care ethicists show a path unto a level of self-awareness that is crucial to 
deconstructing some of the arguably more negative values we hold so dear in neoliberalism - 
a self-awareness and level of introspection taken even further in the next chapter on 
neoliberalism. 
In summary, let us consider what all these different writers have said about ethical behaviour 
and the values of empathy and care. It was pointed out that the recent history of Western 
morality has been dominated by masculine leaning values such as rationality, reason and 
universal principles. However, this often leads to the sacrifice of individuals for the sake of 
these principles (the analysis of neoliberalism showed exactly how). Furthermore, this type of 
morality leads to a loss of community and an arguably unjustified preoccupation with the 
rational and the hyper-individual at the exclusion of the role of the home, the importance of 
the upbringing and the context of each individual. It also leads to a preoccupation with the 
public domain and laws at the exclusion of a mature understanding of the role of practical 
ethical behaviour in a day-to-day environment. A more feminine and balanced ethics would 
take care to devote some attention to the essential nature of empathy and responsibility (care 
ethics) – essential if we wish to address the various imbalances that lead to great injustices in 
the name of the neoliberal state. 
 
4.4 Criticism against care ethics  
In this section, I attempt to share some of the various criticisms against care ethics – 
specifically against the work of Gilligan (1977) and Noddings (2002a; 2002b; 2005; 2013). 
Some critics (such as Held, 1995; Smeyers, 1999) have shown that care ethicists do not strike 
the right balance in their theories between a morality based on care and a morality based on 
principles. Smeyers (1999: 238) draws attention to the fact that Gilligan (1977) sees moral 
problems as either understood from a care perspective or a justice and/or principles 




Even when dealing with close relationships, that seem to revolve around care, there are clear 
principles that govern them (Smeyers, 1999: 238). He echoes Held (1995) when stating that 
we should guard against seeing care as something exclusively related to the private domain 
while seeing justice as only related to the public domain (Smeyers, 1999: 238). Smeyers 
(1999: 240) argues that even if we create an ethics based on personal relationships and 
friendships, it has to have a foundation of principles, for principles are not just called into action 
when things deviate from their proper functioning, but they are always present in and 
responsible for the very functioning of moral networks and relationships.  
This same tension between particular care and justice is then reconstructed as a tension 
between the particular and the universal (Smeyers, 1999: 240), with specific mention of how 
a particularist version of care ethics without a universal vision might lead to xenophobia or 
racism (Baier, 1995, cited in Smeyers, 1999: 240). Senchuk (1990: 233) raised similar 
concerns in response to Gilligan’s work, urging care ethics to move “beyond the ‘here and 
now’ and that it not be restricted to existing webs of personal relationships”. The exact same 
concern regarding Gilligan’s (1997) early work was voiced by Blum (1988: 473), who stated, 
“how this extension [of care ethics] to all persons is to be accomplished is not made clear in 
her writings”.  
To me, none of these criticisms ultimately makes much sense, as they all seem to presuppose 
that the authors against whom the criticisms are voiced intended to construct an all-
encompassing moral system that had to replace those prior to it entirely. The critics seem to 
move between two opposite positions, sometimes admitting to and coming to terms with the 
fact that care ethics does not cover the entirety of the domain of ethics while at other times, 
relentlessly expecting it to do just that. Smeyers (1999: 245) admits, “a care ethic alone cannot 
address all of morality”; yet, his criticism seems to expect that it does. Besides, as we saw in 
the sections on Noddings (2013) and Slote (2001; 2007), later iterations of the care ethicists’ 
work aimed at expanding the framework and reach of the theory. I don’t find this line of criticism 
very relevant, as care ethics was always a project that served to fill in gaps in the existing 
ethical narratives. It is an additional, supplementary line of thinking, just as it was for this study.  
There is also an entire category of criticisms coming from feminist sources. Keller (1997: 153) 
points out that many critics feel that an ethics of care will reinforce stereotypes surrounding 
women, and keep them locked in their traditional roles. These critics are not sure whether care 
ethics will do much for women’s autonomy (Keller, 1997: 153).  
Many of these critics feel that care ethics, with its focus on maternal themes, might end up 




1999: 248). Hoagland (1990: 112), in response to Noddings (2002a; 2002b; 2005; 2013), goes 
as far as to relate elements of caring with a type of enslavement of the mother figure: 
The children learned an assumption of privilege from their father, and he in turn became one of 
the children-legitimately passive, irresponsible […] To pursue the feminine (whose essence is 
agape and unconditional loving), to pursue this sense of female agency, is to pursue oppression 
(Hoagland, 1990: 112). 
This type of feminine analysis seems radical and rather disingenuous in its readings of the 
work of Gilligan (1977) and Noddings (2002a; 2002b; 2005; 2013) – reading too far into what 
these two authors expect from women. A much more helpful response to the potential problem 
comes from other sources, which give suggestions on how a mother or one who cares might 
avoid a type of enslavement. Smeyers (1999: 244) states, “to ensure no over-identification 
with the other, self-care has to be incorporated into the ethics of care, thus keeping it from 
being an ethic of self-effacement”. Slote (2007: 12), although not really concerned about 
carers enslaving themselves, re-evaluates Noddings’ (1984) understandings of empathy, and 
in doing so, produces a good argument against the notion of maternal moods as slavery or 
oppression.  
Slote (2007) delves deeper into the work of Noddings (1984), and identifies the type of caring 
about which she spoke (Slote, 2007: 12). Noddings (1984) was weary of the concept of 
empathy (Slote, 2007: 12), as she felt it (her understanding of empathy) to be yet another 
overly masculine and overly active activity. She desired, instead, a “‘displacement’ of ordinary 
self-interest into unselfish concern for another person”, whereby one “not only focuses on a 
particular individual, but is engrossed in that other person” and is “open and receptive to the 
reality – the thoughts, desires, fears, etc. – of the other human being” (Slote, 2007: 12).  
Furthermore, “when they [a moral actor] act on behalf of (for the good of) the person they care 
about, they don’t simply impose their own ideas about what is good in general, or what would 
be good for the individual cared about”, much rather “they pay attention to, and are absorbed 
in, the way the other person structures the world and his or her relationship to the world – in 
the process of helping that person” (Slote, 2007: 12). This version of caring was so different 
to how Noddings understood empathy, that she decided to refer to it as engrossment, rather 
than empathy (see Noddings, 1984: 9). Slote (2007: 12), however, points out that Noddings 
(1984) seems out of touch with the psychological literature on empathy that was available at 
the time of her writing. The type of empathy that Noddings wanted to avoid and transcend “is 
actually just one kind of empathy studied by developmental psychologists, which they tend to 
call projective empathy” (Slote, 2007: 12). However – 
[A]s the psychologist Martin Hoffman points out […] there are other forms of empathy […] And 




and, if you will, more feminine character that Noddings says is constitutive of engrossment 
(Slote, 2007: 12.).  
Slote (2007: 12) also feels that other care ethicists have not fully understood the importance 
of empathy or engrossment in an ethics of care, and that more attention should be given to 
the psychological literature regarding empathy. He refers to both CD Batson (2014) and Martin 
Hoffman (2000) and how their works “argue that various studies and experiments show that 
empathy plays a crucial enabling role in the development of genuinely altruistic concern or 
caring for others” (Slote, 2007: 13). Furthermore, what Slote (2007) gathers from the writings 
of Hoffman is that the identification with the other that takes place during processes of empathy 
is not a “total merging with or melting into the other: genuine and mature empathy doesn’t 
deprive the empathic individual of her sense of being a different person from the person she 
empathises with (Slote, 2007: 14). In other words, it is not at all necessary to undergo some 
‘loss of identity’, but, rather, genuine empathy involves “feelings or thoughts that are in some 
sense more ‘appropriate’ to the situation of the person(s) empathised with than to (the situation 
of) the person empathizing” (Slote, 2007: 14).  
Getting back to the early care ethicists, Sander-Staudt (n.d.) makes it clear that Gilligan’s work 
is strongly loyal to feminism, stating that Gilligan (1977), although she “resisted readings of 
her work that posit care ethics as relating to gender more than theme”, was always absorbed 
in “her thesis of an association between women and relational ethics.” (Sander-Staudt, 
n.d.:n.p.) When looking at the most recent of Gilligan’s work, such as Why does patriarchy 
persist (Gilligan & Snider, 2018) or Darkness now visible: Patriarchy’s resurgence and feminist 
resistance (Gilligan & Richards, 2018), it becomes clear that Gilligan finds the notion of the 
patriarchy and issues related to gender to be the foundation of almost all the primary moral 
conundrums of our age. I am not too sure whether this is a productive direction. If care ethics 
is to be about investing some effort into understanding the unique contexts, identities and 
struggles of each individual, then I am not sure that the potential judgement cast over an entire 
gender will help one in remaining receptive and empathetic towards all individuals. This 
stance, by Gilligan, seems to be an abstraction within a school of thought that is supposed to 
fight against unnecessary abstractions. Beyond being an abstraction, such a position also 
goes against what care ethics stands for from a relational perspective.  
Care ethics calls for a very open and accepting type of relational stance as the way unto 
empathetic ethical values. Construing things in terms of ‘the patriarchy’ being the root of 
almost all evil creates an ‘us versus them’ mentality, which studies have clearly indicated leads 
to a strong lack of neutrality and a strong level of prejudice (Perdue, Dovidio, Gurtman & Tyler, 
1990), and a strong lack of empathy as a value (Cikara, Botvinick & Fiske, 2011; Cikara, 




meaning and intention of an ethics of care. Therefore, for the purpose of this study, I aimed to 
extract the relevant philosophical and ethical wisdom from care ethics, without the radical 
feminism, without the politics.  
 
4.5 Responsibility 
Throughout this study, it became increasingly clear that the safeguarding of many ethical aims 
is reliant on a certain understanding of our relations with one another. In other words, values 
can often be understood through the lens of relationality. This chapter, as a precursor to the 
next, predominantly focuses on the values of compassion and empathy through the work of 
the care ethicists. This means that the way in which relationality influences empathy, 
compassion and care, was explored and is reported here. However, another value that was of 
importance is responsibility. Chapter 2, and the policy documents discussed in the chapter, at 
times, made reference to responsibility as a value. Similarly, Chapter 5 and the contemplative 
thought found within that chapter also make reference to the value of responsibility (see 5.3.2). 
In order, therefore, to gain a philosophical foundation for an understanding of the concept of 
responsibility and, to show how this value acquires an enriched understanding if seen in 
relational terms, I drew on the work of both Derrida (1995) and Patočka (1974) (from whose 
writings Derrida, in turn, gained inspiration).  
As Patočka’s work (1974) illustrates, the Platonic notion of the care of the soul, which is 
attributed to Socrates and which plays a central role within all of Greek philosophy (Gasché, 
2007: 294), came to influence Christian thinking in a very profound way. However, in order to 
achieve a real sense of caring of the soul, the philosopher must come to a point of shunning 
everything temporary and worldly, and “[he or she] is guided in this by the knowledge of what 
is and emulates the eternal, the unchangeable order of the cosmos, the Divine, or the Good” 
(Gasché, 2007: 294). It is this act of being guided by knowledge of the eternal, which still 
drives the Christian notion of responsibility in Patočka’s (1974) and Derrida’s (1995) time (and 
ours) (Gasché, 2007: 295). This is a type of knowledge which both writers argue should not 
be the impetus for responsibility.  
Derrida (1995) shows how Patočka (1974) keenly warns against what this ‘knowledge’ and 
‘rationality’ have become. Patočka (1974) highlights how, during the French Revolution, 
“things purely laical by nature were transformed by public opinion into sacred things: these 
were the Fatherland, Liberty, Reason” (Patočka, 1974, cited in Derrida, 1995: 22). Such a 
revolutionary “enthusiasm”, as Patočka refers to it (Patočka, 1974, cited in Derrida, 1995: 22), 
“is undisciplined or insufficiently disciplined by the personal relation to responsibility” (Patočka, 




ideas (see Author, date) and maintains the “Platonic desire to subordinate responsibility itself 
to the objectivity of knowledge” (Patočka, 1974, cited in Derrida, 1995: 24). I remind the reader 
that when Patočka speaks about ‘Christianity’, his analysis is so broad and all-encompassing 
that we can safely take it as an analysis of the wider field of Western ethics in general (which 
is, of course, heavily influenced by Christianity). Derrida (1995: 24) states, “[the] Christian 
consciousness of responsibility is incapable of reflecting on the Platonic thinking that it 
represses” and, thereafter, loses sight of how the soul does not reach self-actualisation 
through a connection to an object or an abstract principle such as ‘the Good’, but through a 
connection to a person (Patočka, 1974, in Derrida, 1995: 25).  
To a devout Christian, or other religious person, that person might be God, but no matter what 
one’s personal beliefs, when attempting to act ethically and responsibly, it is always in relation 
to ‘the other’ – a person. And a person implies something contextualized and particular, 
leading to situations that cannot be subdued and perfectly encapsulated by abstract 
knowledge. This is why Derrida (1995: 25) mentions that there exists an “irreducible 
complexity that links theoretical consciousness to ‘practical’ conscience”. In other words, when 
attempting to exercise responsibility, there is always a tension between the perfect decision 
we try to reach through appeals to theoretical knowledge and objectivity, and the decision we 
need to make ‘in action’, in the face of the immediate and pressing needs of the other and 
without sufficient knowledge of all the variables involved. Derrida (1995: 26) claims, “[the] 
activating of responsibility (decision, act, praxis) will always take place before and beyond any 
theoretical or thematic determination”. He is, thus, trying to drive home the inadequacies of 
the Platonic ideals that we have attempted to keep as our foundation for responsibility.  
This is an analysis of responsibility that one would not easily find elsewhere, and it is 
intriguingly similar to the thinking of care ethicists, in that it tries to move away from the 
abstraction of values and ethical inclinations, and places emphasis instead on the persons, 
the ‘other’, the relationships, that form the basis of values and ethics. Once again, this is in 
stark contrast to the justice-based, asocial ethics of neoliberalism. There is much that can be 
said about the further implications of Derrida’s (1995) work on responsibility. For my purposes, 
I can at least say that it urges one further along to join a small group of philosophers and 
thinkers who have begun to see the limits of abstract morality and the dangers that can come 
from hiding behind principles.  
 
4.6 Values in the South African context 
It is important to realise that all the various ideas under consideration must also be subjected 




values in the South African context? For this purpose, I have drawn from some literature to 
shed light on this question. 
As a side note, although much of the available literature on values in education in the South 
African context often includes discussions on religion, for my purposes, the discussion on 
values goes beyond religious considerations. Of course, that is not to say that religious 
sentiments cannot inform the adoption of various values, but the aim of this research was to 
focus on a more secular conception of values. Even for the various prophets of our major 
religions, their hope was that their followers would develop a sense of empathy, selflessness 
and responsibility that is rooted in the individual at a central identity, which is beyond the 
various religious concerns that are highly influenced by cultural and traditional factors. 
Nonetheless, I will share what others have written. After all, the questions raised by the writers 
mentioned below regarding the tolerance and integration of various religions show, arguably, 
the need for a contemplative approach, where one can empathise with and care about the 
position of another. 
Ferguson and Roux (2003: 272) note that the South African debate on values centres on on 
issues of diversity and the “need for mutual respect amongst people of different cultures, 
religions and belief and value systems”. This is not only a South African phenomenon, but also 
an international development of the last few decades or so (Ferguson & Roux, 2003: 272). In 
terms of education policy, this has the effect that “inclusive curricula is emphasised in the 
various policy documents” (Ferguson & Roux, 2003: 272). The degree of success in terms of 
facilitating religious diversity and diversity in general depends upon “the particular social 
circumstances of schools, the background and training of teachers, the quality of in-service 
training programmes and the teachers' attitudes towards religious and cultural diversity” 
(Ferguson & Roux, 2003: 275). 
Rhodes and Roux (2004) note that, although C2005 and the NCS identified and espoused a 
diverse range of values and beliefs, research clearly shows that South African teachers have 
been quite unsuccessful in promoting or “teaching different values and beliefs in schools” 
(Rhodes & Roux, 2004: 25). At the time of their writing, Rhodes and Roux (2004: 25) were 
curious to know whether teachers would become more adept at introducing diverse sets of 
ethical beliefs. South Africa is beyond doubt a multicultural society, hosting “people of different 
backgrounds - ethnic, racial, languages, belief and value systems” (Rhodes & Roux, 2004: 
25). This multicultural aspect is present even though there might be major linguistic or religious 
similarities (Rhodes & Roux, 2004: 25). South Africa is also a multi-religious society, even 
though a misconception exists that it is predominantly a country with one religion (Rhodes & 




It is especially in the eighth learning area of C2005 and the NCS, Life Orientation, where the 
teacher had to accommodate and facilitate different values and beliefs (Rhodes & Roux, 
2004: 26). Yet, again, Rhodes and Roux (2004) were unsure at the time of their research 
whether or not teachers were equipped and trained well enough to perform this task, and to 
uphold the new sets of values identified in post-apartheid education policy documents (as 
discussed in Chapter 2) – to uphold such values amidst “prejudices towards diversity in society 
and schools” (Rhodes & Roux, 2004: 26). The authors thought it important that teachers 
“approach the values question with a sense of responsibility” and “realize the importance of 
their role as facilitators of values” (Rhodes & Roux, 2004: 26). 
Roux and Du Preez (2006: 151) found that in-service teachers felt completely “overwhelmed 
and disempowered” when they have to teach or facilitate values and beliefs that were different 
from their own. If they were to succeed in dealing with classrooms that were diverse, it was 
essential that they had to be exposed, from an early stage in their training, to different values 
and beliefs. 
Du Preez and Roux (2010: 13), when writing about attitudes concerning discipline and 
disciplinary measures in schools, remarked that many revert to an underlying faith in traditional 
cultural values, to which they refer as “particularism”. This is in contrast to an affinity for human 
rights values, and it risks the “elevation of the values of only one culture and the consequent 
subversion of the multicultural ideals of our democracy, which seeks to honour the human 
rights of its citizens” (Du Preez & Roux, 2010: 13). The authors identify other academic writers 
who stand in favour of religious values (Du Preez & Roux, 2010: 16) and remind us of initiatives 
such as the “Conservative Christian Lobby”, who were not quite in agreement with the new 
curriculum introduced to the new South Africa (Du Preez & Roux, 2010: 17). This was 
evidenced by the “arguments of the lobbyists [which] were for the most part hostile to the 
explicit enhancement of humanistic values (human rights values) and the overall emphasis on 
social justice, equity, tolerance and diversity” (Chisholm, 2005, cited in Du Preez & Roux, 
2010: 17). The tendency to fall back upon apparently tried and trusted cultural and traditional 
values could cause one to oversimplify very complex issues, and could lead to a very narrow 
perspective when arguing about values (Du Preez & Roux, 2010: 23). Furthermore, it seems 
unlikely that such a teacher will be able to accommodate the diverse range of learners (in a 
typical South African context) and their multifarious needs when engaging with them in terms 








This chapter served to answer sub-question 3, “What are the inherent values of contemplative 
education?”, and sub-question 4, “How can the values cultivated by contemplative education 
counteract a neoliberal mentality?” In other words, through the philosophy of care ethics, I 
could construct a conceptual framework through which to understand some of the ideas found 
in contemplative education better. This includes a thorough analysis of values such as 
compassion, empathy and responsibility, all of which form the foundation of an ethical way of 
living, which focuses on the ‘other’ and a healthy relationality overall. Care ethics offers a 
foundation for understanding, in a conceptual and philosophical manner, that which is most 
lacking in terms of empathy, compassion and responsibility, in a neoliberal world.  
Care ethicists analyse how the modern world is dominated by values leaning toward 
masculinity, such as rationality, reason and abstracted universal principles, which often leads 
to the sacrifice of individuals for the sake of these principles. The previous analysis of 
neoliberalism (see 3.3.1) showed how such sacrifices are justified along a scheme of 
economic rationality and cost–benefit analysis. Furthermore, the care ethicists analyse how 
this principle-based morality leads to a loss of community and an arguably unjustified 
preoccupation with the rational and the hyper-individual at the exclusion of the role of the 
home, the importance of the upbringing and the context of each individual. It also leads to a 
preoccupation with the public domain and laws at the exclusion of a mature understanding of 
the role of practical ethical behaviour in a day-to-day environment (see Noddings, 2002a; 
2002b; 2005; 2013; Slote, 2001; 2007; 2016). All such findings echo and support what was 
found and reported in the previous chapter (see 3.3). The more balanced ‘ethics of care’, 
which Gilligan (1977), Noddings (2002a; 2002b; 2005; 2013) and Slote (2001; 2007; 2016) 
suggest, establishes a framework for healthy relationality and deepens one’s understanding 
of values such as empathy, compassion and responsibility. A quick study of the work of 
Derrida (1995) added a relational analysis of responsibility as a value, in case the reader 
feelings that the care ethicists did not write enough on responsibility. All these findings create 
a philosophical and conceptual foundation upon which to begin an analysis of contemplative 









CHAPTER 5: LITERATURE REVIEW – CONTEMPLATIVE EDUCATION 
 
5.1 Introduction 
As the main research question of this thesis was – Can contemplative education respond to 
the tension between neoliberalism and values education in the Curriculum and Assessment 
Policy Statement (CAPS)? – I hold contemplative education is the best remedy for the 
drawbacks of neoliberalism. I have analysed the ways in which neoliberalism might hamper 
empathy and responsibility (Chapter 3) and I have looked at what care ethics might do to help 
us keep these social justice values alive in the face of neoliberalism (Chapter 4). There are 
however certain key ingredients, which I believe are missing from care ethics, and this chapter 
reports on possible additional benefits and key ingredients, brought about through 
contemplative education.  
This chapter helps to answer the following three sub-questions  
• What are the inherent values of contemplative education? 
• How can the values cultivated by contemplative education counteract a neoliberal 
mentality? 
• What might contemplative education contribute to the values education goals of the 
Curriculum and Assessment Policy Statement and the policies that informed it? 
As far as counteracting the neoliberal mentality, the values contemplative education needs to 
oppose are:  
• an overdependence on economic rationality (Baez, 2007; Bordieu, 2002; Bowles & 
Gintis, 1975; Davies and Bansel, 2007; Lemke, 2001; Munro, 2004; Saunders, 2010);  
• hyper-individuality (and isolation) (Baez, 2007; Bordieu, 2002; Bowles & Gintis, 1975; 
Davies and Bansel, 2007; Lemke, 2001; Munro, 2004; Saunders, 2010);  
• an instrumental approach towards and experience of school (Astin, 1998; Bowl, 2017; 
Kopnina, 2014);   
• an identity of exclusively being a consumer and customer (which makes it difficult to 
absorb one’s self in experiences that do not directly bear profits, such as building 
character and developing values related to empathy and care) (Chaffee, 1998; 
Swagler, 1978; Wellen, 2005); and  
• a propensity to avoid issues of uncertainty relating to the ‘other’ (Bauman, 2007; 




I remind the reader, again, that much of what was discussed in the previous chapter on care 
ethics holds true for this chapter, as I see contemplative education as a field closely related to 
care ethics. 
The chapter begins by relaying some introductory, background information about 
contemplative education. Thereafter, a more detailed exploration of the content of the field 
follows, including how contemplative education represents a paradigm shift in terms of 
epistemology and compassion and/or ethics. Finally, there is a section considering some of 
the criticism and areas of concern, before the chapter concludes with a summary of the 
findings.  
 
5.2 Contemplative education – a history and overview 
Contemplative education is an approach to education with a particular contemplative 
pedagogy that draws heavily from different contemplative practices. Contemplative practices, 
in turn, I can define as follows, drawing from Komjathy (2017). It is a collection of practices 
aimed at an introspective and self-reflective way of life. It involves techniques, such as 
meditation, reflective writing, prayer and more – many of these techniques have to do with the 
deepening of attention and awareness (Komjathy, 2017). The idea is to move to altered states 
of consciousness, where one can access previously hidden and subconscious aspects of 
one’s self to become a more integrated individual and ultimately to become more 
compassionate and more connected to everything around one. Contemplative practice also 
involves philosophies that function through distinct modes of living or lifestyle as opposed to 
a purely theoretical or abstract mode of being. This focus on lifestyle and the questioning of 
inherited narratives and mental conditionings is what allows contemplative practice to break 
through certain deeply rooted patterns and habits within an individual.  
Contemplative practices have a long history as a central component of many spiritual and 
religious traditions from around the world (Barbezat & Bush, 2013: xi). Modern universities are 
descended from monastic schools, where contemplative practice was a staple (Barbezat & 
Bush, 2013: xi.). Zajonc (2016) gives an interesting account of the often forgotten history of 
contemplative practices during the development of the modern Western world. He cites the 
French classicist, Pierre Hadot (1995; 2002) as a prominent exponent and historian of 
contemplative practices. Hadot makes clear how the ancient Greek philosophers were 
interested in shaping, through practice and training, the learners of their time (Zajonc, 
2016: 17). Hadot (2002: 274) says: 
We must discern the philosopher’s underlying intention, which was not to develop a discourse 




communicate to them [the reader or auditor] some ready-made knowledge but to form them. In 
other words the goal was to learn a type of know-how; to develop a habitus, or new capacity to 
judge and to criticize; and to transform – that is, to change people’s way of living and of seeing 
the world. 
Simplicius (cited in Hadot, 2002: xiii), when asked, “[w]hat place shall the philosopher occupy 
in the city?” replied, “[t]hat of a sculptor of men.” Thus, as early as the ancient Greek periods, 
philosophers were set on the notion that contemplative practice forms part of philosophy. 
Zajonc (2016) explains how the movement away from the synthesis of lifestyle and knowledge 
was accelerated by Descartes (2013). According to Foucault (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1984, cited 
in Hadot, 2002: 263–264), “[b]efore Descartes, a subject could have access to the truth only 
by carrying out beforehand a certain work upon himself which made him susceptible of 
knowing the truth … [But now] evidence has been substituted for askēsis [practice]”. After the 
work of Descartes (2013), “we increasingly find such practices [contemplative] lose their 
explicit place in education in favour of reasoning and evidence” (Zajonc, 2016: 18).  
Other select figures stand out in recent history as strong believers in the power and relevance 
of contemplative practice. William James (1890: 424) says, “the faculty of voluntarily bringing 
back a wandering attention, over and over again, is the very root of judgment, character, and 
will … An education which would improve this faculty would be the education par excellence”. 
Barbezat and Bush also mention that some individuals “have thought about expansive and 
reflective approaches to teaching”. They refer to John Dewey (1986), Jean Piaget (1973) and 
Paolo Freire (1970), “all [of whom] have experiential components at the heart of their systems” 
(Barbezat & Bush, 2013: 5).  
Of course, setting aside the Western traditions for a moment, there remains the East, which 
has an arguably richer relationship with contemplative practice. Komjathy (2017: 167) 
mentions the presence of contemplative practice in the Confucian tradition of China, and 
Roeser and Peck (2009: 127) remind one that:  
For more than 2,500 years, the contemplative traditions of India have developed highly 
sophisticated curricula and corresponding sets of practices by which the refinement of 
awareness, attentional training, and the ethical development of individuals can be cultivated 
(Kabat-Zinn, 2003; Lutz et al., 2007; Thurman, 2006). Indeed, these three educational aims 
were traditionally seen as constituting the purpose of education in Ancient India (Mookerji, 
1947/2003). 
In recent times, contemplative practices are not always easily accepted in academic circles. 
Palmer (cited in Barbezat & Bush, 2013: viii) is aware that “contemplation may sound like 
something that belongs in the mystical world of religion and spirituality, not in the empirical, 




practice seem to “have often been experienced as countercultural [in the West], given their 
more holistic orientation to experiences of learning” (Winans, 2012: 159). This all came about 
because the “dominance of a largely Aristotelian emphasis in logic, the natural sciences, and 
theology, beginning at least by the 12th and 13th centuries and consolidated in the reformation 
or scientific revolution” had a large part to play in the removal of all things contemplative (Hart, 
2004, cited in Winans, 2012: 159). Pulkki, Saari and Dahlin (2015: 45) have also noticed that 
contemplative practices are largely “disregarded in academic life”. 
However, Pulkki et al. (2015: 35) also report that, “since the late 1990s a movement called 
contemplative pedagogy has emerged in Anglo-American philosophy and psychology of 
education (see e.g. Bai, Scott & Donald, 2009; Grace, 2011; Hyland, 2011)”. Komjathy (2017: 
1) feels that contemplative studies only really emerged at the turn of the century, and only truly 
began gaining recognition a decade later (i.e. by 2010). 
The above is a historical account of the presence of contemplative practice but it is perhaps a 
good idea to consider how experts in the field choose to define it, even though I have 
attempted my own definition earlier. Komjathy (2017: 51) defines contemplative practice as: 
[V]arious approaches, disciplines and methods for developing attentiveness, awareness, 
compassion, concentration, presence, wisdom, and the like [with] [p]ossible connective strands 
or family resemblances include attentiveness, awareness, interiority, presence, silence, 
transformation, and a deepened sense of meaning and purpose. 
Contemplative education, i.e. education based on contemplative practice, is defined as – 
[Education involving] active student participation with a competent teacher (in the form of a 
person or a set of teachings) and a set of experiential learning opportunities designed to help 
students develop clear, calm, and concentrated states of awareness in a context of personal 
growth and values such as humility, curiosity, openmindedness, open-heartedness, and caring 
for others (Roeser & Peck, 2009: 127).  
Such “experiential learning opportunities might involve being in nature, doing art, learning 
physical disciplines involving set sequences of movements (e.g., tai chi, yoga), engaging in 
guided imagery, contemplating existential questions, or practicing meditation” (Roeser & Peck, 
2009: 127). Jennings (2008: 103) emphasises the possibility of “develop[ing] the self-
awareness to recognize mental and behavioral habits and learn ways to transcend habitual 
patterns” – thereafter one can engage in more “mindful and willful forms of living, learning, and 
relating to others” (Roeser & Peck, 2009: 103). Contemplative education also enables learners 
to experience “universally shared human values” in ways not known or felt before (Hart, 2002, 
cited in Jennings, 2008: 103). Komjathy (2017: 159) defines contemplative pedagogy as an 
“emerging experiential and experimental educational methodology that explores 




relevance and application to education and perhaps to larger existential and sociopolitical 
issues”. Winans (2012: 159) includes within the range of experiences and explorations of 
contemplative education the “embodied experiences of emotions, beliefs, and thoughts”.  
Barbezat and Bush go to great lengths to emphasise the importance of introspection within 
contemplative practice and to show how the practice of introspection was ostracised from 
Western academia (Barbezat & Bush, 2013: 33). They argue for its presence throughout “the 
contemplative traditions of Buddhism, Judaism, Islam, and Christianity” and its usefulness in 
gaining “insight into both the nature of the world around us and the nature of ourselves” 
(Barbezat & Bush, 2013: 33).  
Furthermore, it has been observed that contemplative states are such a natural part of human 
life (or are supposed to be) that they can be observed to manifest by themselves in children 
(Jennings, 2008: 102). Zajonc (2016: 23), when referring more directly to contemplative 
education as seen in a classroom, divides contemplative exercises into three broad 
categories: 
• Capacity-building exercises , which seek to cultivate: 
(a) Equanimity, stress reduction, or emotional balance 
(b) Concentration, attention, and close observation  
(c) Memory and exact sensorial fantasy 
(d) Discernment, judgment, or relational exercises 
(e) Will or discipline 
• Content-related exercises, in which the material being studied (poetry, economics, art, 
or science) is approached through a contemplative method. 
• Compassion and community, in which the cultivation of empathy, compassionate 
concern, and altruism strengthens ethical qualities in the individual and deepens our 
caring relationships with others. 
In summary, contemplative education is a very expansive and broad field, which values 
experiential and introspective learning. It has existed for millennia, and places great emphasis 
on the deepening of ethical values, such as compassion.  
 
5.3 Shifting perspectives and paradigms 
One way in which to rephrase some of my criticisms against neoliberalism is to say that 
neoliberalism is an ideology that encourages and reinforces stagnant modes of thinking and 
living. This is why contemplative education is of particular importance, for it is truly unique in 




(Forbes, 2016; Komjathy, 2017; Walsh, 1989; Winans, 2012; Zajonc, 2006). Therefore, what 
follows is a report on a detailed exploration of the contents of contemplative education, with a 
specific focus on how contemplative education goes about transforming such patterns and 
habits. This section is a response to the main research question, “Can contemplative 
education respond to the tension between neoliberalism and values education in the 
Curriculum and Assessment Policy Statement (CAPS)?”, as well as the sub-questions, “What 
are the inherent values of contemplative education?”, “How do the values cultivated by 
contemplative education counteract a neoliberal mentality?” and “What might contemplative 
education contribute to the social justice awareness goals of Life Orientation?” 
 
5.3.1 Patterns of thought and action 
One particular area to which our modern culture seems to have led us comprises our set 
patterns of thinking and attempting to gain knowledge. Pulkki et al. (2015: 44), drawing from 
Hart (2004), identify the “contemporary approaches to knowledge” as found in Western 
schools “as based on either of the two classical ideas of Western epistemology: rationalism, 
which finds this source of knowledge in reason and systematic thinking; and empiricism, which 
finds the source in sense experience” (Pulkki et al., 2015: 44). Furthermore, “rationalism 
emphasises calculation, causal explanations and logical analyses” (Pulkki et al., 2015: 44) 
while “empiricism focuses on experience, especially observation and various kinds of 
measurement” (Pulkki et al., 2015: 44). These two approaches have solidified as the standard 
for any type of knowledge-gathering activities, even though they cannot tell us much regarding 
“consciousness in the act of learning” (Pulkki et al., 2015: 44) - that is to say, a self-reflective, 
almost phenomenological investigation of our processes for gathering knowledge. This leads 
Pulkki et al. (2015: 44) to recount the analogy of the attitude of a hunter, who is “always 
prepared to meet something unexpected”, just as we should always expect that there is 
something that we do not know or attempt to know in the correct manner.  
One should forego a “natural attitude” in favour of a type of “un-learning” (Pulkki et al., 2015: 
44). Thus, contemplative education represents a type of vigilance against potential ignorance, 
where the learner is always aware that to enter into a state of epistemological complacency 
could spell trouble and could represent a lack of progressive enquiry into one’s own capacities 
for creative thinking and feeling. Furthermore, we are convinced that knowledge and discovery 
are processes that are entirely contained within our own minds or ego-domains, and Pulkki et 
al. (2015: 45) are quick to remind us, “meaning and knowledge are actually lived, not only in 
our bodies but also in our mind-body-world interactions”. From this one can conclude that what 




45). How one knows something is intimately tied up with how one lives that knowledge and 
how one becomes aware of one’s interconnectedness with the world. There is a paradigm 
shift underway in the fields of cognitive science and the broader global culture, as the older 
model “which emphasizes knowledge as something abstract, objectivistic, formal, logical and 
rational is being questioned” and supplemented by “knowledge as something that is concrete, 
embodied, incorporated, and lived” (Pulkki et al., 2015: 45). This would mean that one places 
more emphasis on the historical, that which is unique, and that which is contextualised (Pulkki 
et al., 2015: 45).  
Furthermore, if a person is not abstract, ahistorical, and hyper-rational, then it also means that 
such person is not “isolated from the social world and from all other human motivations and 
instincts” (Smith, 1987, in Pulkki et al., 2015: 47). Komjathy (2017: 167) also highlights how 
contemplative studies challenges the “denial of embodied experience” as found in many 
schools and universities. He goes so far as to echo Wallace (2000, in Komjathy, 2017: 40), 
who calls it a “taboo of subjectivity”, and notes that contemplative education, by overcoming 
this taboo, could also make great strides in terms of teaching values and helping learners to 
explore existential and spiritual questions. This is because a careful study of one’s own 
subjective being could reveal one’s psychological dispositions (Komjathy, 2017: 170) and the 
ways in which one has been formed by cultures and subcultures (Komjathy, 2017: 201).  
One way in which to undergo such self-reflection is through the process known as 
contextualization, a method used in the social sciences (see Harrington, 2008; 2016), which 
can provide a comprehensive analysis of the sociocultural formation of individuals and 
communities (Komjathy, 2017: 202). Although contextualization is frequently used in history, 
sociology and anthropology, it can also be used as a map for the “history of ideas” (Komjathy, 
2017: 202), which, from a contemplative viewpoint, serves the purpose of questioning the 
beliefs we take for granted and which we simply inherit. For Komjathy, this relates to how 
meditation and contemplative education in general are always forced to be analysed from a 
strictly scientific viewpoint (Komjathy, 2017: 202). Furthermore, since contemplative practices 
so often involve different forms of interpretation of experiences, it becomes even more 
important to contextualise our interpretations, to try to avoid cultural and historical biases 
(Komjathy, 2017: 203).  
Getting back to the idea of lived knowledge, when speaking of philosophy, Bai (2006: 19) 
asserts that there is a big difference between a philosophy that is academic and technical and 
“philosophy as art of living”. She then goes on to say that the technical version of philosophy 
has been prioritised over the lived version, something that is not benefitting the people in 
general. Bai (2006: 18) questions the Western epistemological paradigm, and she ascribes a 




the actual reality fully and accurately. In a manner which reminds me of the cautionary remarks 
of Nietzsche (2006), Bai (2006: 19) writes: 
There is no autonomy when we are conditioned to do something and constantly driven by it. 
This is addiction. Contemplative arts help us to overcome our addiction to conceptualization, 
not to stop our practice of thought-construction but to achieve virtuosity in our world-making 
without dogmatism. The most stubborn dogmatism that plagues us is naive realism: the view 
that what we perceive is what is “out there”, objectively. 
This makes it clear that within contemplative education, there is a constant vigilance when it 
comes to our own presuppositions. This is an important first step in the process of unravelling 
the neoliberalist ideology within which we are all submerged. Before trying to argue whether 
what one knows (no matter under which banner of which ideology this might be) is indeed 
correct, it is truly progressive to consider first whether how one attempts to know is even 
effective. Pulkki et al. (2015: 41) also speak of how an “autopilot mode of everyday being can 
be related to the mechanical and unperceptive habits that Dewey (1997b) distinguishes from 
the flexible and sensitive habits that should be developed in education”. Thus, contemplative 
practice is a guarding strategy against potentially harmful or, at the very least, underachieving 
habitual and pattern-driven modes of living.  
There is no doubt that neoliberalism has as its foundation all these features that contemplative 
education identifies as problematic. This much was also established in Chapter 3 (see 3.3.1 
and 3.3.3). It is, therefore, not a far stretch to identify the task of contemplative education to 
be largely the task of combatting neoliberalism. Forbes (2016: 358) notices this tug-of-war 
between the purposes of contemplative education and neoliberalism in the classroom. When 
looking specifically at the practice of mindfulness meditation, Forbes (2016: 358) notices that 
the participants are usually biased towards “scientific evidence, materialism, reason, 
individualism, and entrepreneurial values”. He references the “Myth of the Given” (see Alston, 
2002: 69), where one assumes that “events and actions in everyday life are directly perceived 
as given, objective facts rather than as socially constructed, interpretable, and contested 
meanings that can be uncovered, discussed, and transformed”.  
Furthermore, Forbes (2016: 358) claims that teachers themselves, even those who participate 
in the teaching of mindfulness, do not always investigate their own loyalties to neoliberalist 
biases, and therefore contribute to the neoliberalisation of mindfulness and contemplative 
education. He identifies some of these biases citing, firstly, the notion that each individual is 
exclusively responsible for and in control of his or her own happiness and should pursue 
success through the act of buying and consuming. Secondly, he explains the notion that 
“therapeutic behavioral change and neuroscience are the means by which the individual 




as a form of scientism, and Forbes (2016: 359) goes on to explain the extent to which our 
culture is dominated by “scientific and technocratic approaches” through which mindfulness 
becomes an instrument used to pursue a neoliberalist, isolated and personal version of 
success. Such success can be measured through ““objective” outcome measures such as 
education audits and test scores” (Forbes, 2016: 359). This should not be new to the reader, 
as all such findings were present within Chapter 3 (on neoliberalism) (see 3.3.1 and 3.3.4).  
Ultimately, Forbes (2016: 359) feels that what is normalised and accepted, and what remains 
unquestioned, are “unhealthy and unethical values, practices, and ways of being”. Ultimately, 
mindfulness practice (see Germer, 2004: 24) comes to be used within schools in a manner 
divorced from its contemplative origin (Forbes, 2016). This means that mindfulness practice 
cannot reach its true potential of uncovering the “unchartered realms of unconscious emotional 
life” or attempt to reach states of ego-transcendence as are found in the traditions from which 
the practice originates (Forbes, 2016: 361). It is leading economists, in fact, who are eager for 
more mindfulness within education, because they feel it results in the “greatest returns on 
education investments and lead to greater success in life”, and, finally, will increase “the quality 
and productivity of the workforce through fostering workers’ motivation, perseverance, and 
self-control” (Forbes, 2016: 362). Everything is forced into a narrow, economic, direction of 
understanding. In this way, Forbes (2016: 362) makes it clear that contemplative education 
comes face to face with strong neoliberalist modes of thinking and acting, and, only when one 
can truly understand the call to overcome habits and patterns of thought and action that are 
present in contemplative education, can one understand the deeper purposes of this emerging 
field.  
Contemplative education also challenges our patterns and habits of thought and action by 
exploring the ways in which we approach identity. In Chapter 3 it was shown that neoliberalism 
leads to exclusionary identity formation (see 3.3.3). Contemplative education and 
contemplative practice author Zajonc (2006) writes about divisive identities as well. Forms of 
identity politics can even lead to murder and rape (Zajonc, 2006: 1), and what can truly address 
such issues is not only more aid and more data, but “a view of the human being in which the 
individual develops the capacity to move among worldviews, transcending particular identities 
while simultaneously honoring each of them” (Zajonc, 2006: 1). For Zajonc (2006: 1), it is “at 
the level where information marries with values to become meaning” that we can begin to 
rectify the socio-political mishaps of our world. Contemplative education works hard to make 
the very consciousness of the learner more flexible and receptive to ‘the other’ (Zajonc, 2006: 
1), and to move it away from forms of “objectification” (Zajonc, 2006: 2). Zajonc (2006: 3) 
observes the tendency for “educating the mind for critical reasoning, critical writing, and critical 




sufficient?” He urges education to move towards the transformation of the heart above and 
beyond the mere transformation of the intellect – aiming for the much-needed ability to “live 
the worldviews of others” (Zajonc, 2006: 3). This refers to the much-needed ability to have 
love for even those most different from ourselves (Zajonc, 2006: 3). Zajonc’s article portrays 
another way in which contemplative education challenges our patterns of thought and 
behaviour, namely identity.  
Another narrative or habit of thinking to be challenged is the notion that emotions are inferior 
to pure rationality and thought. Winans (2012: 150) argues that thoughts cannot operate 
without emotions, and that this fact has been established by recent neuroscientific research 
(see Crowley, 2006). Beyond that, she urges one to realise that emotions are not something 
that individuals generate and contain within themselves, but emotions are actually shared. 
There exist networks of socially and historically constructed and shared emotions (Winans, 
2012: 150). This is a similar point to what we saw when discussing knowledge (see 5.3.1) and 
identity (see 5.3.1). Perhaps at this juncture, it can be noted that contemplative education 
reveals an interconnectedness that moves through most facets of life and influences our 
ethics. This is directly in contrast to the hyper-individualist picture painted by neoliberalism. 
Winans (2012: 152) calls for “a critical emotional literacy”, which involves theoretical and 
practiced components.  
The theoretical argument is engaged through “critical, analytical questions” while the practice 
comes about through “experiential, embodied engagement with emotions” (Winans, 2012: 
152.). Traditionally, research has been approached in a manner where the researcher tries as 
far as possible to distance him- or herself from that which is researched (Author, date). This 
approach to research leads to the emotional and moral dimensions of many questions being 
minimised (Winans, 2012: 153). Finally, such distance creates callousness towards the 
sufferings of others (Winans, 2012: 153). She goes on to state that emotions are not only 
communal in that they are shared, but they are also actually formed within relational moments 
(Winans, 2012: 154), meaning that emotions and identity are closely interlinked.  
Once again, this kind of topic was exactly relevant for the discussion on divisive identities and 
asocial relationality as undertaken in Chapter 3, and shows that contemplative education 
counters neoliberalism on many fronts. These identities come about through “emotional” rules 
that are “informed by power relations” (Winans, 2012: 155). Another important point is that, 
just as emotions are formed by observations, observations are directed by emotions (Winans, 
2012: 155). Here it becomes evident that emotions are the driving force behind our patterns 
of inquiry and our very ability to be aware of how such patterns control us (Winans, 2012: 155). 
This has direct bearing on the realm of ethics, as we are prone to ignoring certain 




towards them (Winans, 2012: 155). When thinking further about ethics, it is important to realise 
that emotions can act either as a reinforcing agent of as entrenched power relations or as the 
very seat of transformative processes (Winans, 2012: 155). Contemplative practice and 
contemplative education could facilitate such transformation by helping learners to realise that 
they are not their emotions, and that they do not have to identify with them (Winans, 2012: 
160; also see Zajonc, 2009: 26). Instead, certain negative emotions can be transcended and 
worked through, in order to arrive at a position where one is ready and willing to engage with 
difficult ethical questions. Lastly, upon studying emotions and noticing their relational 
formation, one has an opportunity to let such findings evolve into a genuine understanding of 
an existing interconnectedness, which is the most essential ingredient for social 
transformation (Winans, 2012: 166).  
Speaking of interconnectedness, contemplative education could serve to help us question how 
easily we have, under the neoliberal model, let go of social bonds and social networks. The 
famous work, Bowling alone: America’s declining social capital, by Robert Putnam (1995) 
outlines the decline of what he terms ‘social capital’ – referring to the strength of our social 
networks (or the lack of such strength). I have shown how neoliberalism contributes to the 
breakdown of social capital (see 3.3.3). According to Bourdieu (2002), it is such social capital, 
in the form of family ties and the like, that stands as the last bastion keeping neoliberalism 
from completely engulfing every aspect of modern culture. Barbezat and Bush (2013: 30) 
argue for the significance of contemplative education in restoring to us a sense of social capital 
through a deep sense of interconnectedness. They call for a reimagining of educational 
environments to facilitate the development of explorations of interconnectedness through 
contemplative exercises (Barbezat & Bush, 2013: 32).  
Finally, there is one more narrative or pattern of thought that requires consideration, namely 
the assumption that any individual is able to approach any type of knowledge or experience 
with the right amount of intellectual prowess. Western traditions, especially the more modern 
versions thereof, hold that knowledge is within the grasp of any who can muster up enough 
intellectual acumen to reach it, no matter their state of consciousness. Walsh (1989) – in his 
interesting article, “Can Western philosophers understand Asian philosophies? – offers some 
ideas on why certain ancient contemplative traditions have not quite accepted that knowledge 
and experiences can be handed out easily. Such traditions do not take “intellectual analysis” 
to be enough for gaining access to “the deepest profundities of realization” (Walsh, 1989: 281). 
The Vedantasara (see Nikhilānanda, 1959), a text from India, includes a list of requirements 
needed before anyone would be able to understand its contents, and although the list includes 
“textual study and intellectual discrimination”, two requirements that are more familiar to the 




away from the outer world towards the inner, cessation of sensory perception, endurance, and 
continuous concentration” (Walsh, 1989: 282), which are not so familiar to the modern 
Western mind. In other traditions from the East, similar prerequisites are found, and usually 
include “a rigorous discipline of ethics, emotional transformation, attentional training and 
cultivation of wisdom” (Walsh, 1989: 282.). This leads Walsh to ask whether, amidst everything 
gained by the West through an intellectual study of Eastern traditions, something has not 
perhaps been lost or missed (Walsh, 1989: 283). According to recent findings on the impact 
of different states of consciousness, Walsh concludes that the answer might be a resounding 
‘yes’ (Walsh, 1989: 283). Walsh notes (1989: 283) that the study of consciousness has made 
somewhat of a return within the field of Western psychology, since an absence dating back to 
William James (1890), and, this is happening specifically through research into altered or 
alternate states of consciousness (Walsh, 1989: 283).  
There are a series of different states of consciousness, beyond the normal, waking state, that 
all hold their own, unique insights, and are all accessed in different ways (Walsh, 1989: 284). 
Furthermore, these different states of consciousness “display what is known as ‘state 
specificity’” (Walsh, 1989: 284), meaning the insights and capacities that are accessed in one 
state are not necessarily transferable to a different state. This begins to shed light on why 
certain Asian traditions emphasise different prerequisites needed in order to gain access to 
the treasures within more meditative and contemplative states, treasures that are not 
accessible through mere intellectual rigour. This also makes it difficult for whatever is 
experienced by a person in a different state of consciousness to be communicated to anyone 
else who is not in that same, altered state or who has never even experienced it (Walsh, 1989: 
286). Walsh wants to be clear that much more research is needed to fully grasp the extent to 
which such state-specific limitations exist, but in the very least it can help one to understand 
why Asian mystical philosophies have always placed considerable emphasis on the necessity 
of reaching states of consciousness beyond the usual, mentally and intellectually charged 
waking state (Walsh, 1989: 286).  
Of most importance for this study was the claim, made by such Asian traditions, that specific 
states of consciousness, attained through contemplative and meditative practice, can lead not 
only to “increased calm, equanimity, concentration, and psychosomatic control, greater 
perceptual and introspective sensitivity and acuity”, but, most importantly, “stronger emotions 
of love, joy and compassion” (Walsh, 1989: 287). If contemplative practice and contemplative 
education can provide levels of love, compassion and empathy that are not be accessed in 
any other way, then the field becomes all the more relevant when facing the ethical needs 
brought about through neoliberalism. Already, there is ample evidence for the claims of 




speed and acuity”, as well as evidence for “these Asian claims for enhanced introspective 
skills and state-specific knowledge” (Walsh, 1989: 288). Moreover, there is growing evidence 
for the claims regarding a sense of interconnectedness, compassion and empathy – this is to 
be elaborated upon in a future section specifically on contemplative education and 
compassion (see 5.3.2).  
In short, Western philosophy is a “primarily conceptual enterprise that seeks the deepest type 
of understanding through intellectual analysis and logic” while Asian mystical philosophy 
places special emphasis on the need for discipline (Walsh, 1989: 290). Walsh describes it with 
the word ‘discipline’, although, personally, I feel a much better word would be ‘lifestyle’, 
because a deeper study of these mystical texts show that the practices need not always relate 
to ascetic measures, as the word ‘discipline’ might suggest. If one takes, for example, the most 
popular philosophical text from the East, the Bhagavad-Gita as it is (Swami, 1993), and 
examine it closely, it becomes clear that the largest parts of the text are devoted to what is 
called the ‘three modes of material nature’ – a framework for understanding the different 
modes or energies that can come to dominate one’s life according to one’s chosen lifestyle.  
For example, the ‘mode of ignorance’ is characterised by inertia, confusion, depression and 
so forth, while the ‘mode of goodness’ is characterised by balance, good health, clear 
understanding, friendliness, openness and magnanimity (Swami, 1993). The text describes in 
no uncertain terms which habits and patterns (lifestyle choices) lead to an increase of which 
of the modes of material nature, making it clear that our own decisions, which reinforce our 
own habits and lifestyle, are at the root of the different states of consciousness to which we 
have access, and, consequently, at the root of the results or fruits of such states of 
consciousness, be it positive or negative.  
Getting back to Walsh, whether one wants to use words like ‘discipline’ or use words like 
‘lifestyle’, the fact remains, Asian philosophies emphasise the need for systems of training in 
order to access altered states of consciousness (Walsh, 1989: 292). There has been a 
tendency for Westerners to assume that “Asian philosophies, psychologies and religions” are 
“nonsensical products of primitive thinking” owing to their excessive requirements (Walsh, 
1989: 293). However, it is a classic case of dismissing what one cannot comprehend. Walsh 
refers to the concept “grades of significance” (Walsh, 1989: 293) to explain that a single object 
or concept or philosophy can have different grades of significance or meaning, and that all the 
different levels of interpretation could – at the same time – be, strictly speaking, true, but could 
have different levels of significance or impact. This explains why Western academics might 
very well feel like they have fully understood Asian mystical philosophies, – and, for the 
purposes of this study, we might add contemplative practice in general – when they have, in 




epistemological mode that must be cultivated before these traditions can be understood and 
their validity can be assessed” (Walsh, 1989: 295).  
Walsh’s (1989) article goes a long way to expose a certain habit, pattern or narrative that is 
present within the modern, neoliberal, Western world – the tendency to assume that any type 
of knowledge or experience (or state of consciousness) can be reached simply through 
intellectual means, without any due attention given to discipline and lifestyle. Although this 
topic had already been touched upon in some sense when talking about how contemplative 
education encourages a lived or embodied approach to knowledge, emotions and experiences 
(see 5.3.1), it is a rich understanding to frame the ideas in terms such as those used by Walsh 
(1989), such as states of consciousness (see Walsh, 1989: 283), state-specificity (see Walsh, 
1989: 285), and the necessity of discipline (see Walsh, 1989: 282) and – as I would like to add 
– lifestyle. Furthermore, what makes this analysis even more important is the fact that ethical 
positions can be contributed to states of consciousness, meaning that one can argue, as this 
study did (see 5.3.2), that the deepest levels of empathetic, compassionate and responsible 
living can only be accessed through discipline and lifestyle, and not simply through intellectual 
enquiry.  
This is perhaps an opportune moment to reflect on why I feel that care ethics does not do quite 
enough insofar as challenging neoliberalism. When thinking of the kind of paradigm shifts, 
which this section associates with contemplative education, it becomes clear that care ethics 
does not, in fact, have the power to enact such shifts. With one type of shift, in particular, this 
seems most evident – and that is the move away from a purely cerebral or cognitive mode of 
knowledge gathering and ethics to a more embodied and lived mode thereof. Let me be clear, 
care ethics is distinct from most other ethical schools in that it does, indeed, move away from 
abstractions and the hyper-rational, towards an ethics that is focus on lived relationships and 
context-specific ethical interactions (see Noddings, 2002a; 2002b; 2005; 2013; Slote, 2001; 
2007; 2016), but there are no fleshed-out practices as part of the school, and this is why I feel 
it mainly remains a theoretical project.  
Contemplative education, on the other hand, as one can begin to realise throughout this 
chapter, places considerable emphasis on the experiential, the lived, the meditative, in other 
words, on all that lies beyond the cognitive and the theoretical. Explained in a different way, 
one can make the simple observation that care ethics explains and conceptualises of a 
specific, new ethical voice that should be explored and honoured, while having nothing near 
the immense history and pool of concrete practices, techniques or methods for unlocking that 
very ethical mode or voice. Contemplative education has a plethora of exercises and practices 





5.3.2 Morality, involvement, interconnectedness and compassion 
Although the concepts of interconnectedness and compassion were already touched upon in 
5.3.1, it should be expanded upon and afforded its own section, since the topic of compassion 
within contemplative education represents a very strong answer to the sub-questions “What 
are the inherent values of contemplative education?” and “How can the values cultivated by 
contemplative education counteract a neoliberalist mentality?” When conversations 
surrounding ethics and morality arise, ‘compassion’ seems to be the term favoured by 
contemplative education authors, certainly owing to the fact that it is the word found to be 
central to many contemplative spiritual and religious traditions (Fox, 1999; Mamgain, 2010). 
As a brief side note, I would urge the reader to see this usage of the notion of compassion as 
synonymous with how care ethicists would use ‘empathy’. The way both terms are utilised 
within both fields represents the same ethical modes of being. Furthermore, this section also 
serves as an answer to the question, “What might contemplative education contribute to the 
values education goals of the Curriculum and Assessment Policy Statement and the policies 
that informed it?”, as it deals directly with contemplative education’s approach to ethics. 
In 5.3.1, Pulkki et al. (2015: 44) identified rationality and empiricism as the two main 
constituents of the Western approach to epistemology. Furthermore, I explored how this leads 
to a disembodied mode of being. Even more concerning is how this disembodiment results in 
a person’s alienation from others (Pulkki et al., 2015: 45). Another way of analysing Western 
epistemology is by noticing how much it is framed in terms of “visual perception” (Pulkki et al., 
2015: 38). This, once again, absorbs one in an impersonal and objective mood, as found within 
neoliberalism. With such a disembodied, impersonal and visual approach, one tends to view 
the world in terms of ‘things’ and ‘space’ and not in terms of “dynamic interactive processes 
between living beings” (Pulkki et al., 2015: 38). In a way, it is as if we start to look past people, 
and as if we “suppresses the non-visual and lived-body aspects of moral life and education” 
(Pulkki et al., 2015: 38). Additionally, the technology-rich internet culture of the neoliberal age 
contributes to the frequency of disembodied and impersonal interactions marked by “hate 
speech” (Pulkki et al., 2015: 38). If a different epistemological approach can be pursued, where 
“intuition, sensing, and feeling” are held equally to the more contemporary Western 
approaches, “empathy imagination and compassion” could eventually flourish (Pulkki et al., 
2015: 47).  
Contemplative methods rewire our cognitive biases and relational prejudices (Pulkki et al., 
2015: 38), and furthermore increase our moral awareness (Pulkki et al., 2015: 39). It is 




moral issue (Pulkki et al., 2015: 39). This brings the discussion back to what has been 
mentioned earlier in this chapter – attention and awareness (see 5.3.1). The importance of 
this trait has been recognised since the time of Stoic philosophers, who trained their attentions, 
stilled their minds, and entered into an awareness of each passing moment, to become aware 
of the needs of those around them and to be truly able to act in a mindful and just manner 
(Pulkki et al., 2015: 39). This was the method employed for overcoming the self-absorption of 
an individualised perception and extending that perceptive power, through attention and 
awareness, to a larger, interconnected network of persons beyond the individual (Pulkki et al., 
2015: 39). This Stoic practice is no different to Buddhist, Christian or Hindu practices for the 
sake of compassionate awareness. Academics are witnessing more and more each year that 
there is a strong connection between the heightened levels of awareness that is cultivated 
through contemplative education and the ability to devote one selflessly to another (Pulkki et 
al., 2015: 39).  
In 5.3.1, I highlighted how contemplative education enables one to question and transform the 
patterns and habits of thought and action by which one has been conditioned. This included 
one’s emotions and consequently one’s identity. Similarly, as was argued in chapters 3 and 4, 
such habits and patterns affect one’s moral dispositions and perceptions. Thus, the 
introspective thrust of contemplative education has a direct influence on the realm of ethics, 
“[i]nner attention makes possible the uncovering of what is often happening pre- or 
subconsciously in our mind. Moral perception, like all perception, is initiated by such 
preconscious processes, preceding the conscious interpretation of the situation” (Pulkki et al., 
2015: 40). 
Pulkki et al. (2015: 37) also make it clear that research within psychology and neuroscience 
support hypotheses of interconnectedness, which is in itself a catalyst for empathy. Other 
studies (see Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999) have pointed to the fact that the emotional and 
empathetic maturity that comes from contemplative exercises stems from the “delay of 
gratification” principle taught or obtained through such practices (Roeser & Peck, 2009: 129). 
This is simply the ability to forego a smaller reward at present in exchange for a larger reward 
in the future. This leads one to minimise impulsivity and become aware of the realm of the 
social-emotional (Roeser & Peck, 2009: 129). Barbezat and Bush (2013: 15, 30, 31) relay 
ample scientific research to show the significant effects contemplative education has 
regarding compassion and empathy.  
Although Pulkki et al. (2015) view compassion and interconnectedness as one aspect (albeit 
a large aspect) of contemplative practice and contemplative education, Barbezat and Bush 
(2013: 128) hold that all forms of the teaching of contemplative practice occur “by definition, 




words, all the techniques and exercises used to gain a deeper sense of awareness and to 
become a more calm and integrated person are ultimately aimed at the ability to use such 
benefits for the well-being and in the service of others (Barbezat & Bush, 2013: 128).  
Clearly, according to the contemplative scheme, empathy and compassion flow from a sense 
of interconnectedness (Pulkki et al., 2015). This is why contemplative education makes an 
effort to transform learning environments in such a manner that learners no longer feel 
separated from the subject matter they study or from the broader world they inhabit (Barbezat 
& Bush, 2013: 4). Contemplative education aims to validate and support a learner’s personal 
experiences (Barbezat & Bush, 2013: 6), and this has a considerable effect on a learner’s 
willingness and eagerness to engage with the world around them or with their specific study 
subjects (Barbezat & Bush, 2013: 6). In the foreword to “Contemplative practices in higher 
education: Powerful methods to transform teaching and learning”, Palmer (cited in Barbezat 
& Bush, 2013: vii), when reflecting on learners and their position within education, writes, “I 
see too many people whose expert knowledge – and the power that comes with it – has not 
been joined to a professional ethic, a sense of communal responsibility, or even simple 
compassion”. With that he immediately exposes a lack of certain core values of compassion, 
empathy and responsibility. Palmer goes on to say (cited in Barbezat & Bush, 2013: vii) that it 
is the “objectivist model of knowing” that causes – 
[A] pedagogy that keeps students at arm’s length from the subjects they learn about […] [which], 
in turn, creates an ethical gap between the educated person and a world that is inevitably 
impacted by his or her actions, a failure to embrace the fact that one is a moral actor with 
communal responsibilities.  
This immediately reminds one of the relational gap, which was highlighted by the different 
articles on consumer identity as reported in Chapter 3 (see 3.3.3). Contemplative education 
teaches one how to stop categorising other humans as ‘other’ and thus to create an 
unnecessary distance. Palmer notes that, as Barbezat and Bush argue in their book (cited in 
Barbezat & Bush, 2013: vii), “contemplative practices […] will deepen, not damage, academic 
culture [and] the pedagogical elements found here help students [to] feel more keenly their 
responsibilities as educated persons in the larger ecology of human and nonhuman life”.  
In the words of Hadot (2002: 276): 
[Philosophy] is essentially an effort to become aware of ourselves, our being-in-the-world, and 
our being-with-others. It is also, as Maurice Merleau-Ponty used to say, an effort to “relearn 
how to see the world” and attain a universal vision, thanks to which we can put ourselves in the 




Not only does contemplative education help learners to focus on a sense of 
interconnectedness, which permeates all things, and on care, compassion, empathy and 
responsibility, but the way in which such virtues are approached is also different. The current 
neoliberal paradigm, as discussed in Chapter 4, has a masculine, abstract and principle-based 
approach to ethics and issues of justice (see 4.3). Orr (2014) argues that it is time to break 
out of this masculine and individual mould. The way in which we attempt to develop 
compassion and empathy in our contemporary global world is through an overly ‘rational’ 
engagement with the concept of rights. This is done in a similar manner as we would attempt 
to solve a math problem. Orr (2014: 44) further notes, “modern-era ethical theories […] are 
grounded in the logical abstract formalism developed out of the criteria of scientific 
investigation and theory”. According to Orr (2014: 49), one should uncover “the structure of 
the feminine relational ego and the role of empathy in its mode of moral problem solving” and 
move “toward grounding a moral orientation in a self-concept which avoids the isolation of the 
purely rational ego of the Rights and Justice approach”. According to Orr (2014: 49): 
Meditation practices such as mindfulness, combined with study, can begin to counter this 
repression and to develop an experiential understanding of pratityasamutpada [dependent co-
origination or interconnectedness]. This means that one must live that understanding, not 
simply cognitively recognize it. 
In other words, contemplative practice could contribute much in terms of establishing the 
interconnected, ego-transcending and relational ethics, which I discussed in Chapter 4. Orr 
(2014) mentions meditation practices. I would add that other forms of contemplative education 
could be used, such as contemplative writing or thought-provoking community involvement. 
The form is not as important as the function, namely that learners must begin to live a lifestyle 
that reinforces their sense of interconnectedness. Orr is of the opinion that “[m]indfulness as 
a simple but powerful technique to promote karuna/compassion can be easily integrated into 
classrooms at all levels to develop natural compassion and bring it to bear on the full range of 
curricular, social and environmental issues” (Orr, 2014: 52).  
When thinking about how this vision stemming from contemplative education differs from 
neoliberalism, I think of how persons are convinced that rationality and cold, calculated 
choices are the way by which they must move through life (Bowles & Gintis, 1975; Munro, 
2004). This permeates into educational contexts as well, as shown in Chapter 3 (see 3.3.4), 
and has the effect of obscuring, from a learner’s view, the ‘other’, by erecting an identity based 
on competition and exclusion. Clarke (2008), in his work, urges for a pragmatic identity 
discovery for learners. Contemplative education proves to be such a pragmatic and more 
organic form of identity discovery. The desires of Gunzenhauser (2008) who, when writing 




to the other, are fulfilled by contemplative education. In other words, contemplative education 
signifies a move away from the solipsistic (i.e. egotistic and self-absorbed) and hyper-
individualist nature of neoliberalism towards a more intersubjective identity that recognises an 
existing interconnectedness, and, consequently sustains a greater level of empathy and 
compassion.  
In summary, section 5.2 covered many subtopics, all related to paradigm shifts. First, there 
was the epistemological, the identity-bound and the emotional narratives, which are all turned 
upside down and revolutionised by contemplative education. Of particular importance was the 
emphasis on a lived and embodied philosophy instead of a purely intellectual and 
philosophical one, the realisation that different states of consciousness exist, which are not all 
accessible through mere intellect, the actualisation of an awareness of the interconnectedness 
of being, and, finally, the compassion-based ethics that flows from such sense of 
interconnectedness. All of these findings created a powerful combined formula for resisting 
and counteracting the values that are put in place by neoliberalism. Also of note was the fact 
that contextualised experiences and relationships, and openness to the ‘other’ are 
underscored exactly they are in care ethics. As I have mentioned, in this regard contemplative 
education is, for me, an evolution of care ethics, as it has almost all of the same concepts, but 
with the addition of a lived dimension, a lifestyle, complete with many sets of methods and 
practices. 
 
5.4 Areas of concern 
What follows are some areas of concern as noted by various authors. Contemplative 
education can be described as a still emerging field (see Roth, 2006) and, therefore, it is 
necessary to become aware of the areas that call for some caution. Many pitfalls are possible, 
as the ways in which contemplative education might be implemented into modern school and 
university curriculums are still being finalised.  
A good place to start would be an official article of assessment, directed at the entire 
movement of contemplative education. In her article, “Look before you leap: Reconsidering 
contemplative pedagogy”, Fisher (2017) voices various concerns. First of all, she feels that 
the claim of contemplative education of unlocking a “focused attention [that is] is rarely if ever 
systematically trained or cultivated in most educational settings” (Fisher, 2017: 11) is 
ungrounded. I feel this is an issue of semantics. When contemplative education authors refer 
to “attention” (Gunnlaugson, Sarath, Scott & Bai, 2014: 151; Repetti, 2010: 5, 7, 8) they do not 




If one considers the previously discussed states of consciousness and the ‘state-specificity’ 
that goes with it (see 5.3.1), one can begin to understand that ‘attention’ is a multi-level 
concept, and that there really is a vast difference between the type of attention contemplative 
teachers try to cultivate within learners and the type of attention that is commonly utilised 
within the intellectually oriented modern educational system. Perhaps it can be argued that 
the authors within contemplative education need to be more elaborate and that they should 
considerate in their explanations of different terms, and that they make efforts to differentiate 
when necessary. At the same time, however, it might perhaps behove those approaching the 
field to familiarise themselves with some of the more nuanced meanings and understandings 
of different concepts used by the relevant experts in the field. In any case, it is not a criticism 
on the part of Fisher that I feel holds much weight.  
Fisher (2017: 13) raises other concerns that I feel are relevant. She mentions the religious 
backgrounds of many contemplative practices. This entails various complexities. First of all, 
when contemplative practice is secularised, the religious or spiritual meanings behind various 
rituals are completely subverted (Fisher, 2017: 15). However, secularisation is one easy 
response to some of the troubles that come about through teachers resorting to various forms 
of proselytising when feeling inspired by the practices they themselves follow rigorously 
(Fisher, 2017: 13). Roeser and Peck (2009: 132) are a representative example of the camp 
within the writers on contemplative practice that feel secularisation and a non-sectarian 
version of the field are the best ways forward. 
Furthermore, contemplative exercises within the context of a classroom could evoke a myriad 
of intense and complex emotions and psychological reactions, and there is the very real 
danger of not having teachers who are adequately trained or qualified to facilitate or manage 
such complex responses (Fisher, 2017: 13). Fisher feels that contemplative education 
misguides and distorts teaching until it becomes counselling, and could lead to “dangerous” 
and “irresponsible results” (Fisher, 2017: 16). She proclaims, “[any] pedagogy that requires 
teachers to assess potential psychological benefits or harm belongs in a therapist’s office, not 
in a classroom”, but who is to say that the current, neoliberal educational milieu is 
psychologically neutral? She seems to imply that contemplative education conjures up 
volatility where it does not exist, when it can be argued that it is merely bringing to the surface 
and redirecting powerful emotional and psychological drives that were always in effect.  
Thinking back to the analysis of neoliberalism as reported in Chapter 3, it seems a far stretch 
to claim that neoliberalism is neutral in terms of emotions and psychological states. Regarding 
this issue of adequately trained teachers, Roeser and Peck (2009: 132) recommend “modules 
for the education and support of teachers in how to use contemplative practices”. Others, such 




techniques and approaches that have no real chance of resulting in unsettling emotional or 
psychological states. However, he also notes that many teachers or staff members who are 
enthusiastic about the field fail to consider and discuss potential dangers sufficiently for fear 
of exacerbating the unpopularity of contemplative education (Komjathy, 2017: 111). Although 
Komjathy is in favour of training, he is not in favour of further steps, such as certification 
programmes and the like, which would represent a “professionalization” of contemplative 
practice (2017: 174). Barbezat and Bush (2013: 19) feel that teachers must at least have some 
personal involvement with the practice they want to introduce if they want to be able to give 
learners a meaningful experience or if they want to help them “process their experience 
afterward (Barbezat & Bush, 2013: 68).  
Furthermore, these authors recommend teachers familiarise themselves with the potential 
resistance of a learner by learning about such learner’s level of apprehension about an 
exercise (Barbezat & Bush, 2013: 68) and by respecting the unique context and background 
from which each learner comes in order to make the learners feel that their experiences in 
relation to contemplative exercises are important (Barbezat & Bush, 2013: 69). Eaton, Davies, 
Williams and Macgregor (2017: 29) add that many learners, because of their cultural and 
religious backgrounds and lifestyles, may not know how to react to contemplative pedagogies. 
It is therefore the role of the teacher to “provide sufficient rationale and scaffolding for these 
activities so that students feel safe and supported in participating in them”. Finally, Barbezat 
and Bush (2013: 81) also highlight that contemplative exercises are enacted through “verbal 
guidance” and that it is, therefore, of utmost importance that teachers do not confuse learners 
with unnecessary jargon, but keep their communication effective by keeping it simple and 
clear. 
Fisher (2017: 17) also expresses great doubts over the prospect of evaluating contemplative 
education, a distinctly subjective and personal affair. Yet, I would argue that contemplative 
education should not be evaluated at all. I feel inclined to say that Fisher is exposing the 
symptoms of her neoliberal bias in being concerned about evaluation and measurement when 
it comes to a subject that should not have anything to do with performance in the first place 
(Forbes, 2016). For Barbezat and Bush (2013: 76), the solution lies in grading learners 
according to their level of participation, instead of grading something as subjective as personal 
experiences and reflections. 
Another cautionary note, which I think is of utmost importance considering the theme of 
neoliberalism within this study, comes from Forbes (2016: 357). We already touched upon his 
arguments in section 5.2.1. He cautions against neoliberal elements within mindfulness 
programmes and contemplative education more broadly. He ascribes the move towards 




2016: 357). In other words, he is not that enthusiastic about such secularisation. A distinctly 
vague and relativist ethos of the secular version of mindfulness allows for the neoliberal value 
of “personal well-being” above all else to creep into the picture (Forbes, 2016: 357). Some 
(such as Purser & Loy, 2013) refer to this morally watered down version of mindfulness as 
McMindfulness (Forbes, 2016: 357). This is a reference to the commercial aspect of 
capitalism, as seen in something like McDonald’s. As Forbes (2016: 357) puts it: 
[We see the rise of] self-serving and ego-enhancing purposes that run counter to both Buddhist 
and Abrahamic prophetic teachings to let go of ego-attachment and enact skilful, universal 
compassion” and which sustains the “neoliberal, corporatized, individualistic society based on 
private gain. 
McMindfulness, that distorted version of mindfulness practice, is completely oblivious to “the 
present moral, political, and cultural context of neoliberalism” (Forbes, 2016: 357) and, 
ironically, can offer nothing more than a self-help formula, through and over-emphasis on 
stress relief and mental efficiency for the purpose of material productivity, for individuals to 
keep fit for re-enrolment in the entrepreneurial conveyor belt of neoliberalism (Forbes, 
2016: 357). With McMindfulness, there is no awareness of social imbalances or social justice 
issues (Forbes, 2016: 357) and there is the neoliberal tendency of viewing the individual in 
very isolated terms, completely ignorant of the interdependent networks within society. 
Mindfulness practice should not only aim at the betterment of the isolated individual, but should 
encourage one to become deeply invested in social justice issues, and to develop an ethical 
and empathetic nature (Forbes, 2016: 357), and that was certainly the stance of this study as 
well.  
In another of his works, Forbes (2017: 3) questions the heavy testing and accountability that 
are present in modern-school systems, and asks us to consider to what our definitions of 
success amount and to think how little it has been given deep thought (Forbes, 2017: 2). This 
was all discussed in Chapter 3 (see 3.4), but it is good to see that an Author like Forbes (2017), 
within the field of contemplative practice, is also noticing the same issues. Forbes (2017: 3) 
attests that such a narrow focus on testing and performance contributes to mindfulness 
education being distorted to suite the hyper-individualist and competitive ends of 
neoliberalism. 
Komjathy (2017: 172) observed similar trends in relation to neoliberalism and contemplative 
practice, and refers to it as the “banalization, cooptation, commodification, and corporatization 
of meditation”, noticing the popularity of meditative practice and techniques among corporate 




Komjathy (2017: 37), when writing about critics in general, feels that, since most of them 
“utilize caricatures, straw‐man and red‐herring arguments in technical philosophical language, 
rooted in their own fears and misrepresentations, they are negligible, underserving of serious 
consideration”. He goes on to say, “like contemporary academia more generally, one finds 
various petty careerist, opportunist, pseudo‐intellectual, and politicized motivations (e.g., 
concern for fame, power, and influence)” (Komjathy, 2017: 37). He is obviously writing from a 
very impassioned corner, and there is a rather accusatory tone, making sweeping statements 
about very large sections of academia. However, if one can take it as an expression of his 
frustrations regarding the acceptance of contemplative education, one can see that there is 
certainly a lot of truth to what he is implying about the negative attitudes towards contemplative 
education. Eaton, Davies, Williams and MacGregor (2017: 29), beyond expressing challenges 
faced with regard to a shift away from traditional “curriculum design, course delivery, and 
student assessment protocols”, also attest to challenges faced regarding “acceptance for 
these [contemplative] practices within the student body, within our institutions, and within the 
larger academy” (Eaton et al., 2017: 29). They also note, “personal reflection can be 
misunderstood as undermining academic rigor or confusing the scientific method” (Eaton et 
al., 2017: 29.).  
This brings us to another important area of caution, and that is the relationship between 
contemplative education and scientific rigour. Some authors (such as Roeser & Peck, 2009: 
132) submit to the so-called need to comply with the scientific accountability standards in 
place. Others are not at all enthusiastic or convinced. Komjathy (2017: 38) recognises that the 
current educational milieu is saturated with values such as secular materialism, social 
constructivism, and scientific (scientistic?) reductionism”, and he prefers the cognitive 
processes to the embodied practices. It is clear that Komjathy does not want contemplative 
education to submit itself to such thoughtlessly accepted cultural norms and homogenisations.  
Scientific benchmarks, such as neuroscience and psychology, have become the doorkeepers 
of the acceptable (Komjathy, 2017: 43) but, to Komjathy (2017: 43), it is nothing but 
unnecessarily “dominant interpretive frameworks”. This bias towards scientific standards is 
not only the result of the scientism and technocracy, which he had identified, but also of simple 
economics – funding goes to what is deemed relevant and verifiable (Komjathy, 2017: 43). 
This is yet another clear example of the great influence of neoliberalism. He is not convinced 
that such a scientism will allow for the proper exploration of the “deeper transformative power 
of meditation” (Komjathy, 2017: 256). He is also starkly aware of the political and reputational 
repercussions of contemplative education, and cites personal experience of being warned 




On the topic of secularisation, he cites the same materialist values and reductionism as 
mentioned above as a reason for the pressure to secularise contemplative practice, and he 
resists such pressures in favour of the attempt at “honor[ing] and engag[ing] multiculturalism, 
multiethnicity, and religious pluralism” (Komjathy, 2017: 41). In fact, he evolves these 
recommendations to a point where “interreligious dialogue” can become a way to guard 
against the watered-down and conformist values of secular materialism – “greater inclusion of 
alternative perspectives and other traditions, engaged on their own terms, will strengthen the 
field” (Komjathy, 2017: 42). When a religious learner is expected to conform to a secularised 
system, it represents a form of coercion, and what often happens, is that traditional practices 
are stripped down and reinvented and reconceived to fit a secular setting (Komjathy, 2017: 




Considerable content was covered in this chapter. The chapter started by giving an overview 
of the field, showing that it has a very long and rich history, and by giving some accounts of 
how different authors would define the school of thought. However, the most important part of 
this chapter was section 5.2, where I discussed the contents of contemplative education in 
more detail. It was here that I could address the questions of this study. Firstly, “Can 
contemplative education respond to the tension between neoliberalism and values education 
in the Curriculum and Assessment Policy Statement (CAPS)?”. Related to this main question, 
there were sub-questions:  
• What are the inherent values of contemplative education?  
• How can the values cultivated by contemplative education counteract a neoliberal 
mentality? 
• What might contemplative education contribute to the values education goals of the 
Curriculum and Assessment Policy Statement and the policies that informed it? 
In answer to these questions I analysed contemplative education. The findings are stated 
below: 
• Contemplative education uproots our epistemological narrative and aims to take a 
learner outside of his or her own abstract, overly mental epistemological realms. Such 
education prioritises a lived and embodied manner of knowledge acquisition. This is 





• This same epistemological paradigm shift extends to identity formation and emotions 
(the two are interlinked), and leads to a learner who is all the more aware of the 
interconnected nature of being. Again, this is very different to neoliberalism, where 
individuals conceive of themselves and operate in very isolated terms, and form 
identities and foster emotions and ambitions that are very impersonal and asocial. 
• Contemplative education might very well signify a different state of consciousness from 
the one we commonly utilise when approaching our self-improvement or when 
approaching ethical issues. This explains why it is important to emphasise 
transformative lifestyles and experiential and self-reflective/introspective exercises, 
because an arguably higher level of ethical conduct might only be accessible in this 
manner. 
• Contemplative education is intimately interrelated with a model of compassion, with 
some authors even asserting that all endeavours within the field are ultimately aimed 
at deepening one’s sense of compassion and responsibility towards the ‘other’. This 
compassion is enhanced through the cultivation of altered states of consciousness, 
and attained through practices and exercises, such as meditation and other subjective 
reflections. 
These findings make a strong case for the ability of contemplative education to respond to the 
tensions between neoliberalism and values education in the CAPS. After analysing these 
contents and their relationship to the main research question and its sub-questions, some of 















CHAPTER 6: RECOMMENDATIONS, SCHOLARLY CONTRIBUTION AND CONCLUSION 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this study was to renew consciousness about the implicit neoliberal bias in 
democratic South Africa’s education policy, and, specifically, the CAPS. More precisely, I 
analysed the inherent tension between neoliberalism and core ethical values, as promoted by 
key policies, such as such as the National Education Policy Act, No. 27 of 1996, (RSA, 1996a), 
the RNCS (DoE, 2002a; 2002b), the CAPS (DoE, 2011b), Values, education and democracy: 
Report of the Working Group on Values in Education (DoE, 2000), the Manifesto on values, 
education, and democracy (DoE, 2001) and Building a culture of responsibility and humanity 
in our schools: A guide for teachers (DoE, 2011a).  
In response, I argue for contemplative education as a catalyst for and a facilitator of a renewed 
and progressive form of values education that can resist the various challenges that 
neoliberalism might create. As far as I am aware, although a few authors have written about 
neoliberalism in South African education (such as Baatjies, 2005; Chisholm, 2003; 2005; 
Chisholm & Leyendecker, 2008; Jansen, 1998; Peet, 2002), at the time of this study, there 
was no work available which showed how neoliberalism might work against the teaching of 
ethical values in South Africa. The thesis began with a report on the thorough analysis of the 
contents of various policy documents, to ascertain what values are upheld within them.  
It became apparent that, despite particular references to values education, such as broad and 
generalised allusions to human rights (see DoE, 2002; RSA, 1996a), social justice (see DoE, 
2002; RSA, 1996a) and good citizenship (see DoE, 2002; RSA, 1996a), there appeared to be 
a lack of attention to and concern for the influence of a strong neoliberal overtone within the 
said policy documents. Therefore, I wanted to show, by means of a report on the conceptual 
research, what those effects of neoliberalism are. Thereafter, I reported on care ethics and 
contemplative education, in order to show which steps are necessary and from which angle 
ethics might be approached, in order to safeguard one’s cherished ethical values against 
neoliberalism. 
This process of inquiry was represented by the following sub-questions: 
• What are the inherent values contained in the Curriculum and Assessment Policy 
Statement?  
• How might neoliberalism undermine ethical values? 
• What are the inherent values of contemplative education? 





• What might contemplative education contribute to the values education goals of the 
Curriculum and Assessment Policy Statement and the policies that informed it? 
This chapter gives a summary of the main findings of the study. Thereafter, I consider some 
of the contributions this study could make to policy, to the academic realm, as well as to the 
broader South African society. This constitutes the scholarly contributions of the thesis. 
Thereafter, I reflect upon the limitations of the study, before making recommendations for 
further research. 
 
6.2 A summary of the research findings 
Chapter 2, in response to sub-question 1 (“What are the inherent values contained in the 
Curriculum and Assessment Policy Statement?”), reported that there is a wide range of aims 
and goals within the post-apartheid policy documents. Many of the goals relate to economic 
progress and skills-oriented learning for the purpose of workplace relevancy and efficiency 
(DoE, 1995; 1996; 1997; 2002b; 2011b; 2011c). Many of the other goals relate to ethical 
values and ‘good’ citizenship, enacting social justice, caring for one’s fellow human beings 
and acting responsibly towards the environment – in other words, values education (DoE, 
2000; 2001; 2002b; 2011a; RSA, 1996a; 1996b). Furthermore, it was found that certain 
subjects, such as Life Orientation, provide even more focus on values education. However, 
the main finding reported in this chapter was a distinct lack of awareness on the part of 
policymakers of how the neoliberal elements of modern South African education might cause 
tension for ethical values and values education. There is some realisation on the part of 
policymakers that the implementation of values education is not faring well, which led to further 
policy documents, which focus exclusively on values (DoE, 2000; 2001; 2011a).  
However, the Values, education and democracy: Report of the Working Group on Values in 
Education (DoE, 2000) and the Manifesto on values, education, and democracy (DoE, 2001) 
serve only to identify specific values that such policy documents deem worthy of being taught 
in South African schools, without any clear guidelines for implementation. Building a culture of 
responsibility and humanity in our schools: A guide for teachers (‘The guide’) (DoE, 2011a: 
37) includes “[p]hase by phase ideas for learning and teaching about responsibilities at 
school”, but the recommendations remain unstructured and do not represent any solid, clearly 
outlined and centralised action plan for implementation. Thus, it is evident that there is a 
significant gap in the policy. 
Chapter 3, in response to sub-question 2 (“How might neoliberalism undermine ethical 
values?”), sought to establish my suspicions that neoliberalism is largely to blame for the 




important findings related to the effect of neoliberalism on education. Neoliberalism leads to a 
corporatisation of educational institutions, seeing a strong increase in the competitive 
atmosphere that permeates such settings (Alexander, 2001; Clark, 1998; Clarke, 2005; Davies 
& Bansel, 2007; Giroux & Giroux, 2004; Hill, 2003; Horowitz, 2004; Newson, 2004; Slaughter, 
1998; Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004; Tierney, 1998). Furthermore, learners identify as 
customers of a product (Apple, 2004; Aronowitz, 2000; Astin, 1998; Chaffee, 1998; Giroux & 
Giroux, 2004; Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004; Swagler, 1978; Wellen, 2005). All of this leads to 
a very instrumental approach to education, making it difficult for educational dimensions, such 
as values education, to flourish.  
Furthermore, various findings pointed to how hyper-individualist identities are formed by 
neoliberalism (Saunders, 2010), which leads to relationships and lifestyles being predicated 
on economic rational choice and cost–benefit analysis (Baez, 2007; Lemke, 2001). This 
creates attitudes where ethical values and social justice are viewed as distractions and 
subsequently avoided (Davies & Bansel, 2007; Saunders, 2010). The hyper-rational 
(economic) outlook on life also leads to real-life moral issues being abstracted and interpreted 
in over-simplified, impersonal ways (Bordieu, 2002). However, what I would consider the most 
important findings reported in this chapter came from those writing about neoliberalism and 
relationality. These authors (Barber, 2008; Bauman, 1994; Biesta, 2007; Edwards, 2000; 
Gunzenhauser, 2008; Marginson, 2006; Rhodes, 2013; Sassatelli, 2007) drive home the 
findings that neoliberalism and the identities formed through it, foster asocial citizens who 
avoid responsibilities related to ethical modes of being and social justice, and become rather 
unbalanced and incapable when it comes to dealing with the ‘other’. The identities formed are 
of a highly exclusionary nature (Bauman, 2007; Edwards, 2000).  
It was particularly valuable to find a discussion of neoliberalism, which focuses on relationality, 
and which shows how such relational issues have an effect on questions of ethics (see Barber, 
2008; Bauman, 1999; 2007; Edwards, 2000; Rhodes, 2013), because there was a growing 
realisation that values education is dependent on healthy relationality.  
Chapter 4, as a pre-analysis of contemplative education, presented responses to sub-
questions 3 and 4 (“What are the inherent values of contemplative education?” and “How can 
the values cultivated by contemplative education counteract a neoliberal mentality?”). A 
theoretical framework for healthy relationality through a study of care ethics was constructed 
and was reported in 4.3. I wanted to construct a solid conceptual framework for a progressive 
relationality within ethics to aid values education against detrimental neoliberal influences. The 
authors I studied (Gilligan, 1977; Noddings, 2002a; 2002b; 2005; 2013; Slote, 2001; 2007; 
2016) provided a considerable body of work, representing a thorough philosophical argument 




to move from an outdated, justice- and principle-based mode of ethics, focused on 
abstractions of nuanced realities, towards involved modes of ethics that demonstrate a more 
personal element. Thus, care ethics encompasses moving away from generalised 
abstractions towards particular, contextualised realities (see Gilligan, 1977; Noddings, 2002a; 
2002b; 2005; 2013; Slote, 2001; 2007; 2016), away from independent mentalities and outlooks 
towards interdependent mentalities and outlooks (see Gilligan, 1977; Noddings, 2002a; 
2002b; 2005; 2013; Slote, 2001; 2007; 2016), and away from rational observation towards 
intuitive empathy (see Noddings, 2013; Slote, 2016). The work of these authors on abstract 
principles and the collateral damage they justify expose neoliberalism and the economic aims 
that go with it as a principle to which many are sacrificed – a justification for many modern 
injustices. The findings these care ethicists provide represent a perfect countermeasure to the 
unbalanced relationality as discussed in Chapter 3 on neoliberalism.  
Finally, Chapter 4 included conclusions about responsibility as a value from the viewpoint of 
relationality, which were based on the work of Derrida (Derrida, 1995; Patočka, 1974). This 
furthered the argument that values can be understood in a richer sense when viewed in terms 
of relationality, especially concerning the study of the interaction of neoliberalism with ethics.  
Chapter 5 responded to sub-questions 3, 4 and 5 (“What are the inherent values of 
contemplative education?”, “How can the values cultivated by contemplative education 
counteract a neoliberal mentality?” and “What might contemplative education contribute to the 
values education goals of the Curriculum and Assessment Policy Statement and the policies 
that informed it?”). The chapter acted as a study of contemplative education and held many 
valuable findings. The chapter also shows how contemplative education includes everything 
for which care ethics argues, while adding new dimensions to ethical modes of being. It was 
found that contemplative education provides new epistemological paradigms, arguing for an 
embodied and lived type of knowledge (Bai, 2006; Komjathy, 2017; Pulkki et al., 2015) – a 
shift which allows learners to feel more personally involved with what they study, and, 
ultimately, more personally involved with the world that surrounds them. This increases 
feelings of empathy, compassion and responsibility.  
Furthermore, contemplative education combats divisive identities, and creates a learner who 
is more flexible in his or her acceptance of ‘the other’ and unlikely to engage in objectification 
of such ‘others’ (Zajonc, 2006). Another essential finding points to the fact that contemplative 
education familiarises a practitioner or learner with his or her own emotional motivations 
(Winans, 2012) – important when considering that unidentified and misunderstood emotional 
patterns can make one aversive to ethical engagements. Furthermore, Walsh (1989: 284) 
introduces the concept “state specificity”, which explains how certain ethical modes of being 




a long way in establishing why contemplative education, with its focus on such processes, can 
play a unique part in progressive values education. Thereafter, some of the most important 
findings from the study established a sense of interconnectedness that is generated through 
contemplative practice and contemplative education (Barbezat & Bush, 2013; Pulkki et al., 
2015) – a sense of interconnectedness, which pushes back against isolated ways of being, 
relational prejudices and cognitive biases, increases moral awareness, and leads to empathy, 
compassion and responsibility (Barbezat & Bush, 2013; Roeser & Peck, 2009). Some of the 
authors (Barbezat & Bush, 2013: 128) posited that every distinct practice within contemplative 
education and all forms of teaching occur “by definition, within a relational context in which 
personal growth and ethics are emphasized”. In other words, according to some, the entirety 
of contemplative education is an exercise in values education. Thus, Chapter 5 confirmed the 
well-developed ability of contemplative education to uphold values of empathy, compassion 
and responsibility, and of to creating a healthy and vibrant relationality that offers quite the 
answer to the problems that neoliberalism causes for values education.  
Finally, it should also be noted that this chapter showed how contemplative education, through 
the addition of a lived philosophy, a stimulating and progressive mood towards patterns and 
habits of thought and ethical conduct, experiential and participatory pedagogy and self-
reflective an introspective practice, is a clear improvement upon care ethics as a theoretical 
and conceptual framework for values education. Care ethics contains no such fleshed-out 
practices as part of the school, and this is why I feel it mainly remains a theoretical project. On 
the other hand, contemplative education, as one begin to realise throughout this chapter, 
places considerable emphasis on the experiential, the lived, the meditative and on all that lies 
beyond the cognitive and the theoretical. This represents a clear improvement, especially if 
one keeps in mind all that has been argued for concerning that which is lived, practical, 
personal and context-specific over and above that which is abstract, principle-based, 
impersonal and universal.  
 
6.3 Returning to the problem statement and purpose statement  
The problem statement and purpose statement from the first chapter both mention the 
crippling effect that neoliberalism could have on values education. Both statements searched 
for an alternative form of education that could counteract neoliberal tendencies and 
reinvigorate values education. The purpose statement identifies contemplative education as 
the potential solution. Within the purpose statement are the following aims: 




• Find a moral framework to counteract neoliberalism within the empathetic and 
relational realm of care ethics 
• See if contemplative education can represent a lived and realized incarnation of such 
a relational moral framework  
 
Chapters 2 and 3 addressed the first of these aims with a thorough analysis of the policy 
surrounding and including CAPS as well as an investigation of neoliberalism and the stinted 
relationality it produces. A healthier relationality was found in chapter 4 in the form of care 
ethics (the second aim above), and this framework paved the way for an understanding of and 
appreciation for contemplative education. The compassion, interconnectedness, empathy and 
sense of responsibility that contemplative education cultivates was shown to be the ultimate 
culmination of a progressive and positive relationality. The practices inherent in contemplative 
education bring about a relational position that is open, accepting and communal where the 
neoliberal relationality is closed, divisive, isolated and hyper-individual. This is why it is such 
a fitting answer to the challenges of a neoliberal educational system.  
 
Without understanding this concept of relationality, it would be difficult to see the importance 
of values such as compassion, empathy and responsibility in counteracting neoliberal issues. 
However, throughout the various chapters, I have given a thorough account of exactly why 
relationality is such a key concept in understanding the intricacies of neoliberalism’s 
undermining of values education and why contemplative education, through compassion, 
empathy and responsibility, challenges and replaces the stinted relationality of neoliberalism. 
That is why contemplative education is the proper response to the issues identified within 
CAPS.  
 
6.4 Scholarly contributions of the thesis 
This section details the different scholarly (and other) contributions of this study.  
 
6.4.1 Contributions to policy 
This work contributes to South African policy in the following ways: 
Firstly, this study exposed a naivety that exists within the policies, in thinking that values 
education can flourish without a proper understanding of how some of the other policy aims 




ideology, might affect values education by supressing and overshadowing it. This is, in other 
words, a naivety in the form of an unawareness of the neoliberal ideological undertones of the 
economic aims of post-apartheid education policy and its effects on values education.  
Secondly, this research provided a detailed analysis of exactly how neoliberalism might 
undermine values education and ethical values, and, by doing so, the research went further 
in identifying and grasping the problem areas. The research situates the issues within a 
framework of relationality. Although there have been studies showing the effects of 
neoliberalism on education (Alexander, 2001; Apple, 2004; Aronowitz, 2000; Astin, 1998; 
Ayers, 2005; Baez, 2007; Chaffee, 1998; Clark, 1998; Currie, 1998; Davies & Bansel, 2007; 
Eckel, 2000; Giroux, 2005; Giroux & Giroux, 2004; Gumport, 1993; Hill, 2003; Hill & Kumar, 
2009; Horowitz, 2004; Marginson, 2004; McLaren, 2005; Olssen & Peters, 2005; Rhoades, 
2006; Saunders, 2010; Slaughter, 1998; Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004; Swagler, 1978; Tierney, 
1998; Torres & Schugurensky, 2002; Wellen, 2005; Winston, 1999), such studies have not 
framed the issues in relational terms and, thus, missed the opportunity for a more nuanced 
assessment.  
A relational framework exposes the psychological, cultural and social dimensions of the 
problems neoliberalism pose for ethics and values education. This enables policy to be better 
equipped for dealing with the problem simply because policymakers can be more certain of 
where the difficulties for values education arise. The current study was certainly unique in this 
regard, for there has not yet been a study on the effect neoliberalism has on values education. 
There might have been such a study, but I was not able to find it, and I am even more certain 
that, at the time of this study, no such study had been undertaken in the South African 
education policy context specifically.  
Thirdly, not only has the current research provided a detailed assessment of the problem, but 
it has, through the focus on the golden thread of relationality, and the study of care ethics and 
contemplative education, given the most optimal response to and improvement upon the 
policies discussed in Chapter 2 by making specific recommendations in terms of which 
theoretical and conceptual frameworks best address and counteract the problems. In other 
words, to echo Jansen (1998: 327), the policies in question often resort to “bland and 
decontextualised global statements” about social justice, values education and ethical 
behaviour, whereas I have aimed to provide a very clear roadmap for potential movement 
forward. Thus, the current study can be seen as a commentary on the policymaking process 
and a strong questioning of the assumptions within that process. The addition of policy 
documents that focus directly on values (DoE, 2000; 2001; 2011a) shows that there is some 
awareness of how values education is struggling, but the documents do not show enough 




to face. The Values, education and democracy: Report of the Working Group on Values in 
Education (DoE, 2000) and the Manifesto on values, education, and democracy (DoE, 2001) 
deal only with identifying the desired values to be taught and upheld in educational settings, 
without any consideration for ways of implementation and specific action-plans. Building a 
culture of responsibility and humanity in our schools: A guide for teachers (DoE, 2011a: 37), 
breaks away from this tendency and includes a section called “Phase by phase ideas for 
learning and teaching about responsibilities at school”.  
The classroom exercises and ideas that are presented in this section do not show the proper 
level of awareness of practical classroom realities, where the neoliberal mentality, with its 
instrumental approach to education and the competitive atmosphere generated, leave very 
little room for values education. That is why it was essential to construct, with reference to the 
complementary and flexible nature of contemplative education, an action plan that can 
address the negative outcome of neoliberalism, and provide a waypoint towards values 
education, while not threatening the economic aims of the policies. Furthermore, the 
contributions in terms of the field of contemplative education indicate that, in order to make 
true progress with values education, there needs to be an understanding of the importance of 
experiential learning, and how it stands practically uncontested as a remedy to some of the 
ways in which neoliberalism negatively affects values education. I suggest that future policies 
become more aware of this need. 
 
6.4.2 Contributions to the academic landscape 
This study represented an intersection of ideas and theories. Many different concepts and 
theories needed to be analysed and assessed, such as neoliberalism, values, care ethics and 
contemplative education. I genuinely attest to making use of such a wide array of fields and 
theories by which the overall analysis of the study was strengthened – not only that, but the 
different theories and criticism found within the thesis have received unique contributions 
through being studied next to one another.  
The first contribution is to the area of criticism against neoliberalism. Once again, the unique 
contributions of this study relate greatly to the framework of relationality. In drawing from the 
work of those who write about relationality and consumer identities (Barber, 2008; Bauman, 
1994; Biesta, 2007; Edwards, 2000; Gunzenhauser, 2008; Marginson, 2006; Rhodes, 2013; 
Sassatelli, 2007), I am endorsing this type of criticism on neoliberalism, and I urge future 
researchers who criticise neoliberalism (at least those who want to look at the ethical 




studies and to consider the importance of identity formation and relationality in discussions 
neoliberalism and ethics.  
The study also contributes to the field of contemplative education, by identifying the key role 
this field could play in counteracting the effects of neoliberalism on values education. The 
study adds to the arguments for the practical value and contemporary relevance of the field. 
Major contributions to contemplative education are made by showing the similarities between 
care ethics and contemplative education (see 4.3.1, 4.3.5 and 5.3.2), before arguing for the 
greater usefulness of contemplative education by way of the inclusion of experiential learning 
and practices (over and above mere theory) (see 5.3.1). 
Contributions are also made to education policy studies theory (see 2.2.4, 2.2.5, 2.3.2), by 
showing that policies that relate to the teaching of values need even more attention to 
strategising for implementation, if such policy is to be effective. 
The study of contemplative education (Chapter 5) contributes to the wider academic milieu in 
urging for a reconsideration of the importance of experiential learning and self-reflective 
practice. In other words, it is not just an increase in experiential learning and self-reflective 
practice for the specific purpose of dealing with the tension between neoliberalism and values 
education, but also for the betterment of any educational areas that want to strive for a non-
instrumental approach to education, no matter whether such areas relate to ethics or not.  
Finally, the study makes a contribution to the field of interdisciplinary research, since it drew 
from literature pertaining to education, philosophy, sociology and psychology. There is a 
growing sense that the future of many academic research areas is interdisciplinary (Bridle, 
Vrieling, Cardillo, Araya & Hinojosa, 2013; Jones, 2010; Lyall & Meagher, 2012), and I would 
argue that the current study showed the benefits of an interdisciplinary approach. 
 
6.4.3 Contributions to the broader South African society 
In conclusion, this study can contribute to South African society, and the more global society, 
by reminding citizens that the ways in which they form identities, and the ways in which such 
identities affect how they relate to one another, ultimately affect their ability to treat each other, 
and the environment, in ways that are consistent with social justice, human rights and the 
ethical values of empathy, compassion and responsibility. Furthermore, Chapter 5 shows that 
serious thought must be given to the impact and influence of lifestyle and habits if we are to 
strive for such ambitious goals relating to ethics and social justice. There is certainly a lot more 
to achieving and maintain a successful democracy than simply investments towards GDP and, 




of the study serves as a reminder to teachers and learners alike that the importance of values 
education cannot be neglected and that we must turn to progressive ways of protecting and 
advancing values education, such as demonstrated by contemplative education, if we are to 
become better citizens and more conscientious teachers through the process of education.  
 
6.5 Limitations of the study 
As discussed in Chapter 1, in the section on methodology (1.5.1), this study employed an 
exploratory research design, as there was limited literature available in terms of the specific 
topics I wanted to address. Yes, much has been written on neoliberalism, and a decent amount 
has been written on contemplative education, but when looking at the notion of contemplative 
education as a remedy to the effects of neoliberalism on values education, the study becomes 
rather unique. This means that the study was conducted exclusively by means of literature 
reviews and conceptual research, with the use of some forms of extrapolation in certain 
circumstances. The study also makes various new suggestions, and dealt with the exploration 
of new theories and ideas rather than with attempts at reconfiguring or investigating older 
ones. The main research question was an example of the notion of contemplative education 
entering into South African schools or even South African education policy. Of course, 
contemplative education exists in different forms, in private educational institutions, but this 
study was interested in the broader South African context. This exploratory focus means, as 
predicted during the section on methodology (1.5.1) and also by Christoph (2010: 372–374), 
that the study could feel unstructured.  
Furthermore, the study did not include any empirical research, potentially adding to a reader’s 
feelings that the findings are too open-ended. Nevertheless, I do not have any regrets about 
the chosen methodology, as it was always my intention to make arguments for the presence 
of contemplative education within the South African educational context from a very 
philosophical and conceptual standpoint. I feel that, since it is such a new area of investigation, 
the research had to begin with a philosophical foundation. It was beyond the scope of this 
study to begin such an exploration and above all to attempt to verify the hypotheses with 
empirical findings. 
 
6.6 Recommendations  
I now make further recommendations in terms of how the research area can be expanded and 






6.6.1 Pertaining to further research 
Since the study was highly exploratory, there can be many possible recommendations for 
further research. However, I share what I consider the most relevant areas for further research. 
The first area that should receive further attention is the study of values education as it is 
expressed through the post-apartheid South African education policy (see Du Preez & Roux, 
2010; Roux & Du Preez, 2006). There needs to be a further investigation of how the policy 
might become more strategic, specifically when it comes to implementing values education. 
Perhaps an empirical study can be conducted to ascertain to what extent teachers are familiar 
with Building a culture of responsibility and humanity in our schools: A guide for teachers (DoE, 
2011a) and if any of them have actively attempted to implement the recommendations of the 
document.  
There is a great need for further research on the effect of neoliberalism on values education. 
My research necessitated that I drew from various different sources of literature to construct 
my own analysis of the effect of neoliberalism on ethical values. The most significant and 
contributory sources from which I drew came from authors who were not writing within the 
context of education. Taking their findings and combining it with studies on the effect of 
neoliberalism on educational institutions, I arrived at my conclusions of how neoliberalism 
affects values education. However, since the ideology of neoliberalism is so widespread and 
consists of many different sub-topics, much further research is needed in order to ascertain 
many potentially unidentified ways in which neoliberalism interacts with values education.  
In terms of contemplative education, I would claim that one of the most important areas for 
further research is to demonstrate how contemplative practices in the classroom are 
complementary towards other study activities and subjects, and do not detract from the more 
traditional skills-oriented teaching and curriculums. This is because, although it is eventually 
certainly necessary to move away from the corporatisation and instrumentalisation of 
education, it will be a mammoth task, and for the time being, one should make peace with the 
fact that neoliberal biases need to be appeased. Although I have shown how authors in the 
field of contemplative education have made claims towards such a flexibility and 
complementary nature of contemplative education, I do not believe these authors realise to 
what extent contemplative education and values education must be proved in order not to 
stand to compete with the classic ‘maths’ and ‘science’ that help a country to be economically 
well oiled. This unobtrusive, complementary element must be practically demonstrated with 




At some point, it will be necessary to conduct actual classroom-based experimentation and 
research on the benefits of contemplative education in public schools in South Africa. In this 
regard, I would recommend that such studies include research on Waldorf Schools in South 
Africa – a group that is already implementing teaching methods that are certainly much closer 
than that of other schools to something akin to contemplative education (Nicol & Taplin, 2012; 
Petrash, 2002). 
In Chapter 5, when discussing potential areas of caution regarding contemplative education, 
I mentioned the prospect of training aspiring contemplative teachers. This training should 
ensure that teachers are equipped to deal with the potential psychological and emotional 
effects of contemplative education. Some of the authors within the field agree that training 
should be formalised (Roeser & Peck, 2009: 132), while others feel that over-formalisation will 
not do the field well (Komjathy, 2017: 174). Although contemplative education seems to be as 
old as education itself, it is certainly not enjoying a strong presence in today’s world, and 
therefore, no matter how the authors in the field feel, there will need to be formalised training 
and cautionary measures in place before contemplative education can hope to be adopted in 
any serious way. Substantial research on how to proceed in this area is needed. 
 
6.6.2 Pertaining to the South African educational context 
Here, I have only one recommendation, and that is that teachers and parents should think 
very seriously about the presence of values education in today’s South African schools – or 
the lack thereof. I see teachers and parents as the main actors through whom policy, and, 
ultimately, curriculums can be influenced. This study made a strong case for the re-evaluation 
of our assumptions regarding values education and the position of values education within a 
neoliberal world. This reassessment could come in the form of a renewed appreciation for the 
subject Life Orientation. Currently, it is a subject that provides an exclusive avenue and space 
for values education and a specific focus on the development of good citizens.  
According to the exclusive CAPS policy document for the subject (DoE, 2011c: 8), “it is a 
unique subject in that it applies a holistic approach to the personal, social, intellectual, 
emotional, spiritual, motor and physical growth and development of learners”, which 
“encourages the development of a balanced and confident learner who can contribute to a just 
and democratic society, a productive economy and an improved quality of life for all”. 
Furthermore, “the subject contains the following six topics in Grades 10 to 12” (DoE, 2011c: 
8): 
• Development of the self in society 




• Democracy and human rights 
• Careers and career choices 
• Study skills 
• Physical education 
Therefore, although there is still a trace of the focus on economic incentives, there is large 
scope within the subject, Life Orientation, for the development of ethical values and for values 
education.  
Furthermore, “an emphasis on experiential and participatory methodologies” is what is most 
needed, yet absent, from the Life Orientation curriculum (Rooth, 2005: iv) indicating that 
contemplative education and Life Orientation could enjoy a very complementary and symbiotic 
relationship, for contemplative education is one of the most experiential and participatory 
forms of education that exists today, and can help to fill this gap existing within Life Orientation.  
However, with all of that being said, it seems that, at the time of writing, Life Orientation will 
be removed from the curriculum for Grades 10 to 12 in the very near future, and be replaced 
by compulsory History (Bashiera, 2018). It is not clear whether this trend will deepen, and 
whether Life Orientation will be scaled back further, and for other grades, but it certainly opens 
up an important conversation. If one considers that Life Orientation is unquestionably the best 
platform for values education and experiential learning, then this development should prompt 
teachers and parents to consider the future of values education in the South African context.  
I am certain that History, just like Life Orientation, is expected to address the need for values 
education, and can provide a theoretical version of values education, but I urge teachers and 
parents (and policymakers) to consider whether History can facilitate the experiential elements 
and the need for practice and deep self-reflection, over and above mere theoretical learning, 
as this study has argued for. Teachers, parents and policymakers need to reconsider where 
the various ethical aims of current education policy can find suitable expression in the 
classroom. I have presented my arguments for why contemplative education, potentially within 
the subject of Life Orientation, provides the greatest opportunity for such aims, and I hope that 
it will resonate with those who are steering South African education.  
 
6.7 Summary 
The study began with a thorough investigation of post-apartheid South African education 
policy, culminating in the CAPS, and highlighted the fact that both strongly economic goals 
and goals pertaining to values education are present within policy, without any provisions 




problem statement indicated (see 1.3), there is a great potential, given the strong presence of 
neoliberalism in education, that the economic aims will overshadow the ethical aims. My 
proposed solution was to introduce new pedagogies and new methods of education, which 
can rejuvenate values education – as indicated by the main research question: Can 
contemplative education respond to the tension between neoliberalism and values education 
in the Curriculum and Assessment Policy Statement (CAPS)? 
My first order of business was to establish the potential harmful effects of neoliberalism on 
values and values education, and through studies done on – specifically – how neoliberalism 
affects our identity formation and how we relate to the ‘other’, I began constructing a 
conceptual framework for addressing the issues. This relational approach to ethics was 
thereafter philosophically grounded in a study of care ethics, before finishing with an analysis 
of contemplative education. Contemplative education, with its immense focus on the 
development of a sense of interconnectedness within the teacher or learner, leads to a very 
thorough engagement with values and ethics, specifically values such as empathy, 
compassion and responsibility. Contemplative education represents the resurgence within 
education of experiential and participatory modes of learning, which include many self-
reflective and introspective elements. It is argued that such experiential and participatory 
modes of education can solidify the importance of values education within the hearts and 
minds of both teachers and learners in a manner that no other methods can. Furthermore, the 
flexible nature of contemplative education makes it even more suitable for a context like South 
Africa, where multiculturalism might complicate discussions on and the teaching of values. 
Therefore, I make recommendations for further research into the advantages of contemplative 
education for the South African educational context, especially regarding values education. 
We need to afford this progressive area of education at least a trial period. The poor track 
record for the implementation of values education, in the face of the gigantic and far-reaching 
ideology that is neoliberalism, speaks for itself (Rooth, 2005) and demands that newer, 
reformist approaches start replacing more traditional and stereotypical ones. I sincerely hope 
that this study has acted as a contributing voice to this argument and I am hopeful for the large 
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